METHOD AND METAPHOR IN ARISTOTLE’S SCIENCE OF NATURE
(Thesis format: Integrated Article)

by

Sean Michael Pead Coughlin

Graduate Program in Philosophy

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

© Sean M. P. Coughlin 2013

Abstract
This dissertation is a collection of essays exploring the role of metaphor in Aristotle’s
scientific method. Aristotle often appeals to metaphors in his scientific practice; but in the
Posterior Analytics, he suggests that their use is inimical to science. Why, then, does he use
them in natural science? And what does his use of metaphor in science reveal about the
nature of his scientific investigations? I approach these questions by investigating the
epistemic status of metaphor in Aristotelian science. In the first essay, I defend an
interpretation of metaphor as a type of heuristic reasoning: I claim that Aristotle uses
metaphor to express conditions an explanation in natural science must meet if it is to
explain regular, ordered change. These conditions specify the kinds of causes—particularly
unmoved efficient causes—which the inquirer into nature is seeking. In the second essay, I
look to Aristotle’s use of certain endoxa or common beliefs as explanatory principles in
science, and show that his use of these principles is similar to his use of metaphor. In the
final essay, I present a historical study of the analogy of art and nature, and I suggest that by
looking to how the Greeks understood the role of inquiry in the arts, we can shed some light
on Aristotle’s views concerning the method of inquiry he thinks the natural scientist should
adopt.
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1. Introduction
“Perhaps universal history is the history of a few metaphors.”
Borges (1964), Other Inquisitions, 6.

A common way we talk about the world, in our everyday language and in science, is
through metaphor, but the place of metaphor in science has often been subject to
suspicion. In rhetoric or poetry, one might question the appropriateness of a particular
metaphor when judging the success of the poem or speech. In science, however, it is the
appropriateness of metaphor as such that has often been questioned. In its beginnings in
the 17th Century, modern science developed with the self-conscious abandonment of
figurative forms of thought, and metaphor was condemned as too obscure to have any
appropriate use. Hobbes, for instance, says using metaphor in science is akin to
“wandering amongst innumerable absurdities” that fail to advance our knowledge
(Leviathan, part I, chapter 5), and calls metaphor an ignis fatuus—a fool’s fire. 1 Since the
mid-twentieth century, attitudes have changed. On the one hand, the use of metaphor
has been defended as an important means to scientific discovery and education. 2 On the
other hand, empirical studies have begun to look at how the use of different metaphors

1

Literally, “foolish fire”, they are phosphorescent lights, thought to be the work of malevolent spirits, which
one might encounter and mistakenly follow while walking through an English bog at night. They are
“foolish” because those who followed them were fooled into being led astray. Metaphorically, they came to
mean any delusive guiding principle.
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Black (1962), Models and Metaphors; Ricoeur (2003), The Rule of Metaphor; Lakoff and Johnson (2008),
Metaphors We Live By; Chew and Laubichler (2003), “Natural Enemies—Metaphor or Misconception? “,
Science 301(5629), 52-53.
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in scientific writing influences how we understand and react to the same data. 3 Like a
false light, metaphors can lead us to see and react to things that may not be there. And
while most people would no longer adopt Hobbes’ proscription against metaphor in
science, questions remain about the epistemic status of metaphor and about when their
use in science is appropriate.
Similar questions to these were asked during the development of ancient science. For
many of the early Greek philosophers, what we might call a “scientific” or
“philosophical” understanding of the world was expressed through myth and metaphor.
In the late fifth century, however, the dominant mode of expression changed from the
mythoi of the poets and Presocratics, to the rational accounts or logoi of the Sophists,
orators and philosophers. Many of these latter writers believed metaphors were
inappropriate in reasoned speech and sought to avoid them altogether. As Isocrates tells
us, their aim was the precise use of conventional language to describe “the facts
themselves [αὐτὰς τὰς πράξεις]” (Isocrates, Evagoras 9.10), indicating that a distinction
was beginning to be made between “poetical” and “rational” forms of discourse.
Metaphor came to be identified as a particular kind of poetical discourse, while rational
accounts were thought to express the way things really are. Despite the fact that his
writings often make use of symbolic language, Plato is one of philosophy’s first defenders
of this distinction. He is routinely critical of those who claimed to demonstrate truth

3

Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011), “Metaphors We Think With: The Role of Metaphor in Reasoning”,
PLoS ONE 6(2).

3

through metaphor or who thought metaphor could constitute proper knowledge (Meno
99d; Protagoras 320c-328d; Republic II 376a-383a). 4
Aristotle, by contrast, sometimes seems more sympathetic than either Isocrates or Plato
to metaphor’s positive role in philosophy and science. In the Rhetoric, he endorses
metaphor as a useful rhetorical and pedagogical tool because it allows a speaker to
communicate new and complex ideas easily (Rhetoric III 10, 1410b6 ff.). Yet, like both
of his predecessors, he often suggests that metaphors are inappropriate in philosophy,
particularly in definitions and demonstration. In the Posterior Analytics, he goes so far as
to suggest they have no place in science at all: “if one should not argue in metaphors, it is
clear that [one must neither] define using metaphors nor [define] what is said
metaphorically: for necessarily one will then be arguing in metaphors” (Posterior
Analytics II 13, 97b37-39). For Aristotle, metaphors lack the clarity required for
philosophical discourse: “everything said metaphorically is unclear [ἀσαφὲς]” (Topics VI
2, 139b34-5), and any lack of clarity will introduce difficulties when attempting to
produce sound arguments. As G.E.R. Lloyd has pointed out, “any recourse to metaphora
[sc.] introduces an unclarity that is utterly inimical to the enterprise of strict
demonstration—the drawing of true, incontrovertible, conclusions, by valid inference,
from self-evident, indemonstrable primary premises” (Lloyd 1996, 209).
Given that Aristotle is critical of metaphor in science, it is, therefore, surprising how
often he uses different metaphors in his scientific practice. In nearly all his scientific

4

There are difficulties, which I will not address, squaring Plato’s statements at Meno 97e-98a2—that an
aitias logismos is a necessary condition for knowledge—and his own practice of using figurative language like
metaphor and allegory to express his own philosophical views.
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works—both those works in which he goes about investigating natural phenomena,
such as the Meteorology and the zoology, and in his more theoretical works like the
Physics, On Generation and Corruption and De Caelo—he makes constant appeal to
metaphor. He uses metaphor at a general level, for instance, when he compares nature to
a homeowner (On the Generation of Animals II 6, 744b11 ff.), or a manual worker (On
Parts of Animals I 5, 645a9 ff.), or an art (Physics II 2, 194a21 ff.). He also uses it at the
level of specific phenomena, when, for example, he uses cooking as a metaphor for
digestion (Meteorology IV 3, 381a30 ff.). The frequent use of such expressions might not
seem problematic to a contemporary scientist, but given Aristotle’s own strict
requirements for scientific knowledge, their use suggests an explicit conflict between his
attitude towards scientific theory and his actual practice.
Scholars who have noted this tension usually attempt to resolve it in one of two ways.
Given that the use of metaphor conflicts with Aristotle’s programmatic statements
about science in the Analytics, those who see Aristotle’s science as an attempt to follow
the rigour of this programme conclude that these are only apparent metaphors. Instead,
they claim he intends these expressions to be taken literally. 5 At the other extreme, those
who think Aristotle is a pluralist when it comes to modes of demonstration, although
they are willing to admit that he intends these expressions metaphorically, nevertheless
conclude that metaphor has no place in a scientific theory as Aristotle presents it. 6

5

Charles Kahn, for instance, claims that Aristotle uses certain expressions like “imitation”, “participation”,
and “desiring”, literally, even though they seem like metaphors when applied to non-human natural things.
Kahn (1985), “The Place of the Prime Mover in Aristotle’s Teleology” in Balme and Gotthelf, Eds., Aristotle
on Nature and Living Things, 200.
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Lloyd (1996), Aristotelian Explorations suggests that Aristotle’s scientific practice is at variance with his
restrictions on metaphor in the Posterior Analytics and Topics.

5

What both conclusions share is a belief that, on his considered opinion, Aristotle thinks
metaphors are at best an ignis fatuus. The purpose of this dissertation is to show that this
belief is false. While Aristotle thinks they cannot constitute scientific understanding,
where this would imply knowledge of the causes of some phenomenon, metaphors are
important to Aristotle’s method of scientific inquiry. Aristotle thinks metaphors are
useful precisely in those contexts where we do not have scientific understanding, and
they are useful because they express something true about the phenomenon we are
investigating which can serve as a starting point for inquiry into its causes. Far from
leading us astray, his use of metaphor suggests he thought they were an important guide
to developing our understanding of the natural world.
The problem for Aristotle’s science, therefore, is not to defend metaphor as a way of
attaining scientific—specifically, demonstrative—understanding, but to provide reasons
why metaphor can be useful for inquiry and why the relations metaphors express are not
merely verbal, but grounded in the world. To put it another way, the problem is to show
how to justify the use of such comparisons when we do not already have knowledge of
the phenomena we are relating. Little has been written about Aristotle’s use of
metaphor in science, and what has been written is often deflationary. While I claim
throughout this dissertation that he thinks metaphor can guide inquiry, André Laks
suggests in his paper, “Substitution et Connaissance,” that metaphor for Aristotle
presupposes an acquaintance with the relations it expresses, and that results of inquiry
will therefore determine our use of metaphor and not the other way around. 7 On this
view, metaphor (as Aristotle understands it) is not a means of acquiring new knowledge,

7

Laks (1990), “Substitution Et Connaissance: Une Interprétation Unitaire (Ou Presque) De La Théorie
Aristotélicienne De La Métaphore” in Furley and Nehamas, Eds., Arisotle’s Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays.
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but merely a substitution of terms: a metaphor does nothing more than substitute (one
expression for) something we already know with (an expression for) something else we
already know. Therefore, metaphors cannot provide us with new knowledge or insight.
Furthermore, Aristotle never provides an account of how metaphor could guide
scientific inquiry. This has led G.E.R. Lloyd to speculate that Aristotle has little in the
way of philosophical justification for his use of metaphor, instead “making effective use
of metaphor to bring out the effectiveness of metaphor itself.” 8 On my reading of
Aristotle’s natural philosophy, one strategy in scientific inquiry is to discover and
employ appropriate metaphors. The difficulty, especially because he says so little about
their relationship to inquiry, is figuring out why he thinks these metaphors work.
The first essay in this dissertation, “Metaphor in Aristotle’s Science,” looks at two
questions concerning the role of metaphor in Aristotle’s science: is the use of metaphor
justified in Aristotle’s science? And does he use them in his investigations into natural
phenomena? I answer the first question by defending the view I sketched above, namely,
that Aristotle thinks of metaphor as a way to characterize natural phenomena so that
the natural scientist can begin to inquire into their causes. Metaphor has, in other
words, a heuristic function. Aristotle defines “metaphor” in the Poetics as “the
application of a name [ὄνομα] that belongs to something else [ἀλλοτρίου], either from
genus to species, species to genus, species to species or by analogy” (Poetics 21 1457b910). While Aristotle thinks metaphor is always unclear, if an expression is a metaphor,
then he thinks one of these four relations will hold between what is referred to by the
“name that belongs to something else” and what is referred to by the conventional name.

8

Lloyd (1996), Aristotelian Explorations, 222.
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For example, if cooking is used as a metaphor for digestion, then since it is a metaphor,
both cooking and digestion will either be species of the same generic process, or be
related as species to genus, genus to species, or by analogy. Since some such relation
holds in an Aristotelian metaphor, they consequently express some truth, however
unclear, about what they refer to. It is the causal similarity they express which makes
metaphors useful as heuristics. And since they are heuristic, not explanatory, Aristotle is
not contradicting his own statements against the use of metaphor in definition or
demonstration.
By “heuristic,” I mean a set of reliable but fallible methods or rules for discovering the
causes that will ultimately explain the phenomenon being investigated. 9 The method I
have in mind is that of inquiring into phenomena which we do not understand by
characterizing them as phenomena which we do understand. For example, by
characterizing digestion as cooking, Aristotle can use the familiar efficient and material
causal processes involved in cooking as a means of investigating the internal and largely
hidden process of digestion. Similarly, using a different metaphor, he can appeal to the
familiar relation of producing artistic imitations as a means for inquiring into the
efficient causal relation between the celestial and sublunary seasonal cycles. At a
preliminary stage of inquiry, metaphors such as these characterize phenomena we do not
understand as phenomena we do (digestion as cooking, sublunary cycles as imitations)
so that, in inquiry, we know what kinds of causes to look for. Yet, even if Aristotle could
think the use of metaphor is justified in natural science, it remains an open question
whether he actually uses them in this way.

9

The way I characterize “heuristic” is informed by Chow (2011), Heuristics, Concepts, and Cognitive
Architecture: Towards Understanding How the Mind Works, Philosophy, PhD Dissertation, Chapter 2.3.
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This leads to the second question: how does Aristotle use metaphor in his scientific
practice? One of the dangers of using metaphors in science is that they can cease to be
seen as metaphors, and begin to be understood as explanations themselves. This raises
difficult problems for an historian of science, because most authors, historical or
otherwise, are usually not explicit about whether they are using an expression
metaphorically or not. The lack of clear criteria for determining when an author is using
an expression metaphorically means it is difficult to tell when a metaphor has become a
way of understanding the world instead of a way of inquiring into it. This is primarily an
exegetical problem, but it is a serious one if our goal is to understand the history and
development of science. By establishing a possible role for metaphor in Aristotle’s
science, the broader, methodological question I address in this paper is whether
determining such criteria is possible.
As a way into this question, I look at one such way of understanding the world that is
sometimes attributed to Aristotle: that, as David Sedley suggests, “the whole natural
world is, in one way or another, pulling itself up by its own bootstraps in the interests of
maximum godlikeness.” 10 This is what I call the metaphor of imitation. I argue that
Aristotle is aware he is using imitation metaphorically. I also try to show that the
evidence Sedley and others use to support the reading that the whole natural world
imitates the divine can also be seen as evidence against it. But the larger claim I establish
is that we need not suppose that Aristotle is asserting some way the world is when he
makes such claims; rather, he uses metaphors to investigate some way the world might

10

Sedley (2010), “Teleology: Aristotelian and Platonic” in Lennox and Bolton, Eds., Being, Nature, and Life in
Aristotle, 10. Similar interpretations are given in Burnyeat (2004), “Introduction: Aristotle on the
Foundations of Sublunary Physics” in de Haas and Mansfeld, Eds., Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption,
Book I: Symposium Aristotelicum and Kahn (1985), “The Place of the Prime Mover in Aristotle’s Teleology”.
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be, and part of his method in science involves working out the causes of phenomena that
they suggest.
In the second essay, “On the Principle of Separation in Aristotle’s Biology,” I look at
questions about how Aristotle adopted common Greek beliefs into his science, and how
he understood the relationship between those beliefs and his method of explaining
regular, ordered change. As with his use of metaphor, in this paper I argue that Aristotle
will use popular beliefs to express the conditions an explanation must meet if it is to
account for a world of regular, ordered change. I begin with Aristotle’s explanation of
separate males and females in the second book of On the Generation of Animals and use
it as a case study to explore these questions. The explanation makes use of what I call
“the principle of separation,” and it is one of a family of normative principles that refers
to the comparative value of correlative opposites. Aristotle uses these principles in
several well-known teleological accounts of natural phenomena, and they all depend on
characterizing things in the world in terms of relative value. There are two questions we
might ask about the legitimacy of these normative principles in Aristotle’s natural
philosophy. First, it is hard to see how these are empirically robust first principles
established inductively by observations of the natural world. Rather, they seem to reflect
common Greek attitudes and prejudices, which Aristotle simply takes over
unchallenged. Second, they do not seem to be methodologically sound. According to his
standards for scientific explanations, appeals to what is “better” or “best” should always
be said relative to the specific substance being explained (Physics II 7; On the Gait of

10

Animals 2). In light of this they seem to have too wide a scope to be explanatorily
useful. 11
Such questions have led some scholars to conclude that these principles represent an
uncritical adoption of common beliefs into science. 12 G.E.R. Lloyd, for instance, argues
that Aristotle “stubbornly” adhered to the common Greek belief that right is superior to
left, the upper to the lower, etc., because Aristotle believed that each is naturally and
essentially superior “in man, and man is the norm by which he judges the rest of the
animal kingdom.” 13 Against this view, I follow Leunissen who argues that such
principles are not explanations, but heuristics for determining the causally relevant
features that a proper explanation will pick out. 14 I diverge from Leunissen’s
interpretation, however, by denying that Aristotle thinks animals obtain any biological
advantage from having separate sexes. Instead, the principle reflects Aristotle’s
understanding of efficient causation. If regular, ordered change is one of Aristotle’s
explananda, then he has reason to say it is always better (although perhaps not
necessary) for an agent of such change to be unaffected when it acts.
Finally, the third essay “Art and Nature in Aristotle’s Physics,” looks at how Aristotle
uses the analogy between art and nature to guide questions about how inquiry in natural

11

Leunissen (2010), Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature, 123.

12

Lloyd (1996), Aristotelian Explorations; Preus (1970), “Science and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Generation of
Animals”, Journal of the History of Biology 3(1); Mayhew (2004), The Female in Aristotle’s Biology: Reason or
Rationalization; Witt (2005), “Form, Normativity and Gender in Aristotle a Feminist Perspective” in
Freeland, Ed., Feminist Reflections on the History of Philosophy; Nielsen (2008), “The Private Parts of
Animals: Aristotle on the Teleology of Sexual Difference”, Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 53(45).
13

Lloyd (1962), “Left and Right in Greek Philosophy”, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 82, 5.

14

Leunissen (2010), Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature, Chapter 4.2.
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science should proceed. This paper furthers these studies by looking to how he uses the
analogy between art and nature to guide his questions about how inquiry in natural
science should proceed if it is to explain the regularities in the world around us.
Aristotle’s understanding of the analogy between art and nature is in some respects a
response to Plato. 15 Where Plato saw “natural things, and nature herself” to be
“secondary products from art and reason” (Laws 892b5-8), 16 Aristotle claims “art
imitates nature” (Physics II 2, 194a21-194a27; II 8, 199a15-18; Meteorology IV 3,
381a30 ff.). Aristotle uses this phrase to argue for the unity of natural science, and for
the use of metaphor and analogy from the domain of artistic production to guide
inquiry into natural ones. But, how did Aristotle arrive at this anti-Platonic conclusion?
And what does it suggest about his views on the relationship between art and nature?
This essay provides a historical answer to the first question, by tracing a line of influence
from the Hippocratics, through Democritus and Plato, to Aristotle. I argue that based
on this tradition, Aristotle’s claim that “art imitates nature” is an epistemological claim
about how methods of production were first discovered in the arts. And by looking at
how the Greeks viewed discovery and progress in the arts, we can shed some light on
Aristotle’s expectations for a scientific investigation into nature, in particular his views
concerning the method of inquiry he thinks the natural scientist should adopt. In

15

Lennox (2001), “Material and Formal Natures in Aristotle’s De Partibus Animalium”, Aristotle’s Philosophy
of Biology: Studies in the Origins of Life Science; Menn (1995), Plato on God as Nous; Falcon (2005), Aristotle
and the Science of Nature: Unity without Uniformity; Johansen (2004), Plato’s Natural Philosophy: A Study of
the Timaeus-Critias. See also, Leunissen (2010), Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature,
Chapter Five, and Henry (2013), “Optimality and Teleology in Aristotle’s Natural Science”, Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy 45.
16

πρῶτα ἔργα καὶ πράξεις τέχνης ἂν γίγνοιτο, ὄντα ἐν πρώτοις, τὰ δὲ φύσει καὶ φύσις, ἣν οὐκ ὀρθῶς
ἐπονομάζουσιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὕστερα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ἂν ἐκ τέχνης εἴη καὶ νοῦ.
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particular, I will look at how Aristotle conceives of the relation between art as science
and the study of nature, and why he thinks the use of metaphor and analogy from the
domain of the arts can guide inquiry into processes that occur by nature.
While Aristotle does not consider metaphor to be a form of scientific knowledge, he
nevertheless thinks metaphors play an important epistemic role in inquiring into natural
phenomena. In cases where the scientist has a clear grasp of one domain, he thinks the
intuition of a generic or analogical relation suggested by metaphor will allow her to use
explanations from that domain to formulate expectations for explanation in another.
This process involves experience and intuition, and the perception of a similarity which
leads to metaphor may not produce any scientifically meaningful results; but, that does
not mean Aristotle thinks it is illegitimate in science. For Aristotle, metaphors are not,
as they were for Hobbes, a fool’s guide. Rather, working out the details of these
metaphors, and critically reflecting on both their empirical and a priori plausibility, is a
significant part of Aristotle’s method of inquiry, and in no way antithetical to his
scientific theory.

13
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2. Metaphor in Aristotle’s Science ∗
“Do you think it’s always fresh water that falls

each time Zeus makes it rain? Or, does the sun
draw up the same water from down below again?” 1

Aristophanes, Clouds, ll.1279-1281
One of the scientific ventures that Aristotle engages in is what we might now call
expounding theoretic necessities. 2 A modern example would be the gene, which was
postulated as the unit of heredity well before anyone had any clear idea of what it was or
how it worked. That one proved to be useful and has endured. Another example, but
one whose usefulness for science is still an open question, is the idea of “the language of
thought” (Fodor 1975). The point of such moments in science is to express something
like the following: “there has to be something, some physical mechanism, that brings it
about that x produces y, and these are the details that that mechanism must account
for:….” An Aristotelian example of this is the idea of kinēseis which do so much work for
him in his physiology of perception and also of reproduction. 3 He does not know
precisely what they are, of course, but using them is perfectly legitimate science, just as it
is legitimate to say, “there is something that encodes a parent’s traits and passes them on
to the offspring.”

∗

All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

1

πότερα νομίζεις καινὸν αἰεὶ τὸν Δία
ὕειν ὕδωρ ἑκάστοτ’, ἢ τὸν ἥλιον
ἕλκειν κάτωθεν ταὐτὸ τοῦθ’ ὕδωρ πάλιν;

2

The term “theoretic necessities” and this account of their role in science were suggested to me by John
Thorp.

3

Henry (2006), “Understanding Aristotle’s Reproductive Hylomorphism”, Apeiron 39(3), 436-442
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In this paper, I show that Aristotle uses metaphor as a way of deploying such theoretic
necessities. Aristotle uses metaphors as a way to express conditions that an explanation
of some natural phenomenon must meet if it is to be an explanation of regular, ordered
change—the kind of change which Aristotle believes is observed to occur in the natural
world. These conditions, in turn, characterize the phenomenon in such a way that we
can begin to inquire into its causes. For Aristotle, metaphors are heuristics for
investigating nature, and when they appear in his scientific practice, their role is to make
explicit certain generic or analogical similarities among distinct phenomena, so that we
can, at a preliminary stage of inquiry, use explanations of phenomena we understand as
models to inform the causal investigations of phenomena we do not.
Aristotle defines “metaphor” in the Poetics as “the application of a name [ὄνομα] that
belongs to something else [ἀλλοτρίου], either from genus to species, species to genus,
species to species or by analogy” (Poetics 21 1457b9-10). While Aristotle thinks
metaphor is always unclear, if an expression is a metaphor, then he thinks one of these
four relations will hold between what is referred to by the “name that belongs to
something else” and what is referred to by the conventional name. For example, when
cooking is used as a metaphor for digestion (Meteorology IV 3, 381a30 ff.), then since it is
a metaphor, both cooking and digestion will either be species of the same generic
process, or be related as species to genus, genus to species, or by analogy. Since some such
relation holds in an Aristotelian metaphor, they consequently express some truth,
however unclear, about what they refer to. It is the causal similarity they express which
makes metaphors useful as heuristics. By “heuristic,” I mean a set of reliable but fallible
methods or rules for discovering the causes that will ultimately explain the phenomenon
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being investigated. 4 The method I have in mind is that of inquiring into phenomena
which we do not understand by characterizing them as phenomena which we do
understand: for example, by characterizing digestion as cooking, Aristotle can use the
familiar efficient and material causal processes involved in cooking as a means of
investigating the internal and largely hidden process of digestion. 5 Similarly, as I explore
in this paper, he can use the familiar process of producing artistic imitations as a means
for inquiring into the efficient causal relation between the celestial and sublunary
seasonal cycles. Metaphors are, therefore, a starting point from which inquiry can
proceed to investigate the causes that ultimately explain the phenomenon being
investigated. At a preliminary stage of inquiry, metaphors characterize phenomena we
do not understand as phenomena we do (digestion as cooking, sublunary cycles as
imitations) so that we know what kinds of causes to look for when inquiring.
Scholars, however, have been puzzled by the apparent contradiction between Aristotle’s
use of metaphor in his scientific practice, and programmatic statements about method
in the Organon, which suggest metaphor is inimical to good science. In the Analytics, for
instance, he claims, “if one should not argue in metaphors, it is clear that [one must
neither] define using metaphors nor [define] what is said metaphorically: for necessarily
one will then be arguing in metaphors” (Posterior Analytics II 13, 97b37-39). And in the
Topics, he claims that “everything said metaphorically is unclear [ἀσαφὲς]” (Topics VI 2,
139b34-5). The lack of clarity is particularly problematic for definition:

4

The way I characterize “heuristic” is informed by Chow (2011), Heuristics, Concepts, and Cognitive
Architecture: Towards Understanding How the Mind Works, Philosophy, PhD Dissertation, Chapter 2.3.

5

I discuss this example in more detail in Chapter Three.
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τῶν δὲ ὅρων δυσεπιχειρητότατοι πάντων εἰσὶν ὅσοι κέχρηνται τοιούτοις
ὀνόμασιν ἃ πρῶτον μὲν ἄδηλά ἐστιν εἴτε ἁπλῶς εἴτε πολλαχῶς λέγεται, πρὸς δὲ
τούτοις μηδὲ γνώριμα πότερον κυρίως ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁρισαμένου
λέγεται. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀσαφῆ εἶναι οὐκ ἔχει ἐπιχειρήματα· διὰ δὲ τὸ
ἀγνοεῖσθαι εἰ παρὰ τὸ κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγεσθαι τοιαῦτ’ ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔχει
ἐπιτίμησιν.
The most difficult of all definitions are those that employ terms for
which, in the first place, it is not apparent whether they are used in one
way or several, and, further, it is not known whether they are used strictly
[κυρίως] or metaphorically [κατὰ μεταφορὰν] by the definer. On the one
hand, because they are unclear [ἀσαφῆ], one cannot argue [with the
definer]; on the other hand, because one does not know whether [the
definition] is unclear [ἀσαφῆ] [for any reason] besides being said
metaphorically, it is impossible to criticize them. (Topics VIII 3, 158b815)
Like things said ‘in many ways’, a metaphor signifies two or more things simultaneously,
and so its meaning is unclear. Yet, unlike terms said “strictly” or conventionally,
Aristotle thinks a metaphor will be unconventional: it is intentionally chosen by the
person making the comparison. Aristotle concludes that it is “impossible to criticize” the
person who chose the metaphor because, in a dialectical contest, it must be assumed that
the normal designation is not meant. If someone were to say, “genes are selfish,” one
could be excused for thinking he meant genes have conscious intentions, but it does not
follow that this is what he meant. 6 So long as one is defining in metaphor, then, one will
be arguing in metaphors, and these are good reasons for Aristotle to think that
metaphor is inappropriate in definition and demonstration. Metaphors, as G.E.R. Lloyd
points out, are ambiguous and lack the univocity required by Aristotle for

6

The phrase is from Dawkins (1976), The Selfish Gene, 13-15
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demonstrative knowledge. 7 His scientific practice, therefore, appears to conflict with his
theory.
What, then, are we to make of the status of metaphor in Aristotle’s science? If, as I
argue, Aristotle uses them heuristically, then there is no conflict. But, there will be
further questions: is there any textual evidence that suggests he thinks it is appropriate
to use metaphor? What grounds their use in science? And, most importantly, how does
he think they are supposed to work? If, on the other hand, one supposes Aristotle uses
metaphors in scientific explanations, is there a way to reconcile his theory with his
scientific practice? For example, suppose, as Charles Kahn or David Sedley do, that
Aristotle presents imitation of or participation in the divine as the final cause of each
thing in the natural world. Is Aristotle using imitation and participation to express some
clear, scientifically precise meaning? Should we read these expressions literally or
metaphorically? And what reasons might we give for thinking Aristotle has a clear sense
of what he is trying to express when he uses them?
These latter questions, I suggest, are more important for the modern interpreter, and a
common strategy, adopted by Kahn, Sedley and others (intentionally or not) is to avoid
these questions and interpret the metaphor away—in other words, their strategy is to
interpret these metaphors as though Aristotle meant them literally. 8 In doing so, they

7
8

Lloyd (1996), Aristotelian Explorations, 208

I discuss the widespread case of “imitation” in the section, Paradigm and Imitation, below. It is common, as
well, when interpreting Aristotle’s claims that nature “fashions” or “wants” something. See, e.g. Leunissen
(2010), Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature, 61, 126, 150: “The verbs of agency ascribed
to the formal natures in these principles are more than mere metaphors, or reflections of the analogy
between art and nature: rather, they reflect different causal patterns underlying the generation of animals
and their parts.” See note 29 below specifically on imitation.
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are following Aristotle’s own advice in the Topics that one can “argue captiously
[συκοφαντεῖν] against the user of a metaphorical expression as though he had used it in
its literal sense” (Topics VI 2, 139b35-6), 9 although the aims of the modern reader are
more likely to read Aristotle charitably rather than captiously. But this route has its own
hazards. The interpretation risks being arbitrary; it also assumes Aristotle was
committed to the thesis that metaphors have no role in science. It is this view that I
want to resist. While it is certainly true that Aristotle thinks metaphors do not
constitute scientific knowledge, the Posterior Analytics and the Topics leave open a
positive role for metaphor in scientific inquiry. Furthermore, as we will see in the next
section, Aristotle’s statements about inquiry in Eudemian Ethics II 1 suggest he believes
inquiry begins from statements that are true but not clear, and thus show none of the
Organon’s concerns about using unclear preliminary definitions as a starting point.
Finally, his understanding of metaphor suggests it is not merely a verbal comparison, but
that good metaphors bring out real similarities in the things they compare.
To begin, I provide evidence that Aristotle’s theory of inquiry is consistent with the use
of metaphor as a heuristic. I then turn to Aristotle’s scientific practice to show he uses
metaphor in this way. As a case study, I look at Aristotle’s claim that the cycles of the
sublunary elements imitate the cycles of the heavenly bodies. I argue that “imitation” is
not an explanation of the sublunary elements’ cyclical pattern, but a metaphor that
Aristotle uses as a heuristic to inquire into causal relationships between the heavenly and

9

ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸν μεταφορὰν εἰπόντα συκοφαντεῖν ὡς κυρίως εἰρηκότα. It must be admitted that this way of
describing the strategy [συκοφαντεῖν] hardly seems like an endorsement. However, Stephen Menn suggests
that this was, in fact, a strategy adopted not only by Aristotle, but also by later Peripatetic commentators, like
Themistius. Menn (2012), “Self-Motion and Reflection: Hermias and Proclus on the Harmony of Plato and
Aristotle on the Soul” in Wilberding and Horn, Eds., Neoplatonism and the Philosophy of Nature, 48-49
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sublunary bodies. I then compare his use of the metaphor of “imitation” to a related
metaphor, that “nature is a craftsman.”

2.1

Metaphor and Inquiry

Aristotle’s attitude towards metaphor is ambivalent. While he thinks one should avoid
arguing in metaphors because they lack the requisite univocity for valid inference
(Posterior Analytics II 13, 97b37-39, cf. Topics VIII 3, 158b8-15), he also thinks they can
make a new fact easier to grasp. For this reason, metaphor is useful for teaching and
persuading an audience. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle writes that through the good use of
metaphor, one can not only make learning more pleasant, but one can also make a new
fact intelligible by means of some more general notion, and so “it is from metaphor that
we can best get hold of something fresh” (Rhetoric III 10, 1410b6-13). Many wellknown Aristotelian expressions are intelligible for just this reason. We understand
expressions like “nature does nothing in vain” and “demiurgic nature” (ἡ δημιουργήσασα
φύσις, On the Parts of Animals I 5, 645a9) because their literal sense is obvious. This
sense might not be true, but it helps us to understand the claim Aristotle is trying to
make. There is no single art that imitates nature, but (as I will suggest in chapter three)
we develop tools and techniques by imitating how things occur naturally. Similarly,
there is no “cosmic nature” that does nothing in vain, but it seems that the parts of
animals usually exist for some function.
Aristotle defines metaphor in the Poetics as “the application of a name [ὄνομα] that
belongs to something else [ἀλλοτρίου], either from genus to species, species to genus,
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species to species or by analogy” (Poetics 21 1457b9-10). 10 For Aristotle, metaphor is
not, as it is for us, an expression with two senses, a literal and a figurative. For Aristotle,
an ἀλλοτρίος name—a “foreign” or “unconventional” one—is any name that is not used
strictly (κυριῶς) or conventionally (οἰκείως). 11 A metaphor, therefore, is an
unconventional use of name. So for example, if The Poet says when speaking about
Achilles, “the lion leapt” (Rhetoric III 4, 1406b22), Aristotle does not think he is using
“lion” in a conventional but figurative sense that signifies the abstract concept,
“courage.” Instead, he is using the name, “lion” unconventionally to designate Achilles.
According to Paul Ricoeur, whether or not metaphor has epistemological implications
for Aristotle depends on what it means to say a metaphor is a “foreign” use of a name. 12
On the one hand, it suggests that, when a name is used metaphorically, it substitutes for
a non-metaphorical name that one could have used (assuming that word exists) (Ricoeur
2003, 20). When, for instance, Homer claims Odysseus performed “10,000 deeds”
(Rhetoric III 4, 1456b12)—a name for a specific large quantity—what he is doing is
substituting the generic name for a large quantity, ‘many’, with the name for a species of
large quantity ‘10,000.’ This substitution provides no new information to the listener or
reader; it is simply a rhetorical flourish. In another example, the analogy, “as the
drinking cup is to Dionysus, so the shield is to Ares” (1407a18), Aristotle claims the
second term can be substituted for the fourth, or the fourth for the second. The cup and

10

“μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ
τοῦ εἴ- δους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον.
11

Topics VI 2. What I have been calling “literal” is not quite the same as what Aristotle means by “strictly.”
Lloyd (1996), Aristotelian Explorations, 207. My discussion owes much to two of Lloyd’s essays in that
volume, “Unity of Analogy” and “The Metaphors of Metaphora.” although I do not agree with his
conclusions.
12

Ricoeur (2003), The Rule of Metaphor, 19-22
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the shield are analogical because they are both things that often accompany the god in
representations. Aristotle does not think this is a successful analogy, because the
substitution has unintended implications. If you say, “the shield is the drinking cup of
Ares,” it sounds like you are suggesting that Ares drinks from his shield.
The substitutive nature of metaphor suggests that metaphor is not a means for
conveying new knowledge. As Ricoeur points out, “if the metaphorical term is really a
substituted term, it carries no new information, since the absent term (if one exists) can
be brought back in; and if there is no information conveyed, then metaphor has only an
ornamental, decorative value” (Ricoeur, 23). Conceiving of metaphor as foreign,
however, also suggests that the use of a metaphor is a deviant use of name (ibid., 19). It is
this deviant use of a name that Ricoeur suggests has a role in acquiring new knowledge.
When, for instance, we take a name that designates one domain and apply it to another,
it results in a search for the appropriate generic or analogical relationship that
characterizes the relationship between those two domains (ibid., 22-26). In other words,
metaphor is a kind of “calculated error” that “has to disturb a whole network by means
of an aberrant attribution” (ibid., 23). The normal relations we expect to obtain become
disordered by the metaphor; but, it also suggests new relations among things, and the redescription of the world in terms of these relations results, according to Ricoeur, in new
meaning. Aristotle claims that metaphor has “produced learning [μάθησιν] and
knowledge [γνῶσιν] through the genus” (1410b14-15). 13 For Ricoeur, knowledge
produced “through the genus” gives us a novel way of characterizing how we see the
world.

13

ἐποίησεν μάθησιν καὶ γνῶσιν διὰ τοῦ γένους.
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André Laks, however, has argued that Ricoeur’s interpretation strays too far from the
text when it suggests an independent epistemological role for metaphor. 14 For Laks,
Aristotelian metaphors are only substitutive. Metaphor may have a didactic function,
but it is not a heuristic. For metaphor to play a heuristic role, it would have to open up
new possibilities for thought; but, according to Laks, Aristotle’s view in both the
Rhetoric and the Poetics, suggests the similarities are not first learned through metaphor,
but through intuition or induction:
ἔστιν δὲ μέγα μὲν τὸ ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰρημένων πρεπόντως χρῆσθαι, καὶ διπλοῖς
ὀνόμασι καὶ γλώτταις, πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι. μόνον γὰρ
τοῦτο οὔτε παρ’ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν εὐφυΐας τε σημεῖόν ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ εὖ
μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστιν.
It is a great thing, indeed, to make a proper use of these poetical forms, as
also of compounds and strange words. But the greatest thing by far is to
be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from
others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an
intuitive perception of the similarity [in dissimilars]. (Poetics 22, 1459a48, tr. Bywater)
Several things are worth noting in this passage. First, Aristotle claims that being a
metaphor-maker (μεταφορικόν) is not something that one can learn from anyone else.
Second, he thinks being a metaphor-maker is a sign (σημεῖόν) of genius, and he explains
this by saying someone who is able to produce good metaphors (τὸ εὖ μεταφέρειν) is
someone who is able to intuitively perceive (θεωρεῖν) similarities. According to Laks,
what this text suggests is that the ability to produce good metaphors presupposes that
one can discover similarities by some other means, through the perception of similarities

14

Laks (1990), “Substitution Et Connaissance: Une Interprétation Unitaire (Ou Presque) De La Théorie
Aristotélicienne De La Métaphore” in Furley and Nehamas, Eds., Arisotle’s Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays, 283
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(τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν). 15 It is perception, then, and not metaphor, that Aristotle
attributes to insight. Metaphor has a didactic role, insofar as with it we can persuade or
teach others; but its role, if any, in producing knowledge will be subsidiary or derivative
of other forms of insight. It is, as Laks says, “un effect de connaissance” and so it is better
to talk about its quasi-cognitive role than its cognitive one (Laks, 299). Rather than
guide inquiry, metaphors occasioned by perception will be subject to philosophical
scrutiny. Thus, Aristotle can criticize Empedocles’ metaphor that the sea is “the sweat of
the earth” as being unscientific (Meteorology II 3, 357a24-5), and praise “the comic
poets” for making a good metaphor when they claim grey hair is “the mould of old age”
(On the Generation of Animals V 4, 784a23 ff.), because, as Paul Crittenden writes, “one
looks to physics for the knowledge, not metaphor.” 16 It will be the philosopher’s insight,
in the end, that determines the appropriateness of a metaphor.
Where does this leave the role of metaphor in inquiry? Ricoeur’s suggestion is elegant,
but he also admits it strays from Aristotle’s texts (Ricoeur, 24-5). On Laks’
interpretation, metaphors are merely substitutions of one term for another, and
metaphor will not play an independent role in inquiry. If, for instance, I say Odysseus
performed “10,000” deeds instead of “many,” I have not gained new knowledge, either
of the category “quantity,” or of Odysseus’ deeds. But there is another feature of
metaphor that Laks emphasizes, one which implies metaphor does have a role in
inquiry: good metaphors are grounded in an intuitive perception of similarity. An
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Laks (1990), “Substitution Et Connaissance: Une Interprétation Unitaire (Ou Presque) De La Théorie
Aristotélicienne De La Métaphore”, 286-289
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Crittenden (2011), “Philosophy and Metaphor: The Philosopher’s Ambivalence”, Literature & Aesthetics
13(1), 36
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intuitive perception of a similarity tells us something about what two objects are like—
they may share the same predicate because they share the same genus, or because they are
related as genus to species. And Aristotle suggests that, because we perceive (θεωρεῖν)
this similarity, the metaphor will express a true belief about that similarity. The
perception of similarity is not knowledge because knowledge is knowledge of the cause,
and not simply the fact (Posterior Analytics II 1). Therefore, the metaphors used to
express the perceived similarity cannot be used in scientific definitions whose aim is such
knowledge. This is what we would expect from Aristotle’s statements in the Posterior
Analytics and Topics. Yet, the metaphor (where metaphor is a success term, i.e., the one
produced by ὁ μεταφορικός) will express a true belief, and Aristotle thinks that true belief
is a necessary starting point for inquiry into causes, the kind of inquiry that will result in
scientific knowledge.
The problem of coming to have demonstrative understanding of some phenomena is the
problem of the Meno. How do we go about inquiring into anything if we do not yet
know what that thing is? Plato’s solution is that we must begin from some true
proposition about whatever we are investigating; and, since we do not yet know anything
about it, our starting point will have to be, not knowledge about the subject of our
inquiry, but a true belief about it. 17 Aristotle accepts Plato’s resolution to the Meno
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In this discussion, I largely follow Stephen Menn’s interpretation of Aristotle on inquiry. See Menn (2002),
“Plato and the Method of Analysis”, Phronesis 47(3) and, Menn, The Aim and the Argument of Aristotle’s
Metaphysics (in draft) Iα2, 2-4. Other discussions I have consulted include Charles (2000), Aristotle on
Meaning and Essence and Lennox (2011), “Aristotle on the Norms of Inquiry”, HOPOS: The Journal of the
International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1(1). Lennox, 89, notes that Aristotle offers no
account in the Posterior Analytics for how the scientist is to inquire into basic natural kinds. Although I do
not develop such a view in this paper, if I am correct that metaphor is a legitimate starting point for inquiring
into nature, it is also one way Aristotle might have pursued finding such kinds.
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problem when he claims that, in inquiry, we always start from what is true but not clear
and try to end up with what is both true and clear. A particularly lucid explication of this
method of inquiry is in Eudemian Ethics II 1, where Aristotle is inquiring into moral
virtue. Aristotle begins from the true belief that the moral virtue will be the best
disposition of some part of the soul (1219b37-1220a13); what this means, however, is
not yet clear. “Best disposition” and “some part of the soul” puts us in the ballpark, but
to have knowledge of moral virtue, we must investigate “what [moral virtue] is, its
parts…and through what it comes to be” (Eudemian Ethics II 1, 1220a14). In other
words, we need to know what it is, we need to know its (formal, material and efficient)
causes. He goes on:
δεῖ δὴ ζητεῖν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχοντές τι ζητοῦσι πάντες, ὥστε ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν
ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δὲ πειρᾶσθαι λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς καὶ
σαφῶς. νῦν γὰρ ὁμοίως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ** καὶ ὑγίειαν, ὅτι ἡ ἀρίστη διάθεσις
τοῦ σώματος, καὶ Κορίσκος ὁ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ μελάντατος· τί μὲν γὰρ
ἑκάτερον τούτων οὐκ ἴσμεν, πρὸς μέντοι τὸ εἰδέναι τί ἑκάτερον αὐτῆς πρὸ
ἔργου τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν.
We must inquire [ζητεῖν], as everyone does in other cases, by having
something [to start with]; so here, by going through what is said truly but
not clearly [οὐ σαφῶς], we should always try to grasp [what is said] truly
and clearly [σαφῶς]. For we are now in the condition of one who
describes health as the best disposition of the body, or Coriscus as the
darkest man in the market-place; for what either of these is we do not
know, but for knowing what either of these is, it is worthwhile to be in
this condition. (Eudemian Ethics II 1, 1220a13-23 tr. Solomon,
modified; cf. Eudemian Ethics I 6)
Aristotle thinks all inquiry begins from what is true but not clear and through them,
aims at grasping what is true and clear. Propositions that are true but not clear, like
“health is the best condition of the body” or “Coriscus is the darkest man in the marketplace,” are those that do not yet make clear what the subject of our investigation is. We
might accept them as true, perhaps on past experience (that Coriscus is the darkest man

28

in the market-place), or because they are analytically true (that the excellence of
anything is the best disposition of that thing); but, these propositions are not scientific
definitions, because they express, not what something, e.g., health or Coriscus is, but
what something is like. Still, we are in a better position when we have a true belief of
what something is like, since this belief helps to narrow down where to look for the
object of inquiry (within which range of objects, or which genus) and how to recognize
it when we find it (it is the object with such-and-such predicate or predicates). “It is,”
therefore, “worthwhile to be in this condition” because, from a true proposition about
what something is like we are in an adequate position to inquire into what it is.
Now, as I pointed out in the initial problem of this paper, Aristotle believes that
“everything said metaphorically is unclear [ἀσαφὲς]” (Topics VI 2, 139b34-5). And we
have seen that metaphors for Aristotle, while they are not scientific explanations, still
express true propositions, even on Laks’ substitutionalist reading. Finally, in his account
of inquiry in Eudemian Ethics II 1, true but unclear [οὐ σαφῶς] propositions are the
starting points for all inquiry. There is, therefore, a legitimate role for metaphor in
Aristotelian science. The aim of any scientific investigation is knowledge of the causes of
natural phenomena, the knowledge that is expressed in a scientific definition. Metaphor
will not constitute such knowledge; it can, however, serve as a starting point for
scientific inquiry.
In her book, Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature, one of Mariska
Leunissen’s insights into Aristotelian explanation is that expressions like “nature does
nothing in vain” and “nature always acts for the better” are part of Aristotle’s method of
discovery (Leunissen 2010, 112-135). Leunissen calls these expressions “teleological
principles,” and she argues that they are heuristic strategies that Aristotle uses when
observation and previously established definitions do not lead to final causes. These
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principles are not premises in scientific demonstrations, but hypotheses that he uses to
generate inferences that will lead to a final causal explanation (ibid, 121). I explore
Aristotle’s use of teleological principles in chapter two, but it is worth noting here that
teleological principles are, I think, closely related to metaphor in Aristotle’s science.
After all, many of his metaphors are themselves teleological principles. As Leunissen
points out, teleological principles are empirical principles: they are “the result of
experience, the accumulation of observations, preserved by memory,” which “also always
need to be checked and judged against what is actually perceived” (ibid.). I have also
tried to show this is the case with metaphor. Metaphors are the results of intuitive
perception (θεωρία) and Aristotle thinks it is the philosopher or scientist who is
ultimately the judge of whether a metaphor is appropriate or not. One way to think
about teleological principles, I suggest, might be as established metaphors, metaphors
which are particularly useful for inquiring into the (final) causes of natural phenomena.
A problem for my view, however, would be if Aristotle used metaphor in causal
explanations. I have argued that metaphor in Aristotle is an important part of his
method of inquiry in science, but must, according to his own stipulations in the
Organon, play no role in scientific explanation. There is, however, an attested use of
metaphor in explanation that is pervasive among scholars of Aristotle: the metaphor of
“imitation.” It is almost universally considered that the final cause of sublunary things,
both animate and inanimate, is the “imitation of the divine to the extent that it is
possible.” According to this view, Aristotle’s god is a paradigm which everything else in
the cosmos seeks to imitate. When we examine the textual evidence for this view,
however, we will see that it is thin. There are only three places, two in the physical works
and one in the Metaphyics, where Aristotle uses imitation to describe the relation
between the sublunary and celestial bodies. And in these contexts, I defend an
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interpretation in which “imitation” is not a final cause, but a metaphor that Aristotle
deploys to express the theoretic necessities concerning a unique efficient causal
explanation: the efficient causal influence of the heavens on the sublunary elements.

2.2

Paradigm and Imitation

In On Generation and Corruption, Aristotle gives an argument for the eternity of
coming-to-be. This argument employs three phrases that have been interpreted both
literally and metaphorically by different scholars. 18 The first, that nature always desires
(ὀρέγεσθαι) the better in all things (336b27-28); the second, that the god (ὁ θεός) filled
up the universe, making generation perpetual (συνεπλήρωσε τὸ ὅλον ὁ θεός, ἐνδελεχῆ
ποιήσας τὴν γένεσιν) (b32); and the third, that the simple bodies like air and water
imitate the circular motion of the heavens (μιμεῖται τὴν κύκλῳ φοράν) (337a3-4 and
again at a7). The first looks like a common Aristotelian teleological principle. The
second appears to be a rhetorical flourish: the idea of a god acting in time makes no sense
in Aristotle’s eternal, deistic cosmos. The status of the third metaphor is what I want to
examine. There are two problems with this metaphor. First, it suggests Aristotle is
mixing his metaphors. One of the metaphors, either that the god filled up the universe
with being, or that the sublunary elements perpetually re-generate by imitating the
heavens, is superfluous. Second, if we assume that the metaphor of a providential god is a
form of popularizing or Platonizing, then it seems he is attributing to the elements a
kind of conscious intentionality: the sublunary bodies aim at imitating, or emulating,
celestial bodies. In this section, I argue that the heavenly bodies do not operate for the
sake of the sublunary ones, nor does it work the other way around. The metaphor of
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See note 29 below.
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imitation in this argument does not suggest participation in the eternal and divine, nor
does it suggest a teleological relationship between the heavens and inanimate sublunary
bodies. Instead, the metaphor of imitation designates the relation of a paradigm to its
image, and Aristotle uses this relation, not as a premise in a (final cause) explanation, but
as a heuristic for inquiring into the efficient causal connection between the celestial and
sublunary bodies.
The argument appears in a discussion of why generation will always occur. Having
admonished his predecessors for failing to explain how anything comes into existence at
all (Generation and Corruption II 9), Aristotle gives two distinct arguments for the
eternity of generation. First, he argues for an efficient cause explanation of generation.
Once he has shown how the hypothesis of the sun’s continuous circular movement is
sufficient to guarantee that generation and corruption will never cease, he thinks we
have no reason to fear the world will ever end, nor wonder whether it ever had a
beginning. He then gives an argument to show why this efficient cause explanation was
reasonable 19:
Ἀεὶ δ’, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, συνεχὴς ἔσται ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορά, καὶ οὐδέποτε
ὑπολείψει δι’ ἣν εἴπομεν αἰτίαν. Τοῦτο δ’εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν · ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐν
ἅπασιν ἀεὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ὀρέγεσθαί φαμεν τὴν φύσιν, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ εἶναι ἢ τὸ
μὴ εἶναι (τὸ δ’ εἶναι ποσαχῶς λέγομεν ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται), τοῦτο δ’ ἀδύνατον ἐν
ἅπασιν ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὸ πόρρω τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφίστασθαι, τῷ λειπομένῳ τρόπῳ
συνεπλήρωσε τὸ ὅλον ὁ θεός, ἐνδελεχῆ ποιήσας τὴν γένεσιν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν
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“Reasonable” translates εὐλογῶς. There is some debate about what this term means. Robert Bolton has
argued that it is common in dialectical premises in Aristotle’s scientific works. These premises reflect
common sayings or beliefs that are not meant to be part of a scientific explanation. Bolton (2009), “Two
Standards for Inquiry in Aristotle’s De Caelo” in Bowen and Wildberg, Eds., New Perspectives on Aristotle’s De
Caelo Devin Henry has suggested (personal communication) that εὐλογῶς arguments do not use dialectical
premises, but a priori premises specific to the genus studied by the science. They are, therefore, not endoxic
or common sayings. It makes little difference for my argument which view ends up correct, since I argue that
“imitation” is not an explanation at all.
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μάλιστα συνείροιτο τὸ εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἐγγύτατα εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας τὸ γίνεσθαι ἀεὶ
καὶ τὴν γένεσιν.
Τούτου δ’ αἴτιον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, ἡ κύκλῳ φορά· μόνη γὰρ συνεχής.
Διὸ καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις,
οἷον τὰ ἁπλᾶ σώματα, μιμεῖται τὴν κύκλῳ φοράν· ὅταν γὰρ ἐξ ὕδατος ἀὴρ
γένηται καὶ ἐξ ἀέρος πῦρ καὶ πάλιν ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ, κύκλῳ φαμὲν
περιεληλυθέναι τὴν γένεσιν διὰ τὸ πάλιν ἀνακάμπτειν. Ὥστε καὶ ἡ εὐθεῖα
φορὰ μιμουμένη τὴν κύκλῳ συνεχής ἐστιν.
Generation and perishing, as was said, will always be continuous and will
never fail because of the cause we just stated. This has reasonably turned
out: for since we assert that nature desires the best in all things, and being
is better than not being (the number of senses of “being” was talked about
in another work 20), and this cannot obtain in all cases 21 because they are
too far from the principle, the god completed the whole [sc. the universe] in
the manner that remained by making generation perpetual. For in this way
being would be as coherent as could be, because the closest thing to
substance is that generation comes-to-be eternally, as well.
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There are at least two questions we might ask about this phrase: (1) what other work is Aristotle referring
to? (2) what other sense of being does he have in mind? In response to (1), Aristotle might be referring to the
Categories’ discussion of being, or Metaphysics Δ 7, 1017a8-b9, or both. Metaphysics Δ 7 duplicates some of
the discussion in the Categories. Joachim (1922), Aristotle. On Generation and Corruption: Text and
Commentary, 245-246 points out that various meanings of εἶναι and τὸ ὄν are found in many places, but takes
Δ 7 as his standard. In response to (2), Joachim (ibid.) claims it is “‘being’ in the primary and superlative
sense—the substances which is pure ‘form’ or sheer actuality—that Aristotle here seems to have in mind” but
that the principle “being is better than not being” would equally apply, regardless whether he means beingas-truth is better than being-as-falsity, being-P than not being-P, or being-potentially than not-beingsimpliciter. The problematic case is being-as-said-of-the-categories other than substance, since it seems hard
to understand what it would even mean to say, “being-blue is better than not-being-blue.” Whenever
Aristotle says “being is better than not being” (cf. On the Generation of Animals. II 1, 732b39-30), he probably
has in mind the Pythagorean συστοιχία, reported in, e.g., Metaphysics A5 986a23 ff. According to Aristotle,
Alcmaeon of Croton suggested any pair (contrary or not) could go in one (positive) column or the other
(negative) column. For more on this, see Lloyd (1966), Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in
Early Greek Thought.
21

Devin Henry suggests (personal communication) that the phrase, τοῦτο δ’ ἀδύνατον ἐν ἅπασιν ὑπάρχειν,
might be translated, “but not all things can possess [eternal existence].” The point seems to be, not that some
things are not capable of existing at all (e.g. square triangles), but that some things are not capable of eternal
existence. As we will see, this is a premise in the argument for eternal existence of species in Generation of
Animals II 1, and the claim there seems to be a specific application of this one.
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The cause of this [sc. the approach and retreat of the sun], as was often
said, is circular motion: for only [circular motion] is continuous. That is
also why whatever things change into one another according to their
qualities and capacities, e.g. the simple bodies, imitate circular motion. For
whenever air comes to be out of water, and fire out of air and again water
out of fire, we say the coming-to-be has come around, by bending back
again. Thus, by imitating circular motion rectilinear motion is continuous,
as well. (On Generation and Corruption II 10, 336b25-337a7)
The argument is meant to show why it is reasonable that generation should be eternal:
continuous generation is the closest thing to continuous existence, and since being is
better than the alternative, this is what occurs. 22 In an echo of the Demiurge’s
deliberation (Timaeus 30c2-31a1), or his speech to the lower gods (Timaeus 41b8-
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Aristotle often uses teleological principles or generalizations like the ones in this argument when he
explains a thing’s existence or generation teleologically. Falcon (2005), Aristotle and the Science of Nature:
Unity without Uniformity, 88, lists the following passages where they occur. I have cross-checked these with
Bonitz, Meyer and Langkavel (1955), Index Aristotelicus and Leunissen (2010), Explanation and Teleology in
Aristotle’s Science of Nature. They include, “nature does nothing in vain, but always the best among the
possibilities for the substance of each thing” (On the Gait of Animals 2); also: De Caelo 271a33, 291b13–14;
De Anima 432b21, 434a31; Parva Naturalia 476a13; Parts of Animals 658a8, 661b24, 691b4–5, 694a15,
695b19–20; Gait of Animals 704b15, 708a9, 711a19; Generation of Animals 739b19, 741b4, 744a37. The
claim that “nature always does the best possible thing” is found in Physics 260a22–3; De Caelo 288a2–3;
Generation and Corruption 336b27–8; Parva Naturalia 469a27–8; Parts of Animals 658a23, 687a16–17; Gait
of Animals 704b15, 708a9–10. There is a debate whether Aristotle uses these expressions as heuristics or as
premises in demonstration. Leunissen (2010), Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature, 119135, provides a thorough defense for the former view. Leunissen is responding to Lennox (2001), Aristotle’s
Philosophy of Biology: Studies in the Origins of Life Science, 205-223 (chapter nine), who argued they are used
as premises in demonstration. For a different view, see Henry (2013), “Optimality and Teleology in
Aristotle’s Natural Science”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 45 One textual note I want add to these:
Bonitz and others following him, conflate one instance of this principle with others: the claim that nature
“desires” (ὀρέγεσθαι) the best, as opposed to “does” (ποιεῖν) the best—there is only one occurrence of this in
the corpus, not four as Bonitz suggests at 836b40. Bonitz suggests De Caelo II 14, 297a16 (nature has to
“carry” the heavy to the middle, φέρεσθαι) ; Physics VIII 6, 259a11 (the better “belongs more”, ὑπάρχειν
μᾶλλον, in natural things); and 7, 260b23 (again, ἐν τῇ φύσει ὑπάρχειν [τὸ βέλτιον]. If anything, Bonitz should
have listed Generation of Animals IV 10, that “nature βούλονται to be measured by the periods of the
heavenly bodies”, since both amount to the same relation (passive) of lacking something, as opposed to the
relation (active) of making something. In the end, I am ambivalent whether these differences (e.g. between
nature doing and nature striving) are all that important. Compare the clear case at NE I 1 when Aristotle is
discussing human activities.
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41d1), Aristotle argues that the “the god” brought this result about because, while not
all things in the cosmos can exist eternally, being is better than not being, and nature
desires the best in all things. He concludes by saying that the cause of continuous
generation is continuous circular motion, and that the sublunary bodies, by changing
into one another in an ordered and cyclical series, imitate this motion, and “by imitating
circular motion rectilinear motion is continuous, as well.”
A problem arises for interpreting this passage because it is unclear how the first
argument about the god’s reason for causing eternal generation is related to the second
argument about the sublunary bodies’ imitation of eternal continuous motion. 23 If you
take Aristotle’s explanation somewhat literally, then he seems to be claiming the regular
movement of the sun is efficiently caused by a divine agent because this divine agent
believes perpetual generation is better than some alternative. The god accomplishes this
by causing the simple bodies to imitate continuous circular motion, and, in fact, it seems
that the god is acting for the sake of fulfilling, not its own desire, but nature’s desire to
always have something better. One might think this explanation is un-Aristotelian.
Charles Kahn has called it the “indefensible interpretation.” 24 Still, it is intelligible
enough and fits neatly with this text. If, however, you think this is all too Platonic, you
might say Aristotle is giving one “metaphorical” account, and one literal. Aristotle uses
the idea of “god acting” as a metaphor to lead into the real explanation: that all
sublunary things imitate the divine as a final cause. The range of interpretations varies,
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The only other passage where Aristotle unambiguously speaks of a god as acting is at De caelo I 4, 271a33:
Ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσιν. Aristotle refers to the cycle of elements “imitating” the celestial
cycles at Meteorology I 4, 346b36: γίγνεται δὲ κύκλος οὗτος μιμούμενος τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου κύκλον; and again at
Metaphysics Θ8 1050b28: μιμεῖται δὲ τὰ ἄφθαρτα καὶ τὰ ἐν μεταβολῇ ὄντα, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ.
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Kahn (1985), “The Place of the Prime Mover in Aristotle’s Teleology” in Balme and Gotthelf, Eds.,
Aristotle on Nature and Living Things, 185.
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but generally, one might think Aristotle is identifying “the god” and “nature,” and that
“the god” means “the most exemplary being,” “the being that is the most what it actually
is,” or “the most eternal thing.” “Desire,” then, might suggest the tendency of natural
things to move from being-potentially to being-actually, or to some actuality that is like
what is most actual. “Imitation,” finally, is shorthand for the process all things go
through when striving to attain or be like this eternally actual thing—it is the final cause
of all, whether we mean this specifically, generically or by analogy. 25 Both of these
interpretations are plausible, but neither is very satisfying.
In his paper, “The Place of the Prime Mover in Aristotle’s Teleology,” Charles Kahn
began a line of questioning concerning “cosmic teleology” in Aristotle, namely the
extent to which the “Prime Mover” is a direct final cause of all things in the cosmos. 26
He wanted to show how this argument was part of Aristotle’s larger project to present a
“scientific substitute for the mythical Demiurge, both as immediate cause of the
supreme celestial rotation, and as ultimate cause of the entire system—the οὗ ἕνεκα of
nature as a whole” (Kahn 1985, 196). If, as Kahn argues, the “Prime Mover” is the
supreme paradigm that everything else in the cosmos imitates, then, the metaphors of
“desiring” and “imitating” are literal (by which Kahn means true), while the metaphor
of “god acting” is simply a form of popularizing or Platonizing, and should be taken no
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Broadie (1993), “Que Fait Le Premier Moteur D’aristote? Sur La Théologie Du Livre Lambda De La
Métaphysique”, Revue philosophique de la France et de L’etranger 183, 379-380 raises problems for
interpreting the celestial movers’ “desire” for the prime mover as a form of “imitation.” If, she asks, to love
the prime mover is to imitate it, and this means contemplate it: “si cette âme peut contempler le Premier
Moteur, n’y a-t-il pas déjà là la meilleure forme d’imitation? Pourquoi donc faudrait-il penser que l’âme
désire aussi engendrer le mouvement? Elle contemple Dieu, et Dieu, nous dit-on, se contemple lui-même;
ainsi, en un sens, tous deux font la même chose.”
26

These issues are addressed in Gotthelf (2012), Teleology, First Principles and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s
Biology, chapter 2. I will not enter the debate here.
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more seriously than claims about Mother Nature. 27 In fact, Kahn suggests that all of
these metaphors, including participation, imitation, desiring, are all “literal” instances of
natural things trying or striving to emulate the divine paradigm of actuality.
Kahn was trying to resist what he called “positivism in exegesis,” by which he meant
interpretations that assumed the Prime Mover had no influence on anything in the
cosmos beyond the sphere of the fixed stars. Thus, it seems he was eager to show, by the
force of combined textual evidence, that such a positivist view was implausible. While he
agrees with his positivist interlocutors that Aristotle gives a sufficient mechanical
account of the seasonal variations on earth, what this account lacks is an explanation of
why these mechanical processes were good. He writes, “the explanatory force” of these
metaphors is that their literal sense “lies in the notion of a universal tendency towards
positive being, realized form, and unceasing activity” (Kahn, 200). And if one agrees that
the only consistent view of divinity in Aristotle is as a paradigm for imitation, then the
“unceasing activity” of the Prime Mover will be the goal towards which all things,
animate or inanimate, strive.
The difficulty, as Kahn points out, is that we cannot assume Aristotle’s commitments
are consistent before we know what his doctrines are. So, we need to look at the big
picture of Aristotle’s system, and then attempt to interpret the expressions we find so
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Before Kahn (1985), “The Place of the Prime Mover in Aristotle’s Teleology”, Joachim (1922), Aristotle’s
on Generation and Corruption, ad loc in his commentary and Peck (1963), Aristotle. Generation of Animals, ad
loc in his Generation of Animals commentary (Generation of Animals II 1, 732a2 ff.) assume that Aristotle
does not literally mean “god” is an efficient cause of anything other than the heavens, but take ‘the god’ to be
in some sense the “final cause” of everything. Neither defend this view. Balme (1972), Aristotle. De Partibus
Animalium I and De Generatíone Animalium I (with Passages from Ii. 1-3), 155, however, suggests in his
commentary on the Generation of Animals II 1 parallel that “divine” means final cause in a generalized sense,
and not the first unmoved mover.
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that they fit with the big picture of that system. In Kahn’s picture, the expressions
“desiring” (ὀρεγεσθαι), “striving” (ἐφίεσθαι), “wanting” (βούλεσθαι), “participating”
(μετέχειν) and “imitating” (μιμεῖστθαι) often occur when Aristotle talks about divinity,
and so he thinks they are all expressing the same kind of relation with the divine, a final
causal relation. The problem with Kahn’s approach is that it assumes (although not
explicitly) Aristotle does not use these expressions metaphorically. Instead, he interprets
the metaphors literally, which they must be if Aristotle is using them in scientific
explanations. They seem like metaphors to us, but Aristotle did not intend them this
way. The approach is not altogether unreasonable. When Aristotle says “nature does
what is best” or “does nothing in vain,” we need not interpret “doing” or “in vain” as
substitutions for another possible expression. Aristotle could mean these expressions
literally, without intending it to mean, for instance, that nature is a conscious agent.
Similarly, in the case of “imitation,” Aristotle could mean that the sublunary bodies
literally imitate the heavens, without this implying that they do so consciously. We
could, following Kahn, characterize this approach in the following way: we must aim to
interpret these expressions consistently along with Aristotle’s other philosophical
commitments.
While Kahn’s method will yield some results, it raises a an exegetical problem specifically
when dealing with expressions that seem metaphorical: how can we tell a metaphorical
expression from a literal one, except by checking whether the literal meaning contradicts
the commitments we attribute to an author independently of them? As I have shown in
the previous section, Aristotle thinks, or could have thought, metaphors are legitimate
in science, and to take Kahn’s approach would be question-beginning. I propose, then,
to bracket those philosophical commitments attributed to Aristotle which the strict
sense of the expression might contradict, figure out what work the expression is doing in
a given argument, and compare this to similar arguments that use similar expressions.

38

We must consider the literal sense of the expressions first, and then explore the
similarities and differences between “imitation” and other, related expressions like
“participate” or “desire.”
I first want to look at what Aristotle thinks imitation means, and then try to see how it
is related to two other expressions that have similar meanings: participation and
resemblance. Many scholars besides Kahn have argued that imitation and participation
are equivalent concepts in Aristotle, and that imitation and participation in the divine is
the final cause of all natural things. 28 This interpretation, however, assumes Aristotle is
thinking of imitation as emulation: the elements strive to emulate or be like the divine.
Yet, imitation has two senses: it can mean something like emulate, but it is also used in
the arts to describe the relation, like in artistic contexts, of a model to its image. And
both senses share the common relation of a paradigm (παράδειγμα) and its image (εἰκών),
but we need to tease apart these two senses to figure out which Aristotle is applying in
Generation and Corruption II 10. If he is claiming that the sublunary cycles imitate the
celestial cycles in this latter, paradigmatic sense, as a copy resembles its model, then it is
unclear whether Aristotle is using imitation of the divine as the final cause of the
sublunary cycles.

2.3

Imitation

“Imitation” is an ambiguous term. 29 One of the difficulties of interpreting it in
Aristotle’s natural philosophy arises because its use is quite rare. 30 It occurs only nine

28
29

See note 29 below.

Some of the most influential glosses on the verb μιμέσθαι, “to imitate,” and their main proponents are: (a)
to strive for god-like actuality (Kahn (1985), “The Place of the Prime Mover in Aristotle’s Teleology”, 205;
Bodéüs (2000), Aristotle and the Theology of the Living Immortals, 162; Sedley (2007), Creationism and Its
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times in his physical writings and four times in the Metaphysics, and most of those are
reports. The reports, however, are a good starting point, since by looking at how
Aristotle thought the term was used inappropriately, we might get a better sense of what
he thinks it means. In Metaphysics A 6, he reports “the Pythagoreans say things exist by
imitation of the numbers, but Plato says they exist by participation, changing the
name. 31 But in the middle [of their search,] they gave up inquiring [ἀφεῖσαν ἐν κοινῷ
ζητεῖν] what the participation or the imitation of the Forms could be” (987b11-14. tr.
Ross). 32 Implicit in Aristotle’s report is the claim that, had they continued inquiring,
they might have been able to find an answer, although Aristotle thinks the answer would

Critics in Antiquity, Chapter 6.1); (b) to resemble (Johnson (2005), Aristotle on Teleology and Charles (2012),
“Teleological Causation” in Shields, Ed., The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle; (c) to strive for eternal speciesspecific actuality (Gotthelf (2012), Teleology, First Principles and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s Biology and
Lennox (2001), Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology); (d) to approximate (Richardson Lear (2004), Happy Lives
and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 72-92); (e) to participate (nearly everyone
on this list; the exceptions may be Johnson and Charles); (f) to be active or actual (Kahn (1985), “The Place of
the Prime Mover in Aristotle’s Teleology”, 205 Lang (2007), The Order of Nature in Aristotle’s Physics: Place
and the Elements.
Sedley claims the elements imitate god-like actuality and that “in some attenuated way even the four
elementary bodies strive for everlasting actuality.” Sedley (2007), Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity,
170-173 Johnson (2005), Aristotle on Teleology David Charles suggests “imitation” means something like
“resemblance;” Johnson’s view is similar, and claims the elements receive an “attenuated benefit” from this
imitation. Charles (2012), “Teleological Causation”, Johnson (2005), Aristotle on Teleology. Gotthelf
tentatively suggests that “the thrust” of the passage is to assimilate generation to self-preservation although
he does not look to the passage in detail. Gotthelf (2012), Teleology, First Principles and Scientific Method in
Aristotle’s Biology, 8-9n13, 59;Lang (2007), The Order of Nature in Aristotle’s Physics: Place and the Elements,
250-251 suggests the elements imitate the heavens insofar as they cannot fail to be moved (to move?) to their
proper places so long as nothing prevents them, whereas the heavens have no such potency but are
necessarily active.
30

TLG reports that the phrase occurs 84 times in the Corpus. By far, the majority of occurrences are in the
Rhetoric, Poetics and the ethical works.
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For a discussion of this passage, see Furley (1989), Cosmic Problems: Essays on Greek and Roman Philosophy
of Nature
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οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι μιμήσει τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει, τοὔνομα μεταβαλών. τὴν
μέντοι γε μέθεξιν ἢ τὴν μίμησιν ἥτις ἂν εἴη τῶν εἰδῶν ἀφεῖσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν.
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have been a negative one: he concludes, having pursued the metaphor, that the concepts
of participation and imitation are not sufficient to express the relations the Platonists
and Pythagoreans were after.
While he does not criticize the Pythagorean use of “imitation” explicitly, he criticizes the
related notion of participation in Metaphysics A 9:
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἐκ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστὶ τἆλλα κατ’ οὐθένα τρόπον τῶν εἰωθότων
λέγεσθαι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν παραδείγματα αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ μετέχειν αὐτῶν τἆλλα
κενολογεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ μεταφορὰς λέγειν ποιητικάς. τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἐργαζόμενον
πρὸς τὰς ἰδέας ἀποβλέπον; ἐνδέχεταί τε καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ὅμοιον ὁτιοῦν
καὶ μὴ εἰκαζόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε καὶ ὄντος Σωκράτους καὶ μὴ ὄντος
γένοιτ’ἂν οἷος Σωκράτης· ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι κἂν εἰ ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης ἀΐδιος.
But further none of the other [sc. perceptible] things can be out of the
Forms according to any of the usual senses of “out of.” And to say [the
Forms] are patterns [παραδείγματα] and the other things share [μετέχειν]
in them is to speak vacuously and to talk in poetical metaphors
[μεταφορὰς λέγειν ποιητικάς]. For what is it that does the work, looking to
the Ideas? And anything can either be, or become, like another without
being an image [εἰκαζόμενον] of it, so that whether Socrates exists or does
not, someone might come to be like Socrates; and evidently this might be
so even if Socrates were eternal. (Metaphysics A9, 991a19-26 tr. Ross,
modified)
In this passage, Aristotle raises three criticisms related to the use of “participation” as a
way of characterizing the relation between Forms and perceptible things. First, he
objects that perceptible things are not composed of Forms. Second, specifically against
the claim that Forms are patterns [παραδείγματα] and perceptible things their images, he
objects that such language is “empty talk” and “poetical metaphor” since this relation
suggests something works to make an image based on a pattern, and Aristotle implies
Plato has not adequately specified what it is that looks to the Forms. Third, he objects
that the eternity of the Forms does not entail that they are patterns, but at best that they
are like perceptible things. I want to look at these three objections, with the aim of
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trying to clarify Aristotle’s reasons for objecting to “participation” as a metaphor that
expresses the relation of a “paradigm” to its “image.”
One question this passage raises is why Aristotle would make the second objection,
namely that Plato has not specified what it is that looks to the Forms as patterns. Plato
spends a good deal of time in the Timaeus characterizing just such an efficient cause, and
the Demiurge seems at least to offer a preliminary account of what such an efficient
cause must be like. Ross suggests, with hesitation, that the reason Aristotle calls
“participation” a “poetical metaphor” is precisely because Aristotle thinks the account of
the Demiurge and its activity in the Timaeus is merely figurative. 33 However, I do not
think the Timaeus is helpful context for understanding why Aristotle thinks the
“participation” is a poetical metaphor. First, the reference to “poetical metaphor” does
not imply a criticism of the Timaeus, but the kind of metaphor Plato has chosen to use.
Second, a much closer parallel text is found in the Parmenides, where Plato uses the
metaphor of a “pattern and image” to define “participation.” I want to examine each of
these claims in turn.
Aristotle’s use of the phrase “poetical metaphor” is not obviously a reference to Timaeus.
This is clear from another context in which Aristotle talks of “poetical metaphor,”
Meteorology II 3, 357a24-27. There, Aristotle objects to Empedocles’ explanation of the
saltiness of the sea—that it is the sweat of the earth—because, while it may be sufficient
for the purposes of a poem [πρὸς ποίησιν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως εἰπὼν ἴσως εἴρηκεν ἱκανῶς (ἡ γὰρ
μεταφορὰ ποιητικόν), a26-7], for the purposes of the knowledge of nature it is not [πρὸς

33

Ross (1924), Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Vol. 1, 198-199.
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δὲ τὸ γνῶναι τὴν φύσιν οὐχ ἱκανῶς, a27]. But the reason it is insufficient for knowledge of
nature is not because it is a metaphor, although Aristotle does think metaphors are part
of poetry. The reason it is insufficient, which he immediately goes on to state at a27-28,
is that the saltiness of sweat is not understood, either: “οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα δῆλον πῶς ἐκ
γλυκέος τοῦ πόματος ἁλμυρὸς γίγνεται ὁ ἱδρώς….” Thus, there is no reason to think that
the claim “sea is the sweat of the earth” could not provide a way of understanding why
the sea is salty; however, this would require that Empedocles already has an explanation
of why sweat is salty. But since he understands neither, Aristotle says it is absurd to
suppose anything clear has been said (γελοῖον […] οἴεταί τι σαφὲς εἰρηκέναι, a24-25) by
describing one in terms of the other. 34 Aristotle’s second criticism of participation in
Metaphysics A9 follows the same pattern, although the particular criticism is different.
He calls participation a poetical metaphor, but he explicitly states what it is about the
metaphor that is problematic: if Forms are patterns and perceptible things images of
them, participation it is not a sufficient characterization of this relation, because this
relation requires an efficient cause. The claim Aristotle is making is not that the
Timaues is merely poetic or figurative, but that “participation” is insufficient to
characterize the relation Plato wants to get at.
Second, from the way Aristotle characterizes Plato’s position and the criticism he raises,
it is clear that his target is the Parmenides. There, Plato characterizes the Forms as
“patterns [παραδείγματα] set in nature,” and says perceptible things “resemble them and
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I only note that Aristotle is not here claiming metaphor is inappropriate in science simpliciter, but that this
metaphor is sufficient for a poem, but not for knowledge of nature, because it does not state the reason why
the sea is salty, but only states that both sweat and the sea are salty.
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are likenesses” (Parmenides 132d1-3). 35 Plato, in fact, defines “participation” in the
Forms as certain way of being-an-image [ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ
ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς], and in criticizing Plato, Aristotle is applying the restriction
on definition from Posterior Analytics: “if one should not argue in metaphors, it is clear
that [one must neither] define using metaphors nor [define] what is said
metaphorically: for necessarily one will then be arguing in metaphors” (Posterior
Analytics II 13, 97b37-39). 36 Aristotle’s point is that Plato is mixing metaphors: he is
trying to define “participation,” using another metaphor of “pattern” and “image.”
Aristotle, in his criticism, is trying to tease these metaphors apart by showing that an
image and its model do not share predicates the same way participants and things
participated in do. His first objection attempts to show that an image is not like its
model because it is something that is made out of its model. A statue, for instance, is not
like the model it represents because the model, or some part of the model, is a part of the
statue. By contrast, material things are like what they are composed of precisely because
the material they are composed of exists in them as constituents. Clay, for instance, is
like water because clay literally “shares in”—is composed of—water and earth. The
second objection Aristotle raises suggests that, for an image or likeness to resemble its
model, there must be something that, looking to the model, acts in order to bring the
image about. There must, in other words, be a sculptor in addition to the paradigm and
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τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα,
καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς.
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Alexander of Aphrodisias makes a similar point is his commentary: “For they say that the Ideas are models,
and that the things here below participate in them; now to speak in this way, he [sc. Aristotle] says, is to use
empty words and to speak in metaphors, as do the poets; for those who use “participation” in the case of the
Ideas do not indicate any of those things in which the participant participates” (in Metaphyisca A, 101.18-22,
tr. Dooley). Alexander claims, without argument, that the metaphor of a “model” and its “image” comes from
painting (101.6).
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its image. To make the point even clearer, he raises his third objection, that any two
things can resemble one another, even an eternal and a perishable thing, without this
implying that one (the eternal one) is a model and the other an image. In other words,
two things may resemble one another, but this does not imply one is prior, or has the
predicate in virtue of which they are similar in a primary way, as it would have to if the
relation were of a paradigm to its image. 37 Even if, for two things that resemble one
another, one were eternal and the other finite, Aristotle argues that would not be
sufficient grounds for claiming one is a model and the other its image. For something to
be an imitation, it has to be made in the image of something else.
Aristotle’s argument against Plato suggests two things: first, it suggests he is aware
participation and imitation are metaphors; and second, it suggests he thinks the contexts
in which these metaphors are appropriate are different. Participation and imitation
express different reasons why two or more things are similar. Participation suggests two
things are similar because they share the same type of matter, while imitation suggests
two things share the same form. 38 They also differ in the way they characterize the
Platonic Forms as causes to particulars. Participation suggests they are causes as matter;
imitation suggests they are causes as form. Plato, as Aristotle reads him, does not literally
think Forms are causes as matter or causes as paradigms, but Aristotle is not certain
Plato has any other way of understanding them. Plato seems to be trying to conceive of
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Compare Phaedo 74d9-e2: “Whenever someone, on seeing something, realizes that that which he now sees
wants to be like some other reality but falls short and cannot be like that other since it is inferior, do we agree
that the one who thinks this must have prior knowledge of that to which he says it is like, but deficiently so?”
ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ
δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι [ἴσον] οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν
προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησιν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μέν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν;
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some relation such that Forms resemble particulars but are still somehow prior to them
or separate from them. From Aristotle’s point of view, he is using two incompatible
ways of understanding that relation.
Not only is this a good example of why Aristotle thinks defining in metaphors is
problematic, it also means that Aristotle does not think imitation and participation are
the same relation. Both relations suggest similarity, but a cause and what it causes need
not be similar in the same way. Unlike participation, imitation, as Aristotle understands
it, entails a relation between two things, a paradigm (παράδειγμα) and its image (εἰκών)
or imitation (μίμησις). Furthermore, the existence of the image requires something that
produces it [τὸ ἐργαζόμενον] by looking to the paradigm. Participation does not.
Furthermore, similarity does not entail imitation. Imitation suggests something comes
to have a predicate that it did not previously have, and so the paradigm has the predicate
they share in a stronger way, at least initially. In other words, the paradigm is a cause to
its image of the fact that they resemble one another.
I want to call this sense of imitation the strict sense. By ‘strict sense’, I do not mean this
sense is historically earlier than another, or that Aristotle recognizes this sense as strict. 39
I just mean the more of these features something has, the more likely Aristotle is to call
it an imitation. Imitation expresses a relation between a paradigm and its image. The
paradigm and its image are similar, and they are similar because the paradigm is the
formal cause of its image. Finally, some agent produces the image by looking to the

39

For pre-Platonic use of “imitation”, see Else (1958), “‘Imitation’ in the Fifth Century”, Classical Philology
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paradigm. There are, I think, two senses of “imitation” that meet these criteria that are
found elsewhere in Aristotle, what I will call (a) the emulative, and (b) the paradigmatic:
(a) In the emulative sense, “imitation” suggests an agent tries to make itself like a
model by trying to assimilate herself to it: one causes oneself to share in some
predicate that the model has in either a stronger or more complete way than the one
who is emulating it. This sense is common in Aristotle’s moral and political writings.
Aristotle thinks emulation provides not only a foundation for moral development,
through imitating or acquiring the habits of good models, 40 he also sees it as an
important part of the development of a city, through the imitation of good
constitutions. 41 In the Poetics, he grounds human facility with imitation in human
nature itself, and argues that poetry developed from our natural tendency to imitate
each other’s actions. 42 This sense is also teleological, since the goal is to be like the
model, and being like the model will be beneficial to the one imitating.
(b) In the paradigmatic sense, “imitation” suggests an agent tries to make something
else similar to a model by making it like the model. This sense is used especially in the
plastic arts. 43 The artist makes something like something else, as the sculptor makes
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Burnyeat (1980), “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good” in Rorty, Ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, 73-74;
Curzer (2002), “Aristotle’s Painful Path to Virtue”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 40(2)
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On imitating constitutions: Aristotle thinks the constitutions of Carthage and Tarentum are good ones to
imitate Politics VI 5, 1320b5 f. He defends the mimetic arts, especially music of the appropriate character, in
Politics VIII 5, 1339a13 ff.
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Poetics 4, 1448b5-6

There is a historical question about which sense developed first, that from the plastic arts (representation)
or the sense in the dramatic arts (what we are likely to call ‘imitation’). A good discussion of these issues is in
Else (1958), “‘Imitation’ in the Fifth Century”. He argues that the term developed in the fifth century, and is
derived from the (already existing) term for a mime or actor, ὁ μῖμος. “To imitate” is to do what a μῖμος does.

47

the marble like the model. Aristotle includes among these arts those like writing,
sculpting and poetry (Rhetoric I 11, 1371b6, cf. Poetics 1 1447a16). 44
If Aristotle thinks imitation is a final cause explanation of why the sublunary elements
have similar cycles to the heavens, then it will be because he thinks they imitate in one of
these two senses.

2.3.1

Imitation and Participation

On the standard view of Generation and Corruption II 10, “the imitation of the
divine”—however this is understood 45—is assumed to be the final cause that explains
why the sublunary bodies undergo cycles; furthermore, it is said that this expression is
equivalent to another claim, from De Anima, that the final cause of living things is “to
participate in the eternal and divine to the extent that it is possible” (De anima II 4,
416b5 ff.). This requires understanding “imitation” in its emulative sense—the
elements, like animals, do what they do in order to be as much like the divine as possible.
As Sedley puts it, “the whole natural world is, in one way or another, pulling itself up by
its own bootstraps in the interests of maximum godlikeness.” 46 I want, then, to turn to
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Theatre presents an interesting case. Aristotle will say in Poetics 2 1448a19 ff, “the imitators imitate actions
[sc. of good and bad people]” (μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας). This might sound more like the case of
the student imitating the teacher (Nicomachean Ethics III 12, 1119b13-18) or like someone aspiring to be
virtuous by imitating the actions of the virtuous person. However, the actors are μιμούμενος and thus also
μίμησεις – they emulate, but they are not really trying to assume the virtuous or vicious characters of those
they imitate. An actor (except perhaps a very serious method actor) does not want to acquire a certain moral
character, but merely outward signs of such character. Burnyeat (2004), “Introduction: Aristotle on the
Foundations of Sublunary Physics” in de Haas and Mansfeld, Eds., Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption,
Book I: Symposium Aristotelicum.

45
46

See note 29 above.

Sedley (2010), “Teleology: Aristotelian and Platonic” in Lennox and Bolton, Eds., Being, Nature, and Life in
Aristotle, 10. Sedley also claims “The highest human aspiration, philosophical contemplation, is the most
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those texts where Aristotle claims the sublunary bodies imitate the celestial bodies, to see
if they can shed light on which sense – emulative or paradigmatic – is at play in
Generation and Corruption II 10.
There are only two texts, other than On Generation and Corruption II 10, where
Aristotle describes the movements of the sublunary bodies or their motions as imitating
the celestial bodies or their movements. In Metaphysics Θ 8, Aristotle claims:
μιμεῖται δὲ τὰ ἄφθαρτα καὶ τὰ ἐν μεταβολῇ ὄντα, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ. καὶ γὰρ
ταῦτα ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ. καθ’ αὑτὰ γὰρ καὶ ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν.
The imperishable things are also imitated by the things involved with
change, for example earth and fire. For these are also always active. For
they have motion per se and in themselves. (Metaphysics Θ 8, 1050b2830, tr. Ross, modified)
This is an enigmatic passage, and it is not clear whether Aristotle is using the emulative
or paradigmatic sense of imitation. The problem, as Ross notes, is that it is unclear
whether “they have motion per se and in themselves” refers to the natural movement of
fire up and earth down, or to the constant tendency of the elements to change into one
another. If the former, then Aristotle is asserting that the elements imitate eternal

direct imitation of god’s own activity (EN 10.7.1177b26–1178a8; 10.8.1178b7–32). Procreation, in humans,
lower animals and plants is, as it had been for Plato, a bid for immortality by proxy, another way of imitating
god’s eternal actuality, namely by perpetuating both oneself and one’s species (de An. 2.4.415a26–b7; Pol.
1.2.1252a28–30; GA 2.1.731b24–732a1; Metaph.8.1050b28–30).10 Even below the level of plant life, the
world’s natural cycles, such as the weather cycle whereby the four elementary bodies undergo endlessly
repeated intertransformations, are imitations of god’s eternal actuality (Mete. 1.9.346b35–347a10; On
Generation and Corruption 2.10.336b34–337a7).” Sedley (2010), “Teleology: Aristotelian and Platonic”, 8
Sedley’s is one of the most extreme defenses of global teleology, but the view that all of these arguments
concern a striving for god-like actuality is not. So, also Myles Burnyeat: “In the sublunary world two types of
cycle are said to imitate the divine, eternally circling heavens. One is the eternal cycle of elemental
transformation (On Generation and Corruption II. 10. 336b25–337a15, Metaph. Θ8. 1050b28–30), the other
the eternally continuing life cycles of the biological species (de An. II. 4. 415a26–b7, GA II. 1. 731b24–
732a11).” Burnyeat (2004), “Introduction: Aristotle on the Foundations of Sublunary Physics”, 23-24. See
also note 29 above.
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substance either by engaging in locomotion, i.e., by moving to their natural place. If the
latter, then they imitate the heavens by being reciprocally transformed into one another.
This latter sense suggests at most Aristotle is using “imitation” in its paradigmatic
sense—the transformations of the sublunary bodies resemble the movements of the
imperishable. On the former reading, however, the elements’ eternal activity is meant to
explain why their eternal activity can be called “imitation;” yet, on this reading, it is
unclear whether that implies they imitate the heavens in the emulative or paradigmatic
sense. The text is indeterminate. 47
The other text is in Meteorologica I 9:
ἡ μὲν οὖν ὡς κινοῦσα καὶ κυρία καὶ πρώτη τῶν ἀρχῶν ὁ κύκλος ἐστίν, ἐν ᾧ
φανερῶς ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου φορὰ διακρίνουσα καὶ συγκρίνουσα τῷ γίγνεσθαι πλησίον
ἢ πορρώτερον αἰτία τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς ἐστι[…] Γίγνεται δὲ κύκλος
οὗτος μιμούμενος τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου κύκλον· ἅμα γὰρ ἐκεῖνος εἰς τὰ πλάγια
μεταβάλλει καὶ οὗτος ἄνω καὶ κάτω.
The [cause] as mover, chief and first of the principles [sc. of the region
common to air and water] is the circle [sc. of the sun], for the sun as it
approaches or recedes, obviously causes dissipation and condensation and
so gives rise to generation and destruction[…]. So this cycle occurs,
imitating the circle of the sun [μιμούμενος τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου κύκλον]; for at the
same time as [the sun] moves to this side or that [εἰς τὰ πλάγια, sc.
perpendicular to the plane of the celestial equator], the moisture in this
process rises or falls. (Meteorology I 9, 346b20-36, tr. Webster, modified)
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In his commentary on Metaphysics Θ8 1050b28-30, Ross states it is doubtful whether “they have their
movement of themselves and in themselves” refers to natural movement of fire up and earth down, or to the
constant tendency of the elements to change into one another. Kahn (1985), “The Place of the Prime Mover
in Aristotle’s Teleology”, 168 thinks the passage only refers to locomotion, since transmutation is not
something that belongs to the elements per se and in themselves. Instead, the elements movement up or down
is an eternal fact because it is an expression of their eternal natures. In following their own natures, they
follow their superiors. Johnson (2005), Aristotle on Teleology, 148 claims the notion of “imitate” is explicitly
visual, and that “imitate” simply means “resemblance.” While my sympathies to some extent lie with
Johnson, I do not think “resemble” can be a gloss on “imitate.”
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This text largely agrees with the description in Generation and Corruption II 10. The
sublunary bodies are caused by the sun to dissipate and condense in a cycle which results
in generation and perishing. In this case, however, it is clearly the paradigmatic sense
that is at play: the sun is the efficient cause of the resemblance between the celestial and
sublunary cycles. The paradigm itself is left unstated, but it is not the elements that are
moving themselves to be like the heavens.
Kahn, however, argues that this is compatible with the emulative sense of imitation.
According to Kahn, Metaphysics Θ 8 refers only to locomotion, since locomotion
belongs to the nature of the elements, while transmutation does not. 48 By following their
natures, the elements follow their superiors. A portion of air may have been caused by
the heat from the sun; but, once the air is created, it actualizes its own goal to reach its
natural place. The meaning of the “perishables imitate the imperishables” would be that
the elements, in continuously actualizing their potential to be in their natural place,
“imitate” or “participate” in the divine by being always actual, as animals participate in
the divine by always actualizing their natural functions. Imitation, which in this sense
means becoming actual, would then be a metaphorical way of describing the fact that
the elements have actuality as their final cause, and their actuality resembles the eternal
actuality of the heavens. This, in turn, sounds very similar to Aristotle’s claim in De
anima that animals participate in the eternal and divine by actualizing their own
characteristic activity:
ἧς ἐστὶν ἔργα γεννῆσαι καὶ τροφῇ χρῆσθαι· φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς
ζῶσιν, ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα ἢ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιῆσαι
ἕτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῷον μὲν ζῷον φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου
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μετέχωσιν ᾗ δύνανται· πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πράττει
ὅσα πράττει κατὰ φύσιν.
The functions of [the nutritive soul] are reproduction and the use of
food. For, the most natural function of any living thing that has reached
maturity, is unmutilated, and which has not come to be spontaneously is
the production of another like itself, an animal [producing] an animal, a
plant a plant, in order that, as far as its nature allows, it may participate
[μετέχωσιν] in the eternal and divine. For all desire this, and they do
whatever they do by nature for the sake of this. (De Anima II 4, 415b3-8
tr. Smith, modified)
The similarity between Metaphysics Θ 8 and De Anima II 4, noted by Kahn, Sedley,
Burnyeat and others, is that in both passages Aristotle claims the actualization of a
thing’s nature is its final cause. 49 The elements, on this reading, actualize their potential
to be in a certain place in order to imitate the imperishables. And animals actualize their
potential to generate offspring in order to participate in the eternal and divine. The
interpretation gives a consistent reading of Aristotelian passages, and suggests the literal
or explanatory meaning behind both imitation and participation is the universal striving
for actuality. But, any interpretation that suggests the De Anima notion of participation
is equivalent to the notion of imitation in Generation and Corruption and Metaphysics Θ
8 will have to account for the following:
First, it will have to explain why Aristotle has mixed his metaphors as much as Plato
in the Parmenides. This would be surprising. Any interpretation that suggests these
notions are (more or less) the same will have to give an account of why Aristotle
might not see them as inconsistent in his case, where he did for Plato.
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Second, it would require textual evidence that Aristotle thinks “imitation” and
“participation” can mean the same thing. I have found almost nothing in the extant
Corpus to support this identification. Instead, within the physical treatises as well as
the Metaphysics, the metaphor of “imitating the heavenly cycles” is only used with
reference to the sublunary bodies, and never to animals. The only passages in which
he does so are On Generation and Corruption II 10; Meteorology I 9; and, Metaphysics
Θ 8. 50 When he talks about “participation,” only once does it refer to the cycle of the
elements. In Meteorology II 3, he says that the dry exhalation is mixed with the wet
exhalation and necessarily returns to earth with the rain, and “this will always occur
according to a certain order, as much of the order as this place shares in”
(358a20ff). 51 On all other occasions in the physical works, he uses it to refer
exclusively to ensouled beings. 52 Furthermore, when Aristotle uses the term
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Τhe only other things he refers to as “imitating” in the physical works are: “art” (see Chapter Three), and
certain features of animals (History of Animals 502b9; 609b16; 631b9) where it is used to describe an
observed resemblance. In the next section, I discuss the possibility that imitate means resemblance in our
passages.
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ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι κατά τινα τάξιν, ὡς ἐνδέχεται μετέχειν τὰ ἐνταῦθα τάξεως.

Aristotle uses “participate” in the following passages: On Youth and Old Age 479a28-479a31:”Generation is
the initial participation, mediated by warm substance, in the nutritive soul, and life is the maintenance of this
participation.”; On the Generation of Animals I 23, 731b1f: “For against the latter the mere participation in
touch and taste seems to be practically nothing, but beside plants and stones it seems most excellent.” Cf.
731a32; 732b29; 735a7; II 1, 731a24: “A thing lives, then, in virtue of participating in the male and female
principles; that is why even plants have some kind of life.” On the Generation of Animals II 3, 736b1f: When
and how and whence is a share in reason acquired by those animals that participate in this principle?; On the
Generation of Animals II.5 741a25: “for the fact that these eggs go bad shows that they previously participate
in some way in life.” On the Generation of Animals III 7, 757b14: “Wind-eggs, then, participate in generation
so far as is possible for them.” On the Generation of Animals III 11, 761b23: “Such a kind of animal must be
sought in the moon, for this appears to participate in the element removed in the third degree from earth.”
De Anima II 4, 415a29ff: “For the most natural function for living things, those that are complete and not
deformed or generated spontaneously, is the production of another like itself, an animal an animal, a plant a
plant, so that it can participate in the eternal and divine as far as possible. For all strive for this, and does
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“participation” to characterize something about animals, it is not limited to a desire
to share in the eternal and divine. While he thinks this is the most natural life
function in which animals participate, he also says animals and plants participate in
every other life function. The difference between “the most natural” and all the other
life functions in which animals and humans share—sensation, appetite, locomotion
and reason—is that the function of the nutritive soul is the most necessary. Being
most necessary, however, is not usually characterized by Aristotle as being highly
valued (Metaphysics Α 1, 980b26ff). And while he does say that animals reproduce in
order to participate in the eternal and divine, Aristotle does not say that living things
imitate the heavenly bodies as he says the sublunary elements do (clearly, he could not
say they participate in the heavenly bodies, cf. Generation of Animals II 3, 736b29737a6); nor does he ever characterize their striving or desiring for perpetual
existence as imitation. In fact, Aristotle distinguishes these quite consistently.

2.3.2

Imitation and Resemblance

There is an obvious response to these two restrictions on interpreting imitation and
participation. Aristotle could simply be after their shared sense of “resemblance”
(ὁμοιότης).Whether X imitates Y or X participates in Y, X and Y will resemble one
another by sharing some relevant predicate. Aristotle normally reserves the term
“resemblance” (ὁμοιότης) for this relation, but he could be using the expressions
“imitation” and “participation” for dramatic effect. Nevertheless, on this view, he would
be serious that resemblance is a final cause of both imitation and participation—both
would be a striving or making oneself like that which they want to resemble.

what it does by nature for the sake of it.” Also in De Anima, 410b23; 415b5; 412a15. 416b9; 413b8; 415b25;
433b30; De Caelo II 12, 292a20.
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There is an intuitive overlap among the concepts of image (εικών), likeness (ὁμοιότης)
and imitation (μίμησις). In the Phaedrus, Socrates describes all the fallen souls “living
here, honoring and imitating [the gods in whose choruses we danced] the way we can”
(252d2). 53 To honour them and emulate them, they “make [the soul of their love] as like
to their own god as possible” (253b1). 54 Here Plato suggests that to emulate the god is to
make the world as much like god as possible, but a likeness, not an imitation. To what
extent can we see the imitation of the heavens by water and air as a likeness of the sun’s
movement? First, some preliminaries.
If Aristotle understands imitation merely to mean resemblance, what would be the
relata? Let’s return to the problem text:
The cause of this, as was often said, is circular motion: for only [circular
motion] is continuous. That is also why whatever things change into one
another according to their qualities and capacities, e.g. the simple bodies,
imitate circular motion. For whenever air comes to be out of water, and
fire out of air and again water out of fire, we say the coming-to-be has
come around, by bending back again. Thus, by imitating circular motion
rectilinear motion is continuous, as well. (On Generation and Corruption
II 10, 336a1-337a7)
Aristotle’s text rather ambiguously suggests two ways we could understand how the
simple bodies are like circular motion. In one way, we might think it is the reciprocal
transformation of the elements into one another that is like circular motion. Just as the
sun will pass through Gemini, and then Cancer, Sagittarius and Aquarius, and back to
Gemini, so the simple bodies will become fire, and then air, water, and earth. In this
case, it is not the movements that are being compared, but the process of things passing
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ἐκεῖνον τιμῶν τε καὶ μιμούμενος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ζῇ.
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ποιοῦσιν ὡς δυνατὸν ὁμοιότατον τῷ σφετέρῳ θεῷ.
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through points in an abstract conceptual space. Alternatively, Aristotle might be
comparing the movements themselves: just as circular movement is continuous, so
rectilinear movement is continuous.
There is nothing definitive in the text that would allow one to decide between these two
alternatives. I think it is more plausible that the movements themselves are being
compared. The first suggests only the subject which imitates circular motion: those
bodies which change into one another, i.e., matter which is reciprocally affected, or
what-both-potentially-is-and-is-not. The latter makes explicit what the imitation
consists in, namely rectilinear motion. Left to themselves, the elements would drift to
their natural places and stop. Rectilinear motion, because it engages in a circle-like
movement, will continuously occur.
Two scholars have recently endorsed the idea that Aristotle has “likeness” in mind when
he says imitation. Monte Johnson, and in a different way David Charles, have both
suggested that we need not understand imitation to mean anything particularly
metaphysical. All Aristotle means when he says “imitate” is that the cycles “resemble”
one another. Their views differ on whether or not we can call the resemblance
teleological. On Johnson’s view, the cyclical transmutation of the elements is
teleologically explicable because it resembles the eternal motion of the heavens, which is
paradigmatically teleologically explicable (Johnson 2005, 146-7). The elements receive
some attenuated benefit because the cycle of transmutation allows them to exist
eternally. 55 Nevertheless, Johnson thinks it is unlikely that Aristotle considered the
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One sometimes hears the claim that the elements would cease to exist if they did not undergo cyclical
transformation. I confess I do not understand the reasons for thinking this, since the elements would
(presumably) go to their natural place and remain there. Perhaps the Θ 8 passage is what they have in mind?
Charles (2012), “Teleological Causation” claims Aristotle does not consider what would happen to the

56

elements to be striving or desiring, and so a non-metaphysical sense of imitation, of
resemblance, is likely all he meant (ibid., 147).
Charles also thinks that imitation should be understood as something closer to “is like”
or “reflects,” but his motivation for this is different from Johnson’s. Charles denies there
can be a teleological explanation of the elements because they are not the kinds of things
that can have goals in the relevant sense (Charles 2012, 26). Charles admits that “the
best way for them to continue to exist is to be disposed to take part in [their] cyclical
pattern” of reciprocal transformation; but, for the cycle to be teleologically explicable, he
thinks it would have to be shown why it was good for them to do this or have this done
to them (ibid., 24). Charles rules out this possibility: his understanding of teleological
explanation requires the agent or organism to be alive (ibid., 21). While their views
specifically on teleology differ, both Johnson and Charles agree the sublunary bodies are
not the kinds of things that can literally strive or desire. The question is whether
Aristotle could intend “imitation” to mean “likeness?”
Besides having a useful term for likeness (ὁμοιότης), I think there are some conceptual
reasons why we should resist this interpretation. There is a conceptual distinction (if not
an epistemological one) between imitation and likeness. While both exhibit likeness, the
kind of likeness involved in imitation is importantly different. This is how Plato puts it
in the Phaedo, when he describes recollecting: “whenever someone, on seeing something,
realizes that that which he now sees wants to be like some other reality but falls short

sublunary bodies were the cosmos destroyed; however, he also suggests they would be destroyed were they
not to undergo cyclical transformation.
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and cannot be like that other since it is inferior” (74d9-e2, tr. Grube, modified). 56
Imitation suggests not simply that two things resemble one another (although they do),
but that one member, the paradigm, has the predicate in stronger or more real or more
knowable way. Imitation implies a kind of falling-short: two things may be able to be
completely alike in some respect; no copy of a paradigm could ever perfectly manifest
any predicate of the paradigm.
While there is a conceptual difference between the two, that does not mean Aristotle
could not be using “imitate” as a synonym for “likeness.” But I think the problem with
interpreting imitation as likeness is that it fails to make sense of the direction of
explanation, so to speak. Aristotle is trying to explain why the sublunary bodies imitate
the heavens: “The cause of this [sc. the approach and retreat of the sun], as was often
said, is circular motion … That is also why whatever things change into one another […]
e.g. the simple bodies, imitate circular motion… […] by imitating circular motion
rectilinear motion is continuous, as well.” If “imitate” means “resemble,” then, by
substitution, Aristotle will also be committed to the claim that the rectilinear motion of
the sun north and south is like the rectilinear motion of the elements up and down.
However, the cause of this resemblance is not continuous circular motion. The cause of
the rectilinear motion of the elements is either their nature, or whatever generated
them, or the removal of what was preventing them from moving to their natural place.
But, circular motion was brought in to explain both the movement of the sun north and
south, and the continuity of generation. When Aristotle suggests the sublunary bodies’
rectilinear locomotion imitates circular locomotion, an imperfect motion compared to a
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74d9-e2: ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, 74.e.1
ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι [ἴσον] οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν φαυλότερον.
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perfect motion, this clearly seems like an instance of falling short of or failing to attain a
paradigm. I suggest it is for this reason he used the term “imitate” instead of “resemble.”

2.3.3

Imitation and the Good

I have argued so far that the sense of “imitation” Aristotle uses to describe the motion of
the sublunary bodies is neither equivalent to “participation” nor “resemblance,” but
something closer to what I called the strict sense of paradigm and image. I do not take
this to mean Aristotle thinks the sublunary world is literally an image of the heavens,
any more than I think Plato thinks Bucephalus was literally an image of the Form of
Horse, or that time is literally the moving image of eternity (Timaeus 37d6). Rather,
these metaphors are the result of a perceptual grasp of similarities, and Aristotle thinks it
is the philosopher or scientist who must inquire into whether the similarities can lead us
to an explanation. The metaphor brings with it more than simply the perceived
similarities, but a network of concepts that characterize the phenomena to be explained
as something we already know, so that the scientist can go on to test if that
characterization is appropriate. For Plato, the difficulty was trying to explain the
relation between immaterial and material things. This is also Aristotle’s problem in
Metaphysics, and he will use different metaphors to describe the relationship between
the cosmos and its immaterial source of order and intelligibility.
The explanation of the movement of the sublunary bodies, however, seems like one case
where a metaphor is not needed. The efficient causal explanation seems quite intelligible
without it. What reasons might Aristotle have for using a metaphor to describe the
relation between two material and sensible things, especially a metaphor which he
elsewhere finds problematic? There are two ways we might answer this question. One
answer might be that Aristotle uses “imitation” to make intelligible some final cause that
is left out of the efficient cause explanation. I will present an Aristotelian defense of such
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a view, but I think, ultimately, this is not what Aristotle is trying to express when he
claims the sublunary bodies imitate the celestial cycles. Another answer is that
“imitation” makes something intelligible about the efficient cause of the sublunary
cycles. This is the view that I will endorse, but I want to look at the first answer to try to
motivate why I think the metaphor is not expressing something about final causes.
To understand “imitation” of the celestial by the sublunary cycles, we might look to
something Aristotle thinks the efficient cause does not explain, and see if the metaphor
of imitation might make this more intelligible. Today, we might wonder whether there
is in fact anything left to explain after an efficient causal account is given. Theophrastus
seems to have wondered this as well, namely whether the sublunary bodies (τῶν περὶ τὸ
μέσον) are even parts of the cosmos or not, “since it happens as it were accidentally under
the circular rotation that the changes to their [natural] places and into one another
occur” (Metaphysics 5b23-26). 57 Still, one might believe that even though the sun’s
movement explains why the seasons occur when they do, or why the sublunary bodies
transform into one another when they do, what it fails to explain is why the seasons are
good, or why it is better that they occur. Perhaps he thinks there is some normative fact
left to explain. This normative fact would have something to do with the sublunary
elements’ existence, or perhaps their changes into one another, or the precise periods at
which these changes happen. Even though the efficient cause explains how these occur
and how they will necessarily and eternally occur, it does not explain why it is good that
they occur. To explain this, we need to add the condition that it is better for it to
happen this way.
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συμβάνει γὰρ οἷον κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπὸ τῆς κυκλικῆς περιφορᾶς καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους καὶ εἰς ἄλληλα τὰς
μεταβολάς.
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This suggests one way to understand the relationship between imitation and the first
two metaphors I mentioned at the beginning of this section, that nature always desires
the better and the god provided this benefit.
This has reasonably turned out: for since we assert that nature desires the
best in all things, and being is better than not being (the number of senses
we mean by “being” was talked about in another work), and this cannot
exist in all things because they are too far from the principle, the god, in
the way that was left, completed the whole [sc. the universe], by making
generation perpetual. For in this way being would be as coherent as could
be, because what is closest to the being of substance is that generation
always also come-to-be. (On Generation and Corruption II 10, 336b2534)
This passage seems to suggest that the final cause of continuous generation is the
continuity of being, understood as the completion of the cosmos. It is unlikely that
Aristotle literally meant the god deliberated and acted for the sake of making being as
continuous as possible, using the sun as an instrument to bring this about. But, we could
take the god to be the final cause as aim for everything in the cosmos. The normative
fact that is not explained in the efficient causal account is the fact that everything is as
good as it can be. To say that all of nature desires or strives for that single goal would
provide a teleological account of why what they do is good. Because the movement of
the sublunary bodies is a kind of moving image of something better than them, any
goodness they manifest would be explained by this relation: they are sufficiently like
something good to qualify as being derivatively good. They may not be as good as what
they imitate, but they are not just incidentally good either, since what they are imitating
is goodness itself.
If Aristotle were thinking something like this, he would not necessarily have to admit
that the elements have desires. He could simply take it as basic that all natural things aim
at the good, and admit that, while it is not beneficial for the sublunary bodies to imitate
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the heavenly motions (ἕνεκα οὗ τινι), it is nevertheless a better thing than something else
(βελτίων). It is better because of some relation between the image and its paradigm. For
this strategy to be successful, Aristotle would have to qualify his criticism in Metaphysics
A 7 that the only way for something to be a cause qua good is for it to be a final cause,
and not a formal cause. 58 One way he might go is to say the relation of a paradigm to its
instance confers goodness to a thing if that thing imitates something intrinsically good. If
my hand were guided by a skilled draughtsman, I might produce a beautiful drawing.
While this would not entail that I am good, or even that I benefit by being a part of
producing something beautiful, we would still be likely to say the drawing is good, and
that the movements were good because the drawing was good. Aristotle, then, might not
even need to explain why the elements are good through a final cause. He could explain
why they are good insofar as they are imitations—insofar as they manifest some
objectively good order. 59 In other words, the order of changes in the sublunary bodies
might manifest what we could call beauty or elegance.
Imitation as an explanation of some aesthetic feature of the cosmos may be a direction
an Aristotelian could take, but I admit it is rather far from the text. I think, when forced,
the Aristotelian position must be that there is no final causal relationship between
heaven as paradigm and the sublunary bodies which imitate it. The heavenly bodies do
not operate for the sake of the sublunary ones, nor does it work the other way around.
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“Those who say the one or the existent is the nature [of the good] say it is the cause of substance, but not,
at any rate, that [anything] is or came to be for its sake” (Metaphysics Α 7, 988b12-14).ὡς δ’ αὔτως καὶ οἱ τὸ ἓν
ἢ τὸ ὂν φάσκοντες εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν τῆς μὲν οὐσίας αἴτιόν φασιν εἶναι, οὐ μὴν τούτου γε ἕνεκα ἢ εἶναι ἢ
γίγνεσθαι.
59

A view along similar lines is developed in Judson (2005), Aristotelian Teleology.
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So, to understand why Aristotle would describe their relationship as one of paradigm to
image, we need to look somewhere else.

2.4

Paradigm and Explanation

It remains that there is a uniquely Aristotelian use of “imitation” in his physical writings.
This sense does not suggest participation, and it does not suggest a mere likeness or a
teleological relationship. It is not strictly artistic or emulative, either. Instead, Aristotle
uses these senses to convey something about the relation of a paradigm to its image that
applies only to the relationship between the celestial and sublunary bodies. The reason
must be sought in his account of continuous generation itself.
To explain the continuity of generation, Aristotle appealed to the sun’s apparent
motion north and south between the tropics. The relationship between the sun and
generation and life-cycles on earth can hardly be thought to be an Aristotelian novelty.
What may have been novel was Aristotle’s use of mathematical astronomy to account
for the sun’s apparent movement. But even this seems to be present already in the
Timaeus. 60 What is unique to Aristotle is his characterization of the sun as an unmoved
efficient cause, composed of matter of a different type. The matter of the sublunary
world is matter which-can-be-or-not-be (Generation and Corruption II 9, 335a32-3),
while the celestial realm is composed of what necessarily-is (Generation and Corruption
II 9, 335a28f). Aristotle argues for the fifth element in De Caelo II against Platonists
who conceived of the celestial as fire; but, this distinction is fundamental for Aristotle in
order to explain the continuity of generation.
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See Joachim (1922), Aristotle’s on Generation and Corruption, ad loc.
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It is rarely noted that the only texts in which the expression “being is better than not
being” is found are his two texts on generation. The first is in our text, the other is in a
parallel text at the beginning of On the Generation of Animals II 1:
Τὸ δὲ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν ὅτι μέν εἰσιν ἀρχαὶ γενέσεως εἴρηται πρότερον, καὶ τίς
ἡ δύναμις καὶ ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν· διὰ τί δὲ γίγνεται καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὲν θῆλυ
τὸ δ’ἄρρεν, ὡς μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος καὶ ὁποίας ὕλης,
προϊόντα πειρᾶσθαι δεῖ φράζειν τὸν λόγον, ὡς δὲ διὰ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν
τὴν ἕνεκά τινος ἄνωθεν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχήν.δὲ διὰ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τὴν
ἕνεκά τινος ἄνωθεν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστι τὰ μὲν ἀΐδια καὶ θεῖα τῶν
ὄντων, τὰ δ’ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τὸ θεῖον αἴτιον
ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν τοῦ βελτίονος ἐν τοῖς ἐνδεχομένοις, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀΐδιον
ἐνδεχόμενόν ἐστι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μεταλαμβάνειν καὶ τοῦ χείρονος καὶ τοῦ
βελτίονος· βέλτιον δὲ ψυχὴ μὲν σώματος, τὸ δ’ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου διὰ τὴν
ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν τοῦ μὴ ζῆν, – διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας
γένεσις ζῴων ἐστίν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατος ἡ φύσις τοῦ τοιούτου γένους ἀΐδιος εἶναι,
καθ’ ὃν ἐνδέχεται τρόπον, κατὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν ἀΐδιον τὸ γιγνόμενον. ἀριθμῷ μὲν
οὖν ἀδύνατον – ἡ γὰρ οὐσία τῶν ὄντων ἐν τῷ καθ’ ἕκαστον· τοιοῦτον δ’ εἴπερ
ἦν ἀΐδιον ἂν ἦν – εἴδει δ’ ἐνδέχεται. διὸ γένος ἀεὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ζῴων ἐστὶ καὶ
φυτῶν.
That the female and the male are principles of generation has been
mentioned earlier, both what is their power and the account of their
substance. Why, however, something comes to be and is female, another
male, insofar as it happens from necessity—not only from the first mover
but also from what kind of matter—our account must to try to show as it
proceeds. But insofar as it happens because of the better and the cause for
the sake of something, it has a higher principle. 61 For, since some of the
things that exist are eternal and divine, while others admit of being and
not-being, and the beautiful and the divine are always, according to their
own nature, a cause of the better among things that admit of it, and what
is not eternal is something that admits of being and is allotted a share
[μεταλαμβάνειν] in the worse and the better. But soul is better than body,
and what is ensouled than what lacks soul because of the soul, and being
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For this use of anōthen, LSJ points to Plato, Phaedrus 101d, and Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 97a33.
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than not being and living than not living—because of these causes there is
generation of animals. For, since the nature of such a kind is incapable of
being eternal, in what way [their] nature does admit of [eternal
existence], in this way the generated thing is eternal. It is, therefore,
impossible in number, since the substance of existing things is in the
particular, and if [the particular] were [capable of existing eternally in
number], it would be eternal [in number]. But [the generated thing]
admits [of eternal existence] in kind. For this reason there is always a kind
of human and animals and plants. (On the Generation of Animals II 1,
731b18-732a1)
I want to draw two comparisons between this passage and his account of generation in
general. First, Aristotle claims he will give an efficient causal explanation of animal
generation using the male and female as principles of generation—and he describes the
male as the efficient cause which provides the form, and the female as that which
provides the matter (732a1-11). Thus, like the teleological explanation in On
Generation and Corruption II 10, there is an important sense in which Aristotle
conceives these two efficient causal explanations to be grounded in a final cause.
Aristotle asserts in both texts that generation takes place for the sake of the better.
The second similarity, however, suggests Aristotle’s motivation for grounding the
efficient cause this way. The whole explanation turns on pairs of contraries framed in
normative terms: being is better than not being, soul is better than body, what is
ensouled is better than what does not have soul. In both arguments, Aristotle is
explaining, not just why something came to be, but also why one of two contraries came
to be and not the other. This is a fact of how Aristotle conceives of matter. Aristotle
defines matter as τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι (Generation and Corruption II 9, 335a323) and τὰ δ’ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι (Generation of Animals II 1, 731b25): whatcan-be-or-not-be. Aristotle also treats matter correlatively, that is, for any form F, the
correlative matter of F will be potentially matter for both F and not-F. Both better and
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worse are already present potentially in the matter. To explain why S came to be F and
not not-F, Aristotle thinks we give the efficient cause: S came to be F by the agency of T.
But he still needs to give some sufficient reason for the change proceeding from not-F to
F instead of the other way around. Otherwise, we will have no more explained why T
causes F than not-F. Aristotle’s solution is to designate one of the contrary pairs as
better. So he will say the sun generates, but what it generates out of the matter is not the
(privatives) water or earth; it causes the (positive) dry and moist exhalations. Similarly,
the male generates, but it does not generate a corpse out of the menstrual blood but
something living. The teleological explanation of generation is normative, but it is
normative because of a world conceived as opposites.
Aristotle conceives of the agent of generation in both of these cases as unmoved movers.
He argues this in On Generation and Corruption I 7, and concludes that any process of
change must begin from a single, unmoved mover which causes the agent to act in a
single uniform way. I will leave the discussion of this passage and its ontological
implications for Chapter Two. Instead, I want to suggest that Aristotle defines efficient
causes as causes for only one of a pair of contraries in order to avoid what he saw were
serious difficulties in accounting for regular change through material cause explanations
alone.
Aristotle found his predecessors’ explanations of the sun’s apparent rectilinear motion
unsatisfying because they could not explain why the sun’s motion was regular. If the sun
moved north and south to graze on the earth’s water, why did it not stay longer in the
north after a particularly wet winter? He raises these criticisms earlier in On Generation
and Corruption II 10. The phenomena that both Aristotle and his opponents are trying
to explain is that the sun, as it moves north and south between the tropics, heats and
cools different parts of the earth, and these variations in heat result in the seasons we
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experience. This movement, however, is complex. The sun’s apparent yearly motion
involves two apparent opposite rectilinear movements: one from the northern tropic
(Cancer) accelerating down towards the southern tropic (Capricorn), at which point
the sun slows, stops, turns, and then accelerates again, moving back from south to north.
It is worth noting that Aristotle considers this phenomenon among the causes of
wonder (θαυμαστόν) which initially led humans to philosophize (Metaphysics A 2
983a15, cf. 982b11-28). Certainly, this would be a source of wonder if, as some of
Aristotle’s predecessors had thought, the cause of the sun’s diurnal movement was some
kind of cosmic vortex. Aristotle reports their attempts to explain this complex series of
rectilinear movements in Meteorology II 2. Some explain the sun’s movement north and
south using the sun’s appetite: the sun turns north and south every year, grazing on the
moisture of the earth, staying in one spot until it exhausts the usable moisture and
turning back to the other. Aristotle asks how the other heavenly bodies, which do not
move north and south, manage to survive (Meteorology II 2, 354b33-5). Others explain
that the sun, by warming the earth’s moisture, produces winds which then blow the sun
back and forth (a15). Aristotle remains unconvinced, because in each case the
explanation of the apparent rectilinear motions of the sun was explained by the
reciprocal action of the sun and earth.
Aristotle will not accept these explanations, in part because he does not think the sun is
reciprocally affected by the earth, but, more importantly, because he thinks these kinds
of explanations fail to give sufficient reasons for the stability of the period between the
solstices (On Generation and Corruption II 10, 336b16-24). If there were more moisture
in the north one year, why would the sun not remain there to forage longer? Or why
would it not be blown further south by the greater ensuing wind? Aristotle’s preferred
solution is the one proposed by mathematical astronomy, namely that these alternating
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movements can be shown to result from two uniform circular motions: the continuous
diurnal motion of the sun from east to west, and the sun’s continuous yearly motion
west to east inclined slightly along the ecliptic. The aim of these criticisms is to set up
the conditions that a proper efficient causal explanation must meet. It must be able to
solve these problems, in order to establish that generation and corruption in the
sublunary realm will (a) be continuous necessarily and (b) will occur roughly according
to periods determined by the sun. His strategy will be to attribute this “rough”
correspondence, which would be fatal to the theories of his predecessors, to irregularities
in the matter (336b20-24). 62
These criticisms, however, point to a deeper criticism of the materialists approach to
explanation of regular change that Aristotle introduced in Generation and Corruption II
9:
τῆς μὲν γὰρ ὕλης τὸ πάσχειν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ κινεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν
ἑτέρας δυνάμεως. Δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τέχνῃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει γινομένων· οὐ
γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ τὸ ὕδωρ ζῷον ἐξ αὑτοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον κλίνην, ἀλλ’ ἡ τέχνη.
Ὥστε καὶ οὗτοι διὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς, καὶ ὅτι παραλείπουσι τὴν
κυριωτέραν αἰτίαν· ἐξαιροῦσι γὰρ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὴν μορφήν. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ
τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδιδόασι τοῖς σώμασι, δι’ ἃς γεννῶσι, λίαν ὀργανικῶς,
ἀφαιροῦντες τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰτίαν. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πέφυκεν, ὥς φασι, τὸ μὲν
θερμὸν διακρίνειν τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν συνιστάναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν
ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, ἐκ τούτων λέγουσι καὶ διὰ τούτων ἅπαντα τἆλλα
γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι· φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὸ πῦρ αὐτὸ κινούμενον καὶ πάσχον.
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See note in Joachim (1922), Aristotle’s on Generation and Corruption, ad loc. The interpretation I give is
close to the one presented in Menn (2012), “Aristotle’s Theology” in Shields, Ed., The Oxford Handbook of
Aristotle There is good deal of confusion in the literature about Aristotle’s “mechanical” explanation of the
sun’s yearly motion. Some people think, like Mary Louise Gill, that the dual-motion Aristotle discusses is the
sun’s two celestial and real motions east-west (along the celestial equator) and west-east (along the ecliptic).
By contrast, I am claiming the two motions are the apparent motions north-south and south-north. A
thorough defense of this interpretation is not my aim here. For a good explanation of the other option, see
Gill (1994), “Aristotle on Self-Motion” in Gill and Lennox, Eds., Self-Motion: From Aristotle to Newton, 258
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For, to begin with, it is characteristic of matter to suffer action, i.e. to be
moved; but to move, i.e. to act, belongs to a different power. This is
obvious both in the things that come-to-be by art and in those that cometo-be by nature. Water does not of itself produce out of itself an animal;
and it is the art, not the wood, that makes a bed. Nor is this their only
error. They make a second mistake in omitting the more controlling
cause; for they eliminate the essential nature, i.e. the form. And what is
more, since they remove the formal cause, they invest the forces they
assign to the simple bodies—the forces which enable these bodies to
bring things into being—with too instrumental a character. For since (as
they say) it is the nature of the hot to dissociate, of the cold to bring
together, and of each remaining contrary either to act or to suffer action,
it is out of such materials and by their agency (so they maintain) that
everything else comes-to-be and passes-away. Yet it is evident that even
Fire is itself moved, i.e. suffers action. (On Generation and Corruption II
9, 335b30-336a8, tr. Joachim)
The materialists conceive of the simple bodies themselves, things like water and fire, as
the causes of change. Even the more sophisticated materialists who explain change as the
result of some δύναμις present in the matter, like the hot and the cold, also conceive of all
change as the action of one of a pair of contraries on another. Aristotle is pointing out
that, if we attempt to explain the regularity and order of change by appealing to material
causes alone, we are liable to confuse our intentions for nature’s.
Aristotle wants us to think of examples like throwing water on a fire: on throwing the
water on the fire, we might unreflectively say that the water has cooled the fire. It is
these cases where Aristotle thinks we are liable to go wrong, since both fire and water act
on one another reciprocally and therefore there is just as much reason to say that the fire
warmed the water as there is to say the water cooled the fire. The materialist explanation
gives no sufficient reason why one is the agent and the other the patient, nor can it say
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what would license describing one as agent rather than the other. 63 One might think,
because the fire went out, we can say that the water was the efficient cause in this case,
and in this case Aristotle would agree, but not because the water was an efficient cause,
but because the person putting out the fire was the efficient cause and used the water as
an instrument. He thinks this is precisely the problem with the materialists’ way of
approaching change. They “invest the forces they assign to the simple bodes with too
instrumental (λίαν ὀργανικῶς) a character.” The smith may say that the fire heated the
iron, but the reason he thinks the fire heated the iron (fire makes things become hot) is
not the same as the reason why the fire heated the iron (because he wanted to heat the
iron in order to produce something). Aristotle thinks the mistake the materialists make
is to abstract themselves out of the process, while leaving their intentionality in it, while
the only proper way to describe the reciprocal affection of (say) the iron and fire is as a
kind of mixture (μίξις cf. On Generation and Corruption I 10, 327a30f). Since the
materialists will be unable in principle to say which of two contraries acted on the other,
they will also be unable to explain how anything as complex as an animal came to be out
of them. 64 The matter is incapable of acting without being acted upon, and so cannot
produce a single, uniform motion in what it affects.
Aristotle thinks that, in order to be an efficient cause properly speaking, it must be
reciprocally unaffected or unmoved, and a cause of only one of two contraries (On
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Menn (2010), “On Socrates’ First Objections to the Physicists - Phaedo 95e8-97b7”, Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy, 96 has recently argued this criticism originates in Plato’s critique of material cause
explanation in Phaedo.
64

Aristotle consistently rejects the idea that animals can be spontaneously generated by the matter; the sun
can generate animals spontaneously. He considers fire (De Anima II 4, 415a1f; On the Generation of Animals
II 3, 737a6) and water On Generation and Corruption II 9 above. Likely these were entertained by someone.
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Generation and Corruption I 7, cf. Physics III 2-3). 65 The sun, in order to be a cause of
continuous generation must also be unmixed with the sublunary elements, which might
change, and it must be separate so that, while it is the cause of effects in the matter, the
matter is not a cause of effects within it. Finally, the sun’s motion must be the efficient
cause of a single effect, otherwise there would be no sufficient reason to explain why it
causes generation instead of the perishing of the sublunary body. 66 The clearest way
Aristotle can think of to express this direction of efficient causal influence is to say that
“the simple bodies imitate circular motion” (τὰ ἁπλᾶ σώματα μιμεῖται τὴν κύκλῳ φοράν).
Thus, the relation between the two kinds of body—immortal and perishable—is one of
imitation: the sun, as efficient cause, causes an image of its circular movement in the
continuous rectilinear movement of earth, water, air and fire.
It is no surprise, therefore, when Aristotle gives analogous explanations of generation in
plants and animals, that he describes nature as “fashioning” or “crafting” the embryo in
the womb. Both the metaphor of craft and that of imitation are means of conveying the
apparent truth that the heavens and living natures are the sources of regular, ordered
change. They differ in that, while animals produce something that is one in species
(Generation of Animals II 1, cited above), 67 or another like itself (τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον
αὐτό) (De anima II 4, 416a28), the sun creates an image of itself. Animals, in other
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For a more developed account of this, see Chapter Two. The relation of On Generation and Corruption I 7
and the De Anima’s account of the soul as an unmoved mover is worked out in detail in Menn (2002),
“Aristotle’s Definition of Soul and the Programme of the De Anima”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 22.
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Cf. On Generation and Corruption II 11, 337a22: “what initiates [the movement] must be single, unmoved,
ungenerated, and incapable of alteration.”

67

There is also resemblance to the parent, but Aristotle never speaks of these as ‘imitations’. Cf. Generation
of Animals IV 3, 767a36 ff.
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words, create tokens of the same type. Their reproductive faculty is an efficient cause of
one effect: the production of something specifically like himself. The sun, however, has a
different kind of nature from that found in the sublunary realm: its nature is eternal and
its movement continuous, but what it creates is not something else eternal and
continuous, but a moving image of itself. To make this difference clear, he calls the one
the demiurgic nature (ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις, On the Parts of Animals I 5, 645a9), and
the other θεῖον.

2.5

Conclusion

I have attempted to show that there is a uniquely Aristotelian sense of “imitation” in his
natural philosophy. On the one hand, he uses the metaphor of “craft” to describe
species-specific generation. On the other, he uses the metaphor of “imitation” to
describe the sun’s efficient causal relationship to sublunary bodies. The sun is the cause
of generation to the sublunary bodies, and so it is an efficient cause of order to the
perishable things it acts on. However, it is not a cause of something’s being what it is.
The sun is not, for instance, a cause of what fire is, but it is a cause of fire’s actuality and
of its actualization occurring with a roughly periodic order. Finally, when Aristotle
refers to being as better than not being, and the god or divine acting for the sake of the
better, he is giving a sufficient reason to account for the direction of change in the
matter from one contrary to another. This need not suggest Aristotle is confused or less
pious for appealing to metaphors of craftsman or paradigms, nor does it suggest he is
engaged in what he himself would call bad science. Rather, it suggests a careful use of
metaphor as a heuristic “to help get hold of something fresh.”
To conclude, I present a summary of the results of this investigation into metaphor in
Aristotle’s science. Aristotle thinks metaphor can deploy what I call theoretic
necessities, expectations for what an appropriate scientific explanation must be like.
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Metaphors, therefore, are heuristics and a part of Aristotle’s method of inquiry. One use
of metaphor that posed a problem for my view is ‘imitation’, which, on the majority
view, Aristotle uses to explain the final cause of sublunary entities. I have argued,
instead, that when he begins inquiring into the causes that explain why the seasons
follow certain changes in the heavens, Aristotle thinks the metaphor of imitation
provides a heuristic for how to investigate those causal relations. The cycle of the
sublunary bodies is an imitation of the cycle of the heavenly bodies, as a statue is a
representation or imitation of a model. This metaphor might be justified by our
acquaintance, either through observation or authority, with similarities between both
phenomena; but, what justifies the extension of causal relations from one domain
(artistic production) to another domain (the seasonal cycles) is the ontological
implication of metaphor: both in fact share some predicate or predicates, which will
relate them as genus to species, species to genus, genus to genus, or analogically. Of
course, Aristotle does not think we can know the ontological ground of this similarity
until we have a proper scientific definition of both phenomena. We cannot know, for
instance, that both the seasons and artistic representations are species of imitation until
we have a proper scientific definition of both. Only then will we know in the strict sense
whether the metaphor is appropriate. Aristotle, however, recognizes other grades of
epistemic assent: we might have a true belief that the cycle of the seasons and artistic
representations are similar, because they both seem to resemble but fall short of some
model or pattern. Then again, our belief might be grounded in myths or religious
commitments, for instance that the heavenly bodies are divine and creative forces in the
world around is. Such true beliefs provide some justification for thinking that the causes
of both phenomena are similar. Working out the details is where much of science gets
done.
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3. On the Principle of Separation in Aristotle’s Biology ∗

εἴπατε δ’ ὡς τὰ πρῶτα θεοὶ καὶ γαῖα γένοντο[…]
Hesiod, Theogony, l. 108. 1

3.1

The Myth of Separation

In Theogony, Hesiod explains the origin of the sexes as the result of the first act of
violence, an act that brought about a new world order. 2 After Gaia was formed out of
Chaos, she herself bore Ouranos and the two together produced the race of Titans.
Ouranos, however, bound himself to Gaia in continuous sexual union and this union
forced their offspring deep within the bowels of the earth. And the order of Titans
remained hidden in their mother until she was able to convince her son, Cronus, to
castrate Ouranos from within her, separating the earth from the sky and the female from
the male, and this separation allowed Gaia to bring out into the world all those forms
latent within her depths.
The existence of males and females suggested to Hesiod that reproduction in the natural
order requires their separation, that offspring would be impossible without them. Yet,
when Aristotle came to give a naturalistic account of reproduction, he denied the
separation of male and female was necessary. Instead, he claims it is better, and for this
reason, wherever it is possible, males and females will be separate.

∗

All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

1

“Tell me, O Muse, how, at first, gods and earth came to be…”

2

Theogony, ll. 116 ff.
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Aristotle argues for this conclusion at the beginning of Book Two of On the Generation
of Animals (731b18-732a10), and central to the argument is what we might call, the
“principle of separation.” The principle of separation is one of a family of normative
principles that makes reference to the comparative value of correlative opposites. 3
Aristotle uses these principles in several well-known teleological accounts of natural
phenomena, and all of these explanations, in turn, use the relative value of certain
locations or things as an explanation of the phenomena being investigated. For example,
he invokes the principle that the right-hand side is more honourable than the left to
explain the universal tendency of things—both heavenly and terrestrial—to move
towards the right (De Caelo II 5, 288a2-10; On the Gait of Animals 4, 706a20-26).
Similar principles include “the upper is more honourable than the lower,” “form is more
divine than matter,” and “the separation of the superior from the inferior is better.”
There are two questions we might ask about the legitimacy of these normative principles
in Aristotle’s natural philosophy. First, it is hard to see how these are empirically robust
first principles established inductively by observations of the natural world. Rather, they
seem to reflect common Greek attitudes and prejudices, which Aristotle simply takes
over unchallenged. Second, they do not seem to be methodologically sound. According
to his standards for scientific explanations, appeals to what is “better” or “best” should
always be said relative to the specific substance being explained (Physics II 7; On the Gait

3

Because these opposites are primarily described spatially—up and down, right and left—Mariska Leunissen
has called them “principles of balanced distribution.” Leunissen (2010), Explanation and Teleology in
Aristotle’s Science of Nature, 124.
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of Animals 2). In light of this they seem to have too wide a scope to be explanatorily
useful. 4
In this paper, I use Aristotle’s explanation of the separation of the sexes in On the
Generation of Animals, which appeals to the principle that “the separation of the
superior from the inferior is better,” as a case study for exploring these questions. What
is important about the “principle of separation” is that Aristotle uses it to explain not
only why males are separate from females (On the Generation of Animals II 1, 732a5),
but also why some animals have multi-chambered hearts (On the Parts of Animals III 4,
666b21-667a6), why animals that move are right-handed (On the Gait of Animals 4,
706a20), and why the upper parts of the body are separated from the lower parts (On the
Parts of Animals III 10, 672b19). Given its range of uses, I maintain that this principle is
not a piece of unreflective prejudice, but that there are good Aristotelian reasons
grounding it. I will argue that the principle does indeed make sense, but only in light of
Aristotle’s prior understanding of efficient causation: if regular, ordered change is one of
Aristotle’s explanada, then he has reason to say it is always better (although perhaps not
necessary) for an agent of such change to be unaffected when it acts.
However, even if the principle of separation has some justification, its use in scientific
contexts still raises questions. Is the principle of separation methodologically sound or is
it too general? What does it suggest about the role of dialectically established principles
(endoxa) in natural science? 5 Finally, what is the epistemic status of this and other

4
5

Leunissen (2010), Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature, 123

Charles Kahn, for instance, suggests that if a claim like “it is better for the superior to be distinct” is
regarded as an explanation, “it might well impeded the search for a genuinely functional account of the
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normative principles? Are they meant to be premises in the ultimate demonstrative
explanation? Or, following Leunissen’s suggestion, are they heuristic devices that point
us towards the ultimate causes that figure in the demonstrative explanation? 6 Answering
these questions will help us gain a better understanding of the role of such normative
principles in Aristotle’s natural science.

3.2

The Question

The “principle of separation” occurs in several different formulations in the biological
works, and as we will see, Aristotle always presents it as a justification for why the
“nobler” or “superior” member of a pair of opposites is separated from the less-valued
member. In On the Generation of Animals II 1, it appears as: “the separation of the
superior from the inferior is better.” Aristotle uses this principle in explanations
involving correlative opposites like up and down, right and left, and, in the argument for
the separation of the sexes, male and female. At the beginning of II 1, he reminds us that
“the female and the male are principles of generation” (731b18) and asks “why
something comes to be and is female, another male” (b20). He says he will go on to
explain why distinct sexes exist “insofar as it happens from necessity,” and he turns to
this in Book Four of the Generation of Animals. But his immediate concern is to explain
why distinct sexes come to be “because of the better and the cause for the sake of

separation of the sexes.” Kahn (1985), “The Place of the Prime Mover in Aristotle’s Teleology” in Balme and
Gotthelf, Eds., Aristotle on Nature and Living Things, 195.
6

Leunissen (2010), Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature, 42. A similar view is also given
in Gotthelf (1988), “The Place of the Good in Aristotle’s Natural Teleology”, Proceedings of the Boston Area
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 4, 134.
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something” (b22-3). 7 He claims the reason “has a higher [ἄνωθεν] principle” (b23), and
what follows is a complex argument establishing the final cause of generation itself.
Having established the final cause of generation, he gives the following argument for the
final cause of the separation of the sexes: 8
[i] ἐπεὶ δὲ τούτων ἀρχὴ τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν ἕνεκα τῆς γενέσεως ἂν εἴη τὸ
θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν ἐν τοῖς <ἔχ>ουσιν. [ii] βελτίονος δὲ καὶ θειοτέρας τὴν φύσιν
οὔσης τῆς αἰτίας τῆς κινούσης πρώτης – ᾗ ὁ λόγος ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ εἶδος – τῆς
ὕλης, [iii] βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κεχωρίσθαι τὸ κρεῖττον τοῦ χείρονος. [iv] διὰ τοῦτ’
ἐν ὅσοις ἐνδέχεται καὶ καθ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται κεχώρισται τοῦ θήλεος τὸ ἄρρεν·
[v] βέλτιον γὰρ καὶ θειότερον ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως ᾗ τὸ ἄρρεν ὑπάρχει τοῖς
γιγνομένοις – ὕλη δὲ τὸ θῆλυ.[vi] συνέρχεται δὲ καὶ μίγνυται πρὸς τὴν
ἐργασίαν τῆς γενέσεως τῷ θήλει τὸ ἄρρεν· αὕτη γὰρ κοινὴ ἀμφοτέροις.
[i] Since the female and the male are a principle of [living things], the
female and the male are for the sake of generation among existing things. 9
[ii] But as the first moving cause (to which belongs the account and the
form) is better and more divine in its nature than the matter, [iii] so also
the separation of the superior from the inferior is better. [iv] For this
reason, among whatever admits [of separation] and as far as it admits of
it, the male has been separated from the female. [v] For, the principle of
motion, by which the male belongs to generated things, is better and
more divine, while the female is matter. [vi]But the male comes together

7

The meaning of ἄνωθεν (which I have translated, ‘higher’) is unclear. Peck (1963), Aristotle. Generation of
Animals, ad loc, suggests it is a reference to the prime mover, apparently since the heavens and the god are
‘up there’. Balme (1972), Aristotle. De Partibus Animalium I and De Generatíone Animalium I (with Passages
from Ii. 1-3), ad loc suggests a deflationary reading: it can mean simply “prior” (he cites Bonitz’ Index
Aristotelicus 68b44, 69a20) and suggests Aristotle is referring to a prior final cause, i.e., generation. However,
if the prime mover is a final cause, it too is “prior” and so Balme’s suggestion does not solve the issue. I
present my own solution below.

8

I discuss the first part this argument in chapter one. Other interpretations are offered by Balme (1972),
Aristotle. De Partibus Animalium I and De Generatíone Animalium I (with Passages from Ii. 1-3), ad loc, Kahn
(1985), “The Place of the Prime Mover in Aristotle’s Teleology” , Lennox (2001), Aristotle’s Philosophy of
Biology: Studies in the Origins of Life Science, 133-154, and Mirus (2004), “Aristotle’s ‘Agathon’“, The Review
of Metaphysics 57(3).

9

Alternatively, “among things that have males and females.”
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and mixes with the female for the task of generation, since this [task] is
shared by both of them. (On Generation of Animals II 1, 732a1-732a10)
In the argument, the principle of separation—[iii] “the separation of the superior from
the inferior is better”—is presented as the reason “because of the better and for the sake
of something” for distinct sexes. Aristotle argues [ii] the moving cause, which has the
form, is better and more divine than the matter and [iii] the separation of the superior
from the inferior is better; but since [v] the male is the moving cause, the female the
matter, therefore, [iv] the male is separated from the female as far as possible. The
argument is rather straightforward, but given his characterization of males and females
as principles of generation, questions arise about how to interpret the principle of
separation. The argument begins with the claim that generation is the final cause of
males and females. This follows from the fact that they are principles of living things:
what male and female principles are principles for is the generation of living things.
Aristotle, in fact, has stated this claim at the beginning of II 1, but his argument for this
claim is found in Generation of Animals I 18-21, and it is worth looking at his argument
here, since how he characterizes males and females as principles is important for
understanding much of the argument.
In On the Generation of Animals I 18-21, Aristotle gives arguments to characterize males
and females as a particular kind of principle of living things. He thinks they are not, as
many of his predecessors believed, principles as elements or constituents of living things;
rather, he believes that they are moving and material causes. He introduces his argument
by asking “how is it that the male contributes to generation, and how is the seed from
the male a cause of what is produced” (I 21, 729b1-2 tr. Balme)? He then gives two
answers, one according to reason (κατὰ τὸν λόγον) and one empirical (κατὰ τὴν
αἰσθήσιν). The rational argument turns on Aristotle’s distinction between agents and
patients of change. If the female, qua female, is identified with the patient, while the
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male qua male is the agent of generation, then since “we do not see one thing being
produced out of agent and patient in the sense that the agent is present within the
product, nor indeed (to generalize) out of mover and moved” (729b10-11 tr. Balme),
then “clearly it is not necessary that something should come away from the male; and if
something does come away, it does not follow that the offspring is made out of it as out
of something present within, but only as out of mover and form, in the way that the
cured invalid is the product of the medical art” (729b18-22 tr. Balme). 10 The point of
the analogy to the medical art is that, just as in the case of a medicine, no part of the
doctor is a material constituent of the health of patient, so also in the case of
reproduction, no part of the male is a constituent of the being of the offspring. Rather,
the male is a moving cause of the offspring, as the doctor is a moving cause of health, and
the female is a material cause of the offspring, as a sick patient is the material cause of
health.
To return to Aristotle’s argument for the separation of the sexes, he posits that [ii] the
principle of motion (the moving cause “to which belongs the account and the form,” i.e.,
the first moving cause and not simply the body of the semen or the vital heat) is “better
and more divine” than the matter on which it acts, and in premise [v] he brings in his
conclusion from On the Generation of Animals I 21 to infer that the male, which is the
principle of motion, is better and more divine than the female. And from the inference
that the male is better and more divine than the female, along with the principle of
separation ([iii] the separation of the superior from the inferior is better), he concludes,

10

This is discussed in detail in Preus (1970), “Science and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals”,
Journal of the History of Biology 3(1).
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[iv] “among whatever admits [of separation] and as far as it admits of it, the male has
been separated from the female.”
One problem for interpreting this passage is Aristotle’s move from premise [ii] (as the
first moving cause (to which belongs the account and the form) is better and more
divine in its nature than the matter) to premise [iii], the principle of separation (so also
the separation of the superior from the inferior is better). Is Aristotle inferring the
principle of separation from the fact that the male is moving cause and the female the
material, or is it an assumption? The principle of separation is also problematic for two
further reasons. One reason is that the scope of the premise is unclear: whether Aristotle
is inferring premise [iii] from premise [ii] or not, he does not state whether the inference
is restricted to efficient causes or to principles, or even whether its scope is
unrestricted. 11 There are, therefore, three possible way to understand the premise: the
fact that “separation is better” might follow from something about moving causes and
material causes (i.e., it is better for moving causes to be separate from their matter); or
Aristotle might think it is better for principles in general to be separate from that what
they are principles of; or the claim might simply be, for any two things, if one is better
than the other, then the separation of those two things is also better.

11

Balme’s translation forces the issues. He translates, “but the proximate moving cause is…better; and it is
better that the more excellent be separated from the worse” Balme (1972), Aristotle. De Partibus Animalium I
and De Generatíone Animalium I (with Passages from Ii. 1-3), ad loc. Peck in the Loeb edition and Platt in the
Revised Oxford Translation leave the inference ambiguous. Peck translates: “as the proximate motive
cause…is better and more divine…it is better also that the superior one should be separate….” Peck (1963),
Aristotle. Generation of Animals, 133. Platt’s text reads: “as the first efficient cause…is better and more
divine…, it is better that the superior principle should be separate…” Barnes (1984), The Complete Works of
Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation.
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Another reason the premise is problematic is that Aristotle provides us with no reasons
for thinking it is true. In fact, it is quite easy to come up with counter-examples where it
is clearly false. Aristotle would have to admit that, sometimes, it is better for the superior
to be united with what is inferior. It is certainly better for an artist to be united with the
material she works on, as it is better for a doctor to be in contact with her patient. And
in the very case under consideration, certainly it is better sometimes for the male to be
united with the female, the superior and the inferior, if the final cause of males and
females is generation. If males and females are moving and material causes of generation,
they would presumably need to be united for generation to occur. And Aristotle himself
seems to add this, almost as an aside, when he says [vi] “the male comes together and
mixes with the female for the task of generation, since this [task] is shared by both of
them.” Like Hesiod, Aristotle sees some connection between separation of the sexes and
generation, but he must also admit that generation equally requires the union of both
sexes. Separation is not always better. The question then, is what “separation” means in
this context. Does it mean physically distinct? Not in physical contact? Or does is it a
negative characterization, suggesting merely that males and females are not always
engaging in reproduction?
There is a further problem for Aristotle if the scope of the premise is unrestricted.
Aristotle thinks that plants as well as animals have both male and female principles; and
while these principles are located in distinct beings in most animals, they are united in
plants. 12 And since the argument is meant to explain that male and female animals exist

12

Generation of Animals I 18, 724b10; cf. I 23, 731a29-30. At On the Generation of Animals I 1, 715b19, he
states simply that there are no males and females among plants, although sometimes plants are called “male”
or “female” “in virtue of resemblance and analogy” (b21). His point, then, is not about whether plants have
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in order that the male and female principles of generation might be separate, the
argument should equally apply to plants. The principle of separation should apply
equally to plants as well as to animals, but if it did, it would fail to explain why male and
female principles are separate in the one but not the other. Without a criterion for
excluding plants from what admits of separation, the argument fails.
One way Aristotle might avoid these difficulties would be if such a criterion were
implicit in Aristotle’s methodological commitments. One of these commitments, stated
in Physics II 7 and On the Gait of Animals 2, is that the better is always a cause, not
without qualification (ἁπλῶς), but relative to the substance of each thing (πρὸς τὴν
ἑκάστου οὐσίαν) (Physics II 7, 198b8-9). 13 On this reading, when Aristotle says ‘the
separation of the superior from the inferior is better’, he does not mean it is just better
that the two should be separate. Rather, he means the separation of the superior is better
for something. Aristotle’s reference to the value of separation might be understood in
terms of “advantage for” or “contribution to” the life of an organism. If we interpret it in
this way, Aristotle would not be claiming that separating the superior from the inferior
is the final cause of the separation of the sexes. Rather, the existence of separate sexes
would be beneficial for or contribute to some other function of animals. The principle
of separation, then, would not be a full explanation in itself, but a heuristic for

male or female principles (or both) but whether there are male and female plants as there are male and
female animals.
13

Physics II 7, 198b8-9: “καὶ διότι βέλτιον οὕτως, οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου οὐσίαν”; repeated at On
the Gait of Animals 2. It does not matter for my argument whether “relative to each substance” means “each
particular substance taken severally” or “each substance taken inclusively.” The first (strong) reading entails
that what something is better for must be a particular thing. The second (weak) reading entails that better in
natural science does not apply universally but only relatively. These issues are discussed in Johnson (2005),
Aristotle on Teleology, 92-93. For a recent survey of this dispute, see Sedley (2010), “Teleology: Aristotelian
and Platonic” in Lennox and Bolton, Eds., Being, Nature, and Life in Aristotle, 198.
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discovering the biological advantage provided by separation, and also what it is about
animals (and not plants) that accounts for the presence of this advantage. According to
Leunissen, Aristotle uses such “teleological principles” to pick out both the vital
function that benefits from a particular part or its differentiation, and also “why this
part is in fact the best fit for the animal that has it.” 14 In essence, then, teleological
principles are quasi-explanations that lead us to answers to two related questions: Why
is a feature found (or lacking) in some organisms but not in others? What is that feature
for? The question, then, is what Aristotle might think separation is better for in such a
way that it contributes some benefit to an animals’ way of life.

3.3

Separation and Sensation

If the principle of separation were a teleological principle, then, as many scholars have
suggested, one plausible answer to the question, “what is separation for?” would be some
contribution it makes to sensation. 15 The central text that supports this view is in On the
Generation of Animals I 23:
Καὶ ταῦτα πάντα εὐλόγως ἡ φύσις δημιουργεῖ. τῆς μὲν γὰρ τῶν φυτῶν οὐσίας
οὐθέν ἐστιν ἄλλο ἔργον οὐδὲ πρᾶξις οὐδεμία πλὴν ἡ τοῦ σπέρματος γένεσις,
ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ τοῦτο διὰ τοῦ θήλεος γίγνεται καὶ τοῦ ἄρρενος συνδεδυασμένων,

14
15

Leunissen (2010), Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature, 208.

The earliest testimony I have been able to find for this interpretation is in Michael of Ephesus’
commentary on the Generation of Animals. Theophrastus says next to nothing about sexual differentiation in
plants, except to say that “male” and “female” are applied to plants homonymously. More recently, this has
been suggested by Lulofs (1957), “Aristotle’s Περι Φϒτων”, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 77(1) In his
commentary on On the Generation of Animals II 1, 732a3, Balme suggests separation occurs “presumably
because the male can function better as a cognitive animal when not combined with the more material
female nature.” See Balme (1972), Aristotle. De Partibus Animalium I and De Generatíone Animalium I (with
Passages from Ii. 1-3), ad loc. Also, Robert Mayhew, citing Balme’s, has made much the same point: Mayhew
(2004), The Female in Aristotle’s Biology: Reason or Rationalization, 39 n20. See also, Lennox (2001) “Are
Aristotelian Species Eternal”, 133. Henry, “How sexist is Aristotle’s developmental biology”, Phronesis 52,
2007, 17-18.
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μίξασα ταῦτα διέθηκε μετ’ ἀλλήλων· διὸ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀχώριστον τὸ θῆλυ καὶ
τὸ ἄρρεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐν ἑτέροις ἐπέσκεπται, τοῦ δὲ ζῴου οὐ μόνον
τὸ γεννῆσαι ἔργον (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ κοῖνον τῶν ζώντων πάντων), ἀλλὰ καὶ
γνώσεώς τινος πάντα μετέχουσι, τὰ μὲν πλείονος τὰ δ’ ἐλάττονος τὰ δὲ
πάμπαν μικρᾶς. αἴσθησιν γὰρ ἔχουσιν, ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις γνῶσίς τις. ταύτης δὲ τὸ
τίμιον καὶ ἄτιμον πολὺ διαφέρει σκοποῦσι πρὸς φρόνησιν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τῶν
ἀψύχων γένος. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ οὐδὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ κοινωνεῖν
ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως μόνον, πρὸς δὲ φυτὸν ἢ λίθον θαυμάσιον· ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἂν
δόξειε καὶ ταύτης τυχεῖν τῆς γνώσεως ἀλλὰ μὴ κεῖσθαι τεθνεὸς καὶ μὴ ὄν.
διαφέρει δ’ αἰσθήσει τὰ ζῷα τῶν ζώντων μόνον. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀνάγκη καὶ ζῆν, ἐὰν ᾖ
ζῷον, ὅταν δεήσῃ ἀποτελεῖν τὸ τοῦ ζῶντος ἔργον, τότε συνδυάζεται καὶ
μίγνυται καὶ γίγνεται ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ φυτόν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν.
And nature reasonably fashions all these things. For, the substance of
plants is no other function or activity than the generation of seed, so that,
since this comes about because of the union of the female and the male,
[nature], mixing them, has brought them together. For this reason,
among plants, the female and the male are not separate. […] The function
of the animal is not only generation (for this is common to all living
things), but they also all share in some knowledge – some more, some less,
some very little – for they have perception, perception being a certain
knowledge. (If we consider the value of this we find that it is of great
importance compared with the class of lifeless objects, but of little
compared with the use of the intellect. For against the latter the mere
participation in touch and taste seems to be practically nothing, but
beside absolute insensibility it seems most excellent; for it would seem a
treasure to gain even this kind of knowledge rather than to lie in a state of
death and non-existence.) Now it is by sense-perception that an animal
differs from those organisms which have only life. But since, if it is a
living animal, it must also live; therefore, when it is necessary for it to
accomplish the function of that which has life, it unites and copulates,
becoming like a plant, as we said before. (On the Generation of Animals I
23, 731a25-b8)
It is natural to see in this passage a claim that separation is somehow beneficial to
sensation. Plants have no other function than generation of seed, and so their sexes are
not separate; animals, however, also share in perception, and this seems to imply that, if
plants did have some other function like sensation, it would be better if their sexes were
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separate. Exactly how separation benefits sensation is unclear, but we could reconstruct
plausible advantages for an animal. Separation might be better for sensation because
animals, were they constantly united, would be distracted from other activities like
perceiving and moving and combinations that make up a particular animal’s way of life.
Michael of Ephesus suggests such a final cause in his commentary on this passage:
Since in addition to [the task of] generating [offspring], animals also
share in knowledge, the male and the female in animals are separated
from one another, so that they might live rightly and unimpeded with
respect to that capacity for knowledge [ἵν’ ἀνεμποδίστως καὶ καλῶς
διατελῶσι περὶ τὰς γνώσεις ὧν μετειλήφασι]. For the mixing of the male and
female together with one another brings about confusion [σύγχυσις], and
their knowledge [γνῶσις] would be altogether impotent [ἀδρανὴς] and
confused [συγκεχυμένη] and not pure and steady [οὐ καθαρὰ καὶ ἑδραία].
(ps-Philoponus [Michael of Ephesus], Paraphrase on the Generation of
Animals, 64.21-25) 16
Sexual reproduction, Michael asserts, is a hindrance to our highest capacity. Thus, the
advantage organisms receive from having separate sexes is a reprieve from sexual activity
that might have impeded organisms from exercising whatever share in a rational capacity
they have. Perhaps, then, the final cause of separation is intermittent sexual
reproduction.
If Aristotle did think separation contributed to sensation, his reasons are never spelled
out. Robert Mayhew, following a suggestion of David Balme’s, claims that “[t]he
essential difference between plants and animals is that plants do not possess any
cognitive abilities, whereas every animal possesses some kind of cognition. So, Aristotle
reasons, this separation must have something to do with cognition” (Mayhew, 39 n20).

16

However, Michael also thinks separation was an act of providence, the active wish of a God trying to make
everything like itself.
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Yet, as Mayhew goes on to note, “it is still unclear what (cognitive) function separating
the male and the female serves” (ibid.). It is unclear, I suggest, not only because Aristotle
fails to state what the advantage might be; it is also unclear whether or not Aristotle
draws any causal inference from this correlation. Michael’s commentary is instructive on
this point, not because he got Aristotle right, but because he was forced to invent some
advantage that having separate sexes might confer. Had Aristotle stated a positive
position on this somewhere, he likely would have provided that answer. And this
suggests he could not find any such advantage in Aristotle’s texts. Aristotle may have left
open the question of what benefit separation might have, or he may not have thought
there was any advantage for the organism at all. 17 More importantly, Aristotle does not
use any language in this passage that suggests he is talking about advantage at all. He
refers to a scale of value amongst kinds of living things; but this does not, without
reasons, entail advantage. That separation contributes to sensation is something
Aristotle could have said, and perhaps, according to Michael, should have said, but he
does not. Thus, it remains to consider some other reason for the connection between
sensation and separation. 18

17

When Mayhew writes, “(cognitive) function”, the parentheses could be seen as an admission that it is open
to Aristotle to think some function other than cognition is on the table. Mayhew does not go on to suggest
what this might be. The problem, obviously, is that there is no reason to think, even given a correlation
between separate sexes and organisms with cognition, that cognition is the relevant feature that benefitted by
separation. The interpretation assumes Aristotle thought this correlation (separate sexes and perceptual
capacity) must be teleologically—i.e., directly and causally—related.
18

Another problem for this view is that it suggests On the Generation of Animals I 23 and II 1 form a single
argument. This is suggested by Balme (1972), Aristotle. De Partibus Animalium I and De Generatíone
Animalium I (with Passages from Ii. 1-3), ad loc, and followed by Lennox (2001), Aristotle’s Philosophy of
Biology. However, the textual evidence suggests they are two independent arguments. If the two passages
formed one argument, we would expect to find some textual markers suggesting this. I 23, however, breaksoff abruptly with ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τούτων γενέσεως ὕστερον λεκτέον, suggesting the discussion is complete,
and Aristotle is rushing it to conclusion. The “μέν” in this sentence strengthens the “ἀλλά”: “but, we’ll have to
talk about the generation of these things later.” On the Generation of Animals II 1 begins with, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ καὶ
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When Aristotle says in Generation of Animals II 1, “wherever and as far as possible, the
male and female are separate,” he leaves no criterion for determining where exactly it is
possible. But, if we look to texts where Aristotle states the kind of things in which
separation exists, I think this criterion becomes evident. So, at the beginning of On the
Generation of Animals, he says “speaking generally we may say whichever of the animals
has the power of locomotion […] in all of these males and females exist” (On the
Generation of Animals I 1, 715a26-28). And again, just after the argument for the
separation of the sexes he says “Of [the animals with sense perception], in almost all that
can move about, the female and the male are separate for the reasons already stated” (On
the Generation of Animals II 1, 732a13-15). These texts suggest the kind for which
Aristotle thinks separation exists are not simply those that can perceive, but those that
can move around.
On the Generation of Animals I 23 also begins by stating “in all animals that can move
about the female is separated from the male,” 19 whereas in plants “these capacities [αἱ
δυνάμεις] are mixed and the female is not separate from the male” 20 (Generation of
Animals I 23, 730b32-731a4). Aristotle, then, is not talking about male and female as
members of a species, but as capacities for generation. He goes on to claim “And nature

τὸ ἄρρεν ὅτι μέν εἰσιν ἀρχαὶ γενέσεως εἴρηται πρότερον. If this were the continuation of an argument, we would
expect to find a reference to what was said immediately prior. We don’t; instead, we find Aristotle
mentioning something εἴρηται πρότερον , which not only suggests whatever was said previously is complete,
but also looks like he is pointing back to the earlier discussion of the male and female as principles of
generation, a discussion he feels it necessary to differentiate from the one he is about to begin. The
discussion he has in mind is most likely On the Generation of Animals I 18-23, or even the whole of On the
Generation of Animals I, and it seems, therefore, that when composing II 1, he considered the discussion of
the male and female as principles of generation to be complete.
19

Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ζῴοις πᾶσι τοῖς πορευτικοῖς κεχώρισται τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος.

20

μεμιγμέναι αὗται αἱ δυνάμεις εἰσί, καὶ οὐ κεχώρισται τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος.
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reasonably fashions all these things” because it mixed the male and the female principles
together so that they are not separate, because “plants have only the activity of
production of seed.” We might think this implies that nature also acted reasonably
when it separated the sexes in animals; but Aristotle does not say this. He only claims
that animals also share in a kind of knowledge, sense-perception, and that they come
together like plants when it is time to carry out that function common to all living
things.
When Aristotle says that “nature acts reasonably,” he is using the metaphor of nature as
an intentional agent to describe the well-adaptedness of living things. But it could also
be understood as a quasi-explanation for non-separate sexes in stationary creatures. It is
no accident that he says nature mixes the male and the female in the case of plants. It is
no accident because there could be no way for the plants themselves to mix their sexes. 21
Aristotle is arguing that, in the case of plants, the sexes cannot be separate because they
only have the function of reproduction. Here the emphasis of “only” must be that they
do not have perception. For, if they had perception, specifically the higher faculties of
perception at a distance, they would also have they capacities of desire and locomotion.
And if they had these capacities, they could mix their sexes themselves. However, since
they can neither perceive a mate, nor desire one, nor move towards one, Aristotle thinks
nature acted reasonably: reasonably because it would be impossible for plants to
reproduce if the sexes were separate. An animal, however, has the faculty of perception,
and some have the faculty of locomotion. So in those kinds of living things, with both
the faculty of perception and locomotion, it is possible for the sexes to be separate.

21

The point is made by Sprague (1999), “Plants as Aristotelian Substances” in Gerson, Ed., Aristotle 1 Logic
and Metaphysics, 361–362.

93

Animals can have separate sexes because they can perceive one another at a distance
(they can find a mate) and unite for the purpose of reproduction (move towards one
another). Plants, however, can do neither: if they were separate they could not
reproduce all. Recall, at the same time Cronus castrated Ouranos, the seed of Ouranos
fell upon the sea, creating Aphrodite, the goddess of sexual desire, and the means by
which the separated poles of male and female might still come together to bear fruit. It is
in virtue of desire, which Aristotle thinks necessitates perception, that it is possible for
the sexes to be separate. This is the connection between sensation and separation: the
argument of On the Generation of Animals I 23 explains, not why the sexes are separate,
but where separate sexes are possible.
It is unlikely, therefore, that Aristotle thought the principle of separation was a heuristic
for picking out some biological advantage. He neither specifies any advantage for
separation, nor does the correlation between sensation and separation suggest one. We
must, therefore, look for other explanations of what the principle is doing.

3.4

Separating Agents

The principle of separation is not meant to guide us to an explanation in terms of some
advantage for an organism. This need not imply, however, that the principle conflicts
with Aristotle’s methodological commitments. As we will see, the principle expresses a
central Aristotelian idea about the nature of efficient causation: that an efficient cause,
to be a source of regular, ordered change, must be reciprocally unaffected by its matter.
The principle, therefore, is normative, but it is an expression of the normative features
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implicit in Aristotle’s account of natural, ordered change. I want, then, to return to
Generation of Animals II 1: 22
[i] But since the female and the male are a principle of [living things], the
female and the male are for the sake of generation among existing things.
[ii] But as the first moving cause (to which belongs the account and the
form) is better and more divine in its nature than the matter, [iii] so also
is the separation of the superior from the inferior better. [iv] For this
reason, among whatever admits [of separation] and as far as it admits of
it, the male has been separated from the female.

22

My view is much informed by Witt (2005), “Form, Normativity and Gender in Aristotle a Feminist
Perspective” in Freeland, Ed., Feminist Reflections on the History of Philosophy. I disagree with some details of
her interpretation, but it is an excellent guide to these issues. Witt interprets the argument for the principle
of separation “as a means of keeping the better, more divine principle (form) from the inferior, material
principle.” She argues that “[t]he better, more divine principle needs a location separate from the inferior
material principle. Hence, the need for two sexes. On my interpretation the characterization of the two
principles in this text simply re-states the intrinsic normative features of form and matter in Aristotle’s
hylomorphism. Their respective locations (form in the male and matter in the female), however, is not an
intrinsic feature of hylomorphism. The locations of the better principle and the worse principle reflect the
value accorded to men and women in Aristotle’s culture. Where would one locate a more divine, better
principle than in the male, given the respective social and political positions of men and women?” (Witt, 1267). On Witt’s view, Aristotle’s attribution of greater divinity and goodness to males follows from a kind of
associative chain of reasoning: divinity and goodness belongs to the form, form belongs to the first efficient
cause, and the first efficient cause belongs to the male but not the female. And so, the male is better and more
divine than the female because it is associated with the form. But why should Aristotle attribute divinity and
goodness to the formal cause? Presumably, because it is prior in actuality to the matter on which it operates.
In other words the formal-efficient cause is actually-F because it contains the form, whereas the material
cause is only potentially-F because it lacks form, and since form is the end of a teleological process, and the
actual existence of a form is better, something that is actually-F is better than something that is only
potentially-F. I think there are two problems with this as an interpretation of [ii]. First, neither the male nor
the female contributes anything to the process of generation that is actually-F. The male seed has soul
potentially, as does the female katamenia. Second, both a male and female animal are actually-F. If we are to
claim the actuality/potentiality distinction is doing any work in this passage, we would have to say that the
female is less actually-F, or imperfect, while the male is actually-F. This is something Aristotle will go on to
say, but he cannot say it here. If he did, the argument would be question begging: the reason for distinct sexes
is precisely what is at issue. Nor does he say the male is better than the female because the female is a
deformed or imperfect male, because the distinction he is making is not between what is actually F and what
is imperfectly actually-F, but between what is actually-F (formal-efficient cause) and what is only potentiallyF (material cause). These are not males and females themselves, but the principles the possession of which
determines whether something is a male or a female.
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The structure of [ii] and [iii] as a whole makes it clear enough that Aristotle thinks [ii] is
somehow meant to account for, or at least make plausible, [iii]. And, it is clear that the
main subjects of [ii] are not form and matter, but efficient and material causal
principles. 23 Nor is Aristotle talking about any chance cause of motion, but only those
which are teleological causes, i.e., first causes of motion having a λόγος or form, what he
equivalently calls ἄρχαι or principles of motion. 24
When Aristotle says the one is the first cause of motion and the other is matter, this is
clearly meant to recall his discussion of males and females in the first book of On the
Generation of Animals where he claims that the “male is qua male, the agent, i.e., from
whence the principle of motion [τὸ δ’ἄρρεν, ᾗ ἄρρεν, ποιητικὸν καὶ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς
κινήσεως]” and “the female is qua female the patient [τό γε θῆλυ, ᾗ θῆλυ, παθητικόν]” and
that, taken generally, agent and patient is the highest kind characterizing each of them
[τὰ ἄκρα ἑκατέρων] (On the Generation of Animals I 21, 729b10-11). On the hypothesis,
then, that Aristotle is using normative language to talk about efficient causal principles,
we can ask why he might think it better for such a principle to be separate from its
patient.

23

While Aristotle certainly thinks form is, in some sense, better than matter, I do not think the form / matter
distinction is what is being emphasized in [ii] and [v]. If it were, it would be hard to make sense of premise
[iii], the principle of separation. This principle, applied in this case, would seem to imply that it is better for
the superior form to be separate from the inferior matter. Aristotle, however, thinks this is impossible. And
even if it were possible, the argument would nevertheless suggest that it is better for what is actually-F to be
separate from what is potentially-F, an even more problematic claim: that formal-efficient causes should
always, wherever possible, be separate from material causes would entail that it is better for two correlative
potentialities not to be in contact. This is the same as saying it is better that the teacher be separate from the
student or carpenter separate from the wood.
24

[ii] reiterated in [v]: βέλτιον γὰρ καὶ θειότερον ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως; cf. De anima II 4, 415b28 ff., where
Aristotle differentiates between fire as an efficient cause of growth and the soul as an efficient cause of
growth containing a λόγος and limit.
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Aristotle begins his explanation of the separation of the sexes in On the Generation of
Animals II 1 by appealing to what he calls “a higher” principle. I suggest that he is
arguing from a higher principle because an explanation why separation is better derives
not from biology, but from Aristotle’s account of change. Aristotle is arguing
analogically from the general causal pattern he sees in all natural and teleological change
to the relationship between the male and female in animal reproduction. 25
Now, before looking at the connection between [ii] and [iii], I want to examine in more
detail the principle of separation itself. The principle of separation states that “the
separation of the superior from the inferior is better,” but it is not clear what kind of
separation Aristotle means. The way we are most accustomed to think of “separation” in
Aristotelian philosophy is in terms of Aristotle’s criticisms of separate forms. “Separate”
in these cases often means ontological independence, and what is separate is “a this” or
“this something”: τόδε or τόδε τι. Thus, when two things are separate, it implies they are
each independent substances. There is, however, another sense of separate, which is, I
think, implied by the language Aristotle uses in this passage.
In premise [ii], Aristotle says that a certain kind of ἀρχή, the ἀρχή of motion, is “better”
and “more divine.” One of the primary senses of ἀρχή is not only that which is prior in
knowledge or explanation, but also an efficient cause which “rules.” 26 Similarly, the
terms κρείττων and χείρων in premise [iii] often imply rank in a hierarchical sense, as
superior and inferior do in English. So, in calling a principle superior, Aristotle is
following a common Greek usage of a term that describes a hierarchical relationship of

25

Cf. On the Parts of Animals I 5, 645b22-27.

26

See Metaphysics Δ1, 1013a9-14.
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rule. In the Gorgias, for instance, Callicles defines justice as “the superior ruling the
inferior and having a greater share,” (Gorgias 483d6) and while Socrates questions
Callicles’ definition of superiority, he does not question that the superior should rule the
inferior. Similarly, in the Laws, the Athenian stranger assumes that “every state must
contain those who rule and those who are ruled” (Laws III 689e4-5) 27 and, sets it down
as the fifth law of the city that the superior should rule the inferior (690b1 f.). 28 And
Aristotle, as well, takes “superior” to imply a relation of rule, and applies this relation to
the soul and the body: as he says in the De anima, (recalling Socrates’ criticisms of the
materialists and their search for a “stronger and immortal Atlas” in the Phaedo 29) it must
be soul, and not some other material principle, which keeps the matter of the body
together because “it is impossible that anything be superior to soul and rule it” (De
anima I 5, 410b13). 30
One of the features common to these hierarchical relations is that the superior is always
separated from or unmixed with its inferiors. In the “noble lie” of the Republic, for
instance, the auxiliaries and rulers are kept unmixed from the many. And Plato’s reason
seems to be that separation prevents the guardians from getting caught up in the desires
and passions of the masses, allowing the superiors to rule with stability. 31 And in the

27

Ἄρχοντας δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀρχομένους ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναί που.

28

Πέμπτον γε οἶμαι τὸ κρείττονα μὲν ἄρχειν, τὸν ἥττω δὲ ἄρχεσθαι.

29

Phaedo 99c.

30

ἀπορήσειε δ’ ἄν τις καὶ τί ποτ’ἐστὶ τὸ ἑνοποιοῦν αὐτά· ὕλῃ γὰρ ἔοικε τά γε στοιχεῖα, κυριώτατον δ’ἐκεῖνο τὸ
συνέχον, ὅ τί ποτ’ ἐστίν· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς εἶναί τι κρεῖττον καὶ ἄρχον ἀδύνατον· ἀδυνατώτερον δ’ἔτι τοῦ νοῦ· εὔλογον
γὰρ τοῦτον εἶναι προγενέστατον καὶ κύριον κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖά φασι πρῶτα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι. This is a
clear echo of Laws X 896e9-897a1.
31

Republic 431a3-e2.
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Timaeus, Plato argues that the three souls present in the human body are separated by
partitions to prevent the ruling part from being disturbed by what it governs. The
intellective soul is separated from the mortal soul by the neck, and again, within the
mortal soul, the part with θύμος or spirit is separated by the diaphragm from the part
with ἐπιθυμία or appetite. The intellective soul was separated so that the “disturbances”
(παθήματα) of the mortal soul would “stain the divine soul only to the extent that was
absolutely necessary [σεβόμενοι μιαίνειν τὸ θεῖον, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἦν ἀνάγκη]” (69d7-70a2),
thus allowing “the best part among them all to be left in charge [τὸ βέλτιστον οὕτως ἐν
αὐτοῖς πᾶσιν ἡγεμονεῖν ἐῷ]” (70c1). And the appetitive soul was placed down in the gut,
as far away from the immortal and spirited soul as possible, so that, “making as little
clamor and noise as possible,” the supreme part could “take its counsel about what is
beneficial for one and all [parts of the soul]” (70e5-71a3). 32 Plato’s explanations of these
various physiological features of humans, then, assumes that if something is to be able to
rule, it must be separate from what it rules, not to prevent them from interacting, but to
prevent what is controlled from disturbing what controls.
The most obvious antecedent to Plato’s use of “separation” and “rule” expressing such a
causal relationship is the cosmogony of Anaxagoras. Anaxagoras reasoned that νοῦς,
which was “the absolute ruler” [αὐτοκρατὲς] must be “unmixed with any of the other
stuff” of the cosmos, for if it were mixed, “it would be hindered […] so that it could not
rule [κρατεῖν] any of the stuff as it now does being alone by itself” (DK 12). 33 Like Plato,

32

ἵν’ οὖν ἀεὶ νεμόμενον πρὸς φάτνῃ καὶ ὅτι πορρωτάτω τοῦ βουλευομένου κατοικοῦν, θόρυβον καὶ βοὴν ὡς
ἐλαχίστην παρέχον,τὸ κράτιστον καθ’ ἡσυχίαν περὶ τοῦ πᾶσι κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ συμφέροντος ἐῷ βουλεύεσθαι, διὰ
ταῦτα ἐνταῦθ’ ἔδοσαν αὐτῷ τὴν τάξιν.
33

DK 12 (=Simplicius in Phys. 164.24 f). I am not certain of Anaxagoras’ reasons for claiming that νοῦς must
be separate and unmixed: why, for instance, if a portion of νοῦς contained a portion of hot or sweet its
activity would be “hindered.” There is, however, no scholarly consensus. Cleary, Anaxagoras thinks being
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Aristotle also agrees with Anaxagoras that what rules must be separate from what is
ruled; however, Aristotle explicitly integrates Anaxagoras’ claims into his own causal
theory: “Anaxagoras is right when he says that νοῦς is unaffected and unmixed, since he
makes it the principle of motion; for it could cause motion in this way [i.e., in a constant
and uniform way] only by being itself unmoved and it could have control only by being
unmixed” (Physics VIII 5, 256b25-27). Aristotle agrees with Anaxagoras because on his
own analysis of change, the first agent or principle of motion in an efficient causal series
must be essentially unaffected when it acts.
All explanations of change in Aristotle’s philosophy, and all things that change, require
an agent and patient. But in natural and other teleological contexts, agent and patient
are arranged hierarchically, one strictly acting and the other strictly being acted upon. 34
So, he says in De anima III 5, that νοῦς is “separate, unaffected and unmixed” because
“what acts is always more honourable than what is acted upon, and the principle than its
matter” (De Anima III 5, 430a17-19). 35 The hierarchy consists in an efficient causal

mixed would somehow interfere with the causality of νοῦς; but since it is unclear what and how νοῦς is
supposed to cause, it is also unclear just how being mixed would interfere with νοῦς as an agent. Menn (1995),
Plato on God as Nous, 28, suggests the independent status of νοῦς is somehow connected with a problem
about the unity of its activity. If νοῦς is to account for the stable world-order, while at the same time being
physically present in different portions of matter at the same time, its actions must somehow be coordinated
in all of those various portions. Menn thinks Anaxagoras is addressing some concern like this with the thesis
that νοῦς is unmixed. While this may be right, I think it may also have to do with Anaxagoras’ view that the
quality of some portion of matter is determined by whatever predominates, and so, if there were a portion of
matter in which νοῦς did not predominate, if a portion of matter had more hot than it did νοῦς, then it would
not be able to bring about its characteristic effect or bestowing rationality. For a similar view to mine, see
Sedley (2007), Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity, Chatper 1.
34

Menn (2002), “Aristotle’s Definition of Soul and the Programme of the De Anima”, Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy 22; Falcon (2005), Aristotle and the Science of Nature: Unity without Uniformity, 25 ff.
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De Anima III 5, 430a17-19: “καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγμὴς τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνεργείᾳ. ἀεὶ γὰρ
τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης.” For my argument, it doesn’t matter if we think this is
to be identified with the divine νοῦς of Metaphysics Λ or something like an individual human agent intellect.

100

asymmetry between agents and patients: the agent qua agent is unaffected or unmoved
by the patient when it acts “like, the art of medicine: for when it produces health, it is in
no way affected by the patient who is being healed” (On Generation and Corruption I 7,
324a35-b1). This asymmetry does not exist, however, across all of nature. The material,
like the food or the drug acting as instruments of the agent, are always affected when
they act: “the food, when it produces [health], is also affected in some way: for it is heated
or cooled or otherwise affected at the same time that it acts.”
Aristotle posits unmoved agents as principles of motion to account for the stability and
regularity of natural change. 36 Since these unmoved agents are unchanged when they act,
so long as they are in the appropriate relation with their patient they will bring about
their characteristic result. And while the natural philosopher does not explain these
unmoved principles (since, as unmoved things they are not part of the study of nature,
cf. Physics II 7, 198a36-b3), the natural philosopher assumes them, as efficient causes, to
explain natural movement, change and generation.
I would add, however, that the subject matter of natural science is whatever contains in
itself one of these unmoved efficient principles. 37 Natural, living substances are selfmoved movers, and on Aristotle’s analysis, one part of a self-moved mover is an
unmoved principle or agent while the other part is a moved patient. The unmoved
principle of motion must be unmoved per se, or it would cease to cause the motion
which it essentially causes; however, the principle of motion is still moved per accidens

36

See Furley (1989), “Self-Movers”, Cosmic Problems: Essays on Greek and Roman Philosophy of Nature, 122123 and Menn (2002), “Aristotle’s Definition of Soul and the Programme of the De Anima”, 83-139.
37

Aristotle does not think unmoved movers in the natural world are completely unmoved. Cf. Physics III 1,
201a20-27; 2, 202a3-11; VIII 5-6; On Generation and Corruption I 7.
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when the natural composite thing moves itself or is moved per se by other things (Physics
VIII 6, 259a17-18) And as a consequence “it is impossible that [the unmoved mover
moved per accidens] should cause continuous motion” (259a22) because it “stands in
different relations to the things that it moves, so that the motion it causes will not be the
same: by reason of the fact that it occupies contrary positions or assumes contrary forms
it will produce contrary motions in each several thing that it moves” (260a5-10). Thus,
while some first efficient causes, like the first mover of Metaphysics Λ or the active νοῦς
of De anima III 5, are both unmoved and unmixed and so can have perfect control over
what they move, most natural things, animals in particular, have their efficient causes
“mixed”: animals are moved per se, either by external influences or by themselves. Insofar
as their unmoved principles realize their activities in bodies (the body acting, as it were,
as an instrument) the animal is moved per se when it acts. Insofar as the soul acts using
heat, for instance, its activity of heating is affected per se by external, material sources of
cold. And so the animal body more closely resembles the food or the drug administered
by the doctor than the art of medicine.
Now, I have used the term “hierarchical” to describe the asymmetrical efficient causal
relationship between agent and patient. Aristotle, however, calls this relationship
“separation” (Generation and Corruption I 7 324b18-22). And many explanations
involving the separation of parts Aristotle calls “better,” “superior,” “honourable,” or
“divine,” appeal to this pattern of explanation. The prevalence of right-handedness is
explained by the separation of the noble right from the inferior left, which occurs
because the right contains the principle of motion (On the Gait of Animals 4 706a9a25). The midriff is explained as being for the sake of keeping the more honourable
heart, the principle of sensation, away from the less honourable stomach, so that the
heart will remain unaffected by digestive heat (Parts of Animals III 10, 672b8-24).

102

Similar explanations exist for the chambers of the heart (On the Parts of Animals III 4,
666b21-667a6), and the posture of different animals (On the Gait of Animals 5, 706b916).
To return to the Generation of Animals, we can see how the two claims, “as the first
moving cause (to which belongs the account and the form) is better and more divine in
its nature than the matter” and “so also is the separation of the superior from the
inferior better” are related. Given the first efficient cause is an embodied principle of
teleological change, it is better that it be reciprocally unaffected by the matter on which
it acts, since being unaffected ensures that the principle is better able to produce regular
and uniform effects. 38 Imagine, in place of Aristotle’s metaphor of nature as a doctor
doctoring himself, 39 a surgeon “surgeon-ing” himself. This might give a clearer
illustration of why it is sometimes better to have the agent separate from the patient.
The principle of separation is not, therefore, an unqualified normative principle, but
relative to natural teleological agents and their patients.
Many of Aristotle’s explanations involving the separation of a principle from its patient
presuppose this explanatory schema. The separation of the efficient cause from its
material entails that the efficient cause will be less affected accidentally. And while the
physical separation of the efficient and material cause into distinct entities it not
necessary for regular generation, the separation is better because it contributes to the
end of regular generation by keeping the efficient cause more unaffected. Generation

38

Devin Henry suggests a possible final cause for separate sexes is to keep the male principle from being
contaminated by the female. Henry (2007), “How Sexist Is Aristotle’s Developmental Biology?”, Phronesis
52(3), 17. This essay fills out his suggestion.
39

Physics II 8, 199b30.
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itself, however, has a best way of occurring independent of how it occurs in animals.
And this best way derives, not from empirical observation, but from the conditions of
order presupposed by Aristotle’s natural philosophy and the corresponding form that
any explanation of natural, teleological change must take. 40

3.5

Aristotle’s Principle of Separation

I want to bring out some implications this analysis has for Aristotle’s use of normative
language in natural science. Aristotle often makes claims like the right, front and upper
places are “more honourable” and “better” than their opposites, 41 and in each case, the
“better” or “more honourable” direction is separated from its correlative opposite
because it is “better” for them to be separate. So, for example, in his explanation of the
diaphragm, which separates the heart from the stomach, Aristotle says that nature
“divided the more honourable from the less honourable in whatever sorts of things it
was possible to divide the up and the down” (Parts of Animals III 10, 627b21-22). 42 In
the On the Gait of Animals, he says that “the right being separated from the left is better
by nature” (On the Gait of Animals 4, 706a20) 43 and concludes that humans must be

40

Cf. Metaphysics Λ4, 1070b10-b35.

41

Cf. for instance, On the Parts of Animals III 3, 665a22-25, where he says all three: “In general, the better
and more honourable, wherever nothing else greater interferes, of the upper and the lower is more in upper
things; of the front and the back in front things; of the right and the left in right things.” (Ὅλως δ’ ἀεὶ τὸ
βέλτιον καὶ τιμιώτερον, ὅπου μή τι μεῖζον ἕτερον ἐμποδίζει, τοῦ μὲν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἐν τοῖς μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἄνω, τοῦ δ’
ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ὄπισθεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, τοῦ δεξιοῦ δὲ καὶ ἀριστεροῦ ἐν τοῖς δεξιοῖς.)

42

On the Parts of Animals III 10, 627a21-22: καὶ διεῖλε τό τε τιμιώτερον καὶ τὸ ἀτιμότερον, ἐν ὅσοις ἐνδέχεται
διελεῖν τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω. Aristotle takes this explanation, roughly unaltered, from Timaeus 69d6-70a2, except
where Plato held each part of the soul had a different part in the body, Aristotle thinks all parts of the soul
are primarily located in the same part, namely the heart.

43

On the Gait of Animals 4, 706a20-25: φύσει δὲ βέλτιον τὸ δεξιὸν τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ κεχωρισμένον. διὸ καὶ τὰ δεξιὰ
ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μάλιστα δεξιά ἐστι. διωρισμένων δὲ τῶν δεξιῶν εὐλόγως τὰ ἀριστερὰ ἀκινητότερά ἐστι, καὶ
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“most natural” because humans most of all show the distinctions of right and left, front
and back, up and down. 44 What determines superiority in honour and goodness is the
fact that one opposite is an ἀρχή or principle. 45
G.E.R. Lloyd noted that these distinctions were part of a common Greek belief in the
auspiciousness of up, right and front, and the inauspiciousness of down, left and back.
This belief is represented in the Pythagorean συστοιχία or table of opposites, where right,
front, up, male, light, and unity are associated together as “good” ἄρχαι, and their
opposites as bad ones. 46 In his study, Lloyd was puzzled by a contradiction he saw
between two Aristotles: on the one hand, there was the Aristotle who argued that sexual
differentiation could not (as Anaxagoras and Leophanes would have it) be accounted for
by appealing to the inherent value of the right and the left; 47 on the other hand, there
was the Aristotle who argued that humans are “most natural” because they were the
most right handed, most erect and most forward facing of animals. 48 So, Lloyd
developed an anthropological explanation for this contradiction, and concluded that
Aristotle “stubbornly” adhered to the common Greek belief that right is superior to left,

ἀπολελυμένα μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις. καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι δ’ ἀρχαὶ μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν καὶ διωρισμέναι ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
ὑπάρχουσι, τό τ’ ἄνω καὶ τὸ ἔμπροσθεν.
44

In On the Parts of Animals III 5, 667b32-668a4, Aristotle also claims that, in whatever things the front is
more honourable and more suited to rule, in these things the great blood vessel is more honourable and
suited to rule than the aorta, and attributes this identification to the fact that the great blood vessel is in
front, the aorta in the back. He notes that in many animals the aorta is indistinct.
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Aristotle makes this claim in detail for each of the cardinal directions in On the Gait of Animals 4, 705a28706a25, but is stated succinctly in DC II 2, 284b10.

46

See Lloyd (1962), “Left and Right in Greek Philosophy”, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 82, 59 ff. Lloyd also
points to Plato Republic X, 614c ff. (the Myth of Er), where virtuous souls travel up, to the right, with their
tokens on their fronts, while vicious souls travel down, to the left, with their tokens on their backs.

47

On the Generation of Animals IV 1, especially 763b30 ff. and 765a4 ff.

48

On the Gait of Animals 4, 706a10 ff.
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the upper to the lower, etc., because Aristotle believed that each is naturally and
essentially superior “in man, and man is the norm by which [Aristotle] judges the rest of
the animal kingdom.” 49 On Lloyd’s interpretation, then, Aristotle assigned right, front,
etc., the status of ἄρχαι, which Lloyd takes to mean inherently “superior” and “more
honourable” than what are not ἄρχαι, in order that the distinctions naturally present in
human beings would serve as an ideal to which the whole natural kingdom aspires. 50
While Lloyd’s conclusions are anthropologically insightful, I think they neglect
Aristotle’s philosophical motivations for assigning the status of ἄρχαι to certain of these
pairs of opposites. First of all, while there is certainly a sense in which much of Greek
philosophy and Greek culture in general viewed the world anthropocentrically (and
even Hellenocentrically), there was also a strong trend among many Greek philosophers,
beginning with Xenophanes, of looking at the world non-anthropocentrically. As
Catherine Osborne has argued in the case of Plato: “There is […] a link between the
structure of reality, the nature of causal explanation, and the position of man between
the beasts and the gods.” 51 For Plato, humans may have been better than the animals,
and so perhaps could act as a standard against which to judge them, but humans
themselves were understood to be imperfect realizations of a divine ideal. 52 While it is
possible that Aristotle moved away from Plato in this respect, there are many texts, like
On Generation and Corruption II 11, Metaphysics Λ6-10, and our focal text, On the

49

Lloyd (1962), “Left and Right in Greek Philosophy”, 5.
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Lloyd (1962), “Left and Right in Greek Philosophy”, 66
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Osborne (1988), Topography in the Timaeus: Plato and Augustine on Mankind’s Place in the Natural World,
Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 108.
52

Pellegrin (1986), Aristotle’s Classification of Animals: Biology and the Conceptual Unity of the Aristotelian
Corpus. Pellegrin argues that Aristotle uses human beings as the model animal in his zoology.
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Generation of Animals II 1, which show he was still committed to it when he wrote
them.
All the same, I think asking questions about which cultural normative beliefs might be
influencing Aristotle’s own beliefs about ideals in nature misses the fact that Aristotle is
often quite happy showing how his philosophical system can accommodate the views of
his predecessors. 53 This is how he treats the distinctions of direction in De Caelo II 2,
284b6-33. Aristotle begins by asking whether we should, as the Pythagoreans do, apply
the distinction of the principles of right and left to the body of the heaven, or whether
there is a more proper way [μάλλον ἑτέρως] of putting the matter:
Εὐθὺς γὰρ πρῶτον, εἰ τὸ δεξιὸν ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ ἀριστερόν, ἔτι πρότερον τὰς
προτέρας ὑποληπτέον ὑπάρχειν ἀρχὰς ἐν αὐτῷ. Διώρισται μὲν οὖν περὶ
τούτων ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς τῶν ζῴων κινήσεις διὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖα τῆς
ἐκείνων εἶναι· φανερῶς γὰρ ἔν γε τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπάρχοντα φαίνεται τοῖς μὲν
πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μόρια, λέγω δ’ οἷον τό τε δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερόν, τοῖς δ’
ἔνια, τοῖς δὲ φυτοῖς τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω μόνον. Εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ τῷ οὐρανῷ
προσάπτειν τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις
ὑπάρχον εὔλογον ὑπάρχειν ἐν αὐτῷ· τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἕκαστον οἷον ἀρχή τις
ἐστίν. Λέγω δὲ τὰ τρία τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω, καὶ τὸ πρόσθιον καὶ τὸ
ἀντικείμενον, καὶ τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερόν· ταύτας γὰρ τὰς διαστάσεις
εὔλογον ὑπάρχειν τοῖς σώμασι τοῖς τελείοις πάσας. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄνω τοῦ
μήκους ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ δεξιὸν τοῦ πλάτους, τὸ δ’ ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ βάθους. Ἔτι
δ’ἄλλως κατὰ τὰς κινήσεις· ἀρχὰς γὰρ ταύτας λέγω ὅθεν ἄρχονται πρῶτον αἱ
κινήσεις τοῖς ἔχουσιν. Ἔστι δὲ ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἄνω ἡ αὔξησις, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δεξιῶν ἡ
κατὰ τόπον, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἡ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν· ἔμπροσθεν γὰρ λέγω
ἐφ’ ὃ αἱ αἰσθήσεις. Διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι σώματι τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ τὸ
δεξιὸν καὶ ἀριστερὸν καὶ τὸ ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ὄπισθεν ζητητέον, ἀλλ’ ὅσα ἔχει
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For example, in his explanation of nutrition in De Anima II 4, where he explains in what respect like is fed
by like, and like is fed by unlike. He claims his predecessors were both right and wrong. For Aristotle’s views
about such assimilation or interpretation, see Metaphysics α 993a30-993b11.
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κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔμψυχα ὄντα· τῶν γὰρ ἀψύχων ἐν οὐθενὶ ὁρῶμεν
ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως.
At the start we may say that, if right and left are applicable [to the
heaven], there are prior principles which must first be applied. These
principles have been analysed in the discussion of the movements of
animals, for the reason they are proper to animal nature. For in some
animals we find all such distinction of the parts as this of right and left are
clearly present, and in others some; but in plants we find only above and
below. Now if we are to apply to the heaven such a distinction of parts,
we must expect, as we have said, to find in it also that distinction which in
animals is found first of them all. The distinctions are three, namely,
above and below, front and its opposite, right and left—all these three
oppositions we expect to find in the perfect body—and each may be
called a principle [ἀρχή]. Above is the principle of length, right of
breadth, front of depth. Or again, we may connect them with the various
movements, taking principle to mean that part, in a thing capable of
movement, from which movement first begins. Growth starts from
above, locomotion from the right, sense-movement from the front (for
front is simply the part to which the senses are directed). Hence we must
not look for above and below, right and left, front and back, in every kind
of body, but only in those which, being animate, have a principle of
movement within themselves. For in no inanimate thing do we observe a
part from which movement originates. (De Caelo, II 2 284b6-33, tr.
Stocks, modified)
In this passage Aristotle is pointing out that, while it is correct to call above, right and
front principles of spatial directions, as the Pythagoreans do, principles of spatial
direction are not the correct principles to start from if we are trying to explain motion.
Aristotle’s reasons, though not explicit, seem to be that the Pythagoreans make an illicit
move by taking principles of body in general, which are properly the domain of geometry,
and applying them as if they were principles of moving things, which are properly the
domain of natural science, specifically the subordinate science of living or self-moving
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things. That is not to say that geometrical principles are useless to natural science – they
are useful insofar as they apply to body. 54 Nevertheless, Aristotle is arguing here that if
the distinctions of right and left, etc. are to have a role as principles of self-moving
things, they must be principles of certain kinds of motions, and specifically principles of
the kinds of motion we find in self-moving things. The kinds of motion appropriate to
self-moving things are the primary biological functions: the principles of growth,
sensation and locomotion. 55 Aristotle goes so far as to say that we misapply the terms for
these pairs of opposites, “right and left,” “up and down,” “front and back,” when we
apply them to inanimate things, because inanimate things have no principle of motion
in themselves. So Aristotle is quite intentionally appropriating these spatial distinctions,
from the Pythagoreans or whoever, while at the same time interpreting them by defining
them functionally, and defining one of each pair (the right, the up, and the front) as a
principle of motion or change—as an efficient cause of a specific motion or vital
function proper to natural things—and the other of each pair (left, down, back) as its
correlative patient. 56
This is, of course, the same way Aristotle describes males and females in particular, and
principles of motion in general, in the argument for the separation of the sexes: the
moving principle is more divine, and the matter, i.e., that on which the moving principle
acts, is less so. 57 Aristotle, then, uses normative language to describe a particular relation

54

See, for example, On the Gait of Animals 2, 704b17-21.

55

Parallel passages are at De Anima II 4, 415b28 ff.; and On the Gait of Animals 4, 705b30 and 5, 706b9-15.
This point is raised by Lennox (2001), Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology, 151-152.

56
57

On the Gait of Animals 4, 705b30-706a5.

Cf. for example, On the Generation of Animals IV 3, 765b11: λέγω δ’ ἀρχὴν οὐ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐξ ἧς ὥσπερ ὕλης
γίγνεται τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ γεννῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν κινοῦσαν πρώτην, ἐάν τ’ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐάν τ’ ἐν ἄλλῳ τοῦτο δύνηται ποιεῖν.
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between certain agents and patients, specifically, those ἄχαι of motion or change
responsible for the vital functions of generation, nutrition, sensation and locomotion. In
each case of male, up, front and right, the ἄρχαι of motion is “more honourable” or
“more divine” than that on which it acts because the principle determines the
movement or activity in question. And if the principle is to act invariably, it is better for
the principle to be reciprocally unaffected when it acts.
Where Hesiod in Theogony explains the separation of males and females as the result of
the first unnatural act, Aristotle explains it in terms of the structure of nature itself. For
Aristotle, the thesis that the separation of the sexes is better for generation follows from
his programmatic requirements for any explanation of natural change. If an agent is to
be a regular and effective cause, if it is to act for some goal always or for the most part,
the agent must be as unmoved as possible. We see this same causal structure repeated
throughout Aristotle’s biology. Natural things, composites of unmoved and moved
movers, achieve this to varying degrees of success, both within species and across the
whole chain of being. But since his world is ordered in this way, Aristotle need not rely
on absolute assumptions about the values of males and females and about good and bad.
Perhaps, then, we can agree with Lloyd when he says Aristotle stubbornly adheres to
Greek beliefs about value. But, I think it would be better to say that, as with most beliefs,
Aristotle critically accepts them. 58 His main interest, however, lies in grounding those he
accepts in his own science, to show that his analysis can make sense of them more than
the analyses of his predecessors.

58

By “critically accepts” I do not mean to suggest that Aristotle is critical of assigning the predicate “male” to
the more divine principle, and “female” to the less divine. The claim is not meant to be apologetic. Rather, I
mean to emphasize that Aristotle is less interested in challenging accepted beliefs (endoxa) about the relative
worth of males and females, and more interested in challenging contentious claims about the kinds of
principles relevant to natural scientific explanation.
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4. Art and Nature in Aristotle’s Physics*
Some Antecedents
En la genèse d’une doctrine scientifique, il n’est pas de commencement
absolu ; si haut que l’on remonte la lignée des pensées qui ont préparé,
suggéré, annoncé cette doctrine, on parvient toujours à des opinions qui, à
leur tour, ont été préparées, suggérées et annoncées ; et si l’on cesse de
suivre cet enchaînement d’idées qui ont procédé les unes des autres, ce n’est
pas qu’on ait mis la main sur le maillon initial, mais c’est que la chaîne
s’enfonce et disparait dans les profondeurs d’un insondable passé.
Pierre Duhem (1913), Le Système du Monde, 5. 1
In Chapter One, I defend the view that Aristotle uses metaphor to characterize natural
phenomena in such a way that we can begin to inquire into their causes. In Chapter
Two, I show that he sometimes adopts these characterizations from popular and expert
opinions, but grounds them in his analysis of the conditions which an efficient cause
must satisfy if it is to be a cause of regular, ordered change. This paper furthers these
studies by looking to how he uses the analogy between art and nature to guide his
questions about how inquiry in natural science should proceed if it is to explain the
regularities in the world around us. Aristotle’s views on the analogy between art and
nature are often seen as a response to Plato’s, especially his views in the Timaeus. 2 I trace

*

All translations are my own, except where noted.

1

Duhem (1913), Le Système Du Monde, 5.

2

Lennox (2001), “Material and Formal Natures in Aristotle’s De Partibus Animalium”, Aristotle’s Philosophy
of Biology: Studies in the Origins of Life Science; Menn (1995), Plato on God as Nous; Furley (1996), “What
Kind of Cause Is Aristotle’s Final Cause?” in Frede and Striker, Eds., Rationality in Greek Thought; Falcon
(2005), Aristotle and the Science of Nature: Unity without Uniformity; Johansen (2004), Plato’s Natural
Philosophy: A Study of the Timaeus-Critias; Leunissen (2010), Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science
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a different line of influence from the Hippocratics, through Democritus and Plato, to
Aristotle’s claim that “art imitates nature.” I argue that this is an epistemological claim
about how methods of production were first discovered in the arts, and that by looking
to how the Greeks viewed discovery and progress in the arts, we can shed some light on
Aristotle’s expectations for a scientific investigation into nature, in particular his views
concerning the method of inquiry he thinks the natural scientist should adopt.
Aristotle often raises methodological questions about how inquiry (ζητήσις) into nature
should proceed if it is to result in scientific knowledge about its objects (ἐπιστήμη). For
example, in the introduction to the Parts of Animals I 1, he asks whether the natural
philosopher should inquire into nature the same way the mathematical astronomer
inquires into celestial movement, or whether she should inquire as one would when
inquiring into the production of an artefact (Parts of Animals I 1, 639b5 ff.). 3 Another
example comes from Physics II 2, where he asks whether the science of nature is
concerned exclusively with the form of natural things or the matter, or whether it is, like
the arts of medicine and house-building, knowledge of both together (194a15-194a27).
These questions assume, as James Lennox puts it, that “an inquiry has alternatives,” and
Aristotle often thinks the alternatives offered by his predecessors “are inappropriate in
various ways and have inhibited progress” in developing a science of nature (Lennox
2011, 40). Since Aristotle often uses these questions to motivate his own method in
natural science, one thing he presents himself as doing is providing the appropriate
method for inquiring into different domains of nature.

of Nature, Chapter Five; Henry (2013), “Optimality and Teleology in Aristotle’s Natural Science”, Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 45.
3

Parts of Animals I 1.
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One of Aristotle’s frequent strategies for answering these questions is to appeal to the
arts (αἱ τέχναι) for insight into how the inquirer into nature should proceed. So, for
example, he answers his question in Parts of Animals I 1 by claiming the natural
philosopher should proceed the same way one would in house-building [περὶ τὴν
οἰκοδόμησιν], by stating the form of the house first, and then showing why it comes to be
the way it does because of the form it has (640a15-18). 4 And this implies that we must
first inquire into what a house is before we can inquire into how it came to be (Lennox
2011, 35-39). In Physics II 2, he answers his question about which nature, the form or
the matter, science will study by arguing, “if art imitates nature [ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν
φύσιν], and it belongs to the same science [τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης] to know the form and
the matter up to a point […] it would also belong to natural science to know both
natures” (194a21-194a27). The strategy, therefore, makes use of an analogy between
two domains, art and nature, to justify extending a method of inquiry from one domain
to another.
There are, however, three puzzles for this kind of strategy given Aristotle’s
understanding of the analogy between art and nature. First, there is a puzzle about the
justification for the strategy. What aspect(s) of this analogy justifies extrapolating from
art to natural science with respect to its methodological principles? One similarity often
proposed is that he relies on the teleological character of causation in both art and
nature: art and nature are goal-directed, efficient causes of what they produce. 5 To
secure the analogy, in several places Aristotle provides independent reasons for believing

4
5

See also Generation of Animals V 1, 778b1-18.

Lennox (2008), “‘As If We Were Investigating Snubness’ : Aristotle on the Prospects for a Single Science of
Nature”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 175-181. Leunissen (2010), Explanation and Teleology in
Aristotle’s Science of Nature, 16-17, 39, 218.
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that nature, like art, is a cause that acts for the sake of something. 6 Some scholars,
however, have suggested that Aristotle uses the analogy to argue from the teleological
structure of the arts to the teleological structure of nature. 7 Evidence for this view is
found in Physics II 8, where he says, “generally art in some cases completes what nature is
unable to complete, and in other cases imitates it. If, therefore, artificial products are for
the sake of an end, so clearly also are natural products” 8 (199a15-18). Yet, regardless of
how Aristotle is using the analogy, the strategy of using the arts to inform the method of
inquiry in natural science will depend on how convincing one finds this analogy to be.
A second puzzle for Aristotle’s strategy involves the application of the analogy. Even if
Aristotle can establish that the analogy between art and nature is close enough, how
much can we infer about natural phenomena on its basis? Aristotle sometimes seems to
use the general characterization of art and nature as analogues to infer quite specific
explanations in natural science. So, in the Generation of Animals he claims that “semen
acts in the same way that rennet acts on milk; for rennet is milk containing vital heat
[θερμότητα ζωτικήν], which brings the similar material together and sets it, and the
semen acts in the same way on the nature of the menstrual blood” (Generation of

6

Aristotle argues for this in Physics II 8, Parts of Animals I 1, Generation of Animals II 1. The most discussed
argument is the “rainfall example” presented in Physics II 8, 198b10-199a8.There are disputes (which I do
not engage here) about how this argument is to be interpreted. See Furley (1985), “The Rainfall Example in
Physics Ii.8” in Balme and Gotthelf, Eds., Aristotle on Nature and Living Things; Sauve Meyer (1992),
“Aristotle, Teleology, and Reduction”, Philosophical Review 101(4); Sedley (2007), Creationism and Its Critics
in Antiquity, Chapter 6; Cooper (1987), “Hypothetical Necessity and Natural Teleology”, Gotthelf and
Lennox 1987; Johnson (2005), Aristotle on Teleology. Good surveys of the literature can be found in Leunissen
(2010), Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature, Chapter 1 and Gotthelf (2012), Teleology,
First Principles and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s Biology, Chapter 3.
7
8

Granger (1993), “Aristotle on the Analogy between Action and Nature”, The Classical Quarterly 43(1), 170.

ὅλως δὲ ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται. εἰ οὖν τὰ κατὰ τέχνην ἕνεκά
του, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν.
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Animals II 4, 739b21-25). And, in the Meteorology he claims, “broiling and boiling occur
by art [γίγνονται μὲν τέχνῃ], but the same general kind of thing (τὰ εἴδη καθόλου), as we
said, also [occurs] by nature [φύσει]. The affections produced [τὰ γιγνόμενα πάθη] are
similar though they lack a name, since art imitates nature [μιμεῖται γὰρ ἡ τέχνη τὴν
φύσιν]” (381a30 ff.). But why does he think that the specific processes we develop in the
arts, like broiling or cheese-making, could be used to guide inquiry into natural
processes? It is one thing to think art and nature are both goal-directed efficient causes;
he would need further reasons for thinking the same kinds of material-efficient causal
processes occur in the arts and in nature, and further reasons for choosing one of the
artistic processes, e.g. cooking, over another, e.g., sculpting. One might object that
Aristotle is stretching the analogy too far, and that his grounds for this (the perception
that curds and embryos are similar 9 or that “art imitates nature”) are too weak. 10
Related to the first two puzzles is a puzzle about ambiguity. As we have seen, Aristotle’s
strategy seems to trade on an ambiguity between two senses of art which do not
obviously translate into two senses of nature (Lennox 2008, 176-177). Art is, for
Aristotle, both a goal-directed efficient cause and a body of knowledge (in Aristotle’s
terminology, an ἐπιστήμη). At least in some cases, it is not clear why he thinks the
analogy between art and nature as goal-directed efficient causes implies there should also
be similarities between art (as a form of knowledge) and natural science. If, as he says, “art
imitates nature,” why would that lead us to think that knowledge in the arts in general

9

In response to the question of which artistic process to use as a model, Devin Henry suggests (personal
communication) that, from evidence in the History of Animals, Aristotle seems to appeal to apparent
similarities, i.e., observation, to justify using art as a source domain from which to understand nature by
analogy.

10

Lloyd (1996), Aristotelian Explorations, 83-103.
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should imitate natural science? If anything, it seems the claim should be the other way
around: if Aristotle thinks artistic forms of knowledge imitate natural science, then
natural science should be used as a model for inquiring into artefacts (Lennox 2008,
177). 11
One way to approach these puzzles is to compare Aristotelian natural teleology with
Plato’s artistic teleology. Most scholars agree that, when Aristotle characterizes nature
like an art, he is responding to the teleological account of the cosmos in Plato’s
Timaeus, 12 and an important difference in their views of teleology is how they
understand the relationship between art and nature. For Plato, art (specifically the art of
the cosmic demiurge) is prior to generated natural things (Timaeus 27d-29b, 46d-e; cf.
Laws X 892b-c), while for Aristotle, it is the other way around. In natural generation,
the principle or cause of change is internal to the thing being generated (Physics II 1,
192b20-23), while in artistic production, the principle or cause is external to the
product. Thus, even if Aristotle occasionally uses language which might be suggestive of
a craftsman-like nature, this language should be taken metaphorically (Henry 2013).
Instead, we might think what Aristotle is doing is refining Plato’s mythical account in

11

At the level of application, Lloyd has argued that, while the general concept of “cooking” or “concoction”
(πέψις) helps Aristotle find connections among different phenomena, its weakness lies in the generality
which suggested those connections: “the connections [Aristotle] apprehends run ahead of the theoretical
explanations he can offer.” Lloyd (1996), Aristotelian Explorations, 95 At the level of justification, however,
the analogy plays an important didactic role in making the causal structures Aristotle thinks exist in nature
more explicit. Cf. Lennox (2008), “Aristotle on a Single Science of Nature”, 181-183. Also, Leunissen (2010),
Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature, 16-17.
12

For example, Lennox (2001), “Unnatural Teleology”, Menn (1995), Plato on God as Nous, Furley (1996),
“What Kind of Cause Is Aristotle’s Final Cause?”, Falcon (2005), Aristotle and the Science of Nature: Unity
without Uniformity, Johansen (2004), Plato’s Natural Philosophy: A Study of the Timaeus-Critias, Sedley
(2007), Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity, Leunissen (2010), Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s
Science of Nature, Chapter Five, Henry (2013), “Optimality and Teleology in Aristotle’s Natural Science”
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the Timaeus: language that suggests nature is art-like (or artefact-like) is a metaphor
Aristotle uses to express the fact that art is nature-like. 13 One way scholars think
Aristotle expresses this contrast is with the phrase, “art imitates nature.” 14
The idea that art imitates nature, however, is not Aristotelian in origin: its roots lie in
both the Hippocratic and Atomist traditions. This paper is an attempt to establish the
influence of this tradition on Aristotle’s method of inquiry in natural science in order to
show that the dictum “art imitates nature” is not meant to imply a commitment to
natural teleology. Instead, it is an epistemological claim about how the arts were first
discovered, and implies that the arts have discovered a method of systematic inquiry or
research (ζητήσις) into the natural origins of their methods. Thus, Democritus claims
“we are pupils of the animals in the most important things: the spider for spinning and
mending, the swallow for building, and the songsters, swan and nightingale, for singing,
by way of imitation” (DK 68B154). And the Hippocratic author of Visits claims “[the
patients’] nature is the doctor that cures illness [νούσων φύσιες ἰητροί]” to justify the
methods used in medicine by appealing to their discovery in nature (Visits, 6.5.1). I
argue that Aristotle uses this epistemological sense of “art imitates nature” in his attempt

13

Broadie (2007), Aristotle and Beyond: Essays on Metaphysics and Ethics, 85-100, especially 193-194, argues
that the analogy of art to nature presents nature as an idealized artist who never deliberates and rarely makes
mistakes, although she thinks Aristotle’s views on art are determined by his views on nature, rather than the
other way around. She concludes, “when nature is compared to craft, it is the first that prescribes what the
second must mean in this alignment.”
14

Johnson claims that the target is Plato, particularly Laws X, where Plato claims art is prior to nature and
chance (889b). “While Plato thinks that nature and natural causes are secondary to intelligence and art,
Aristotle holds that the existence of art as a cause for the sake of which confirms that nature is a fortiori a
cause. This is because art imitates nature, or fills in where nature leaves off.” Johnson (2005), Aristotle on
Teleology, 123. Leunissen is skeptical that the model of the arts is used to justify Aristotle’s natural teleology,
since art is ontologically dependent on the teleology of nature; instead, she thinks the claim serves a didactic
purpose. Leunissen (2010), Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature, 16-18. On these issues,
see also Lennox (2008), “Aristotle on a Single Science of Nature”, 181-183.
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to motivate a method of inquiry in natural science. To establish this claim, I will first
look at how the idea that art imitates nature was used by Hippocratic authors to justify a
method of inquiry in the arts, and how that method of inquiry was adopted by Plato as a
way to motivate a scientific rhetoric in the Phaedrus. I will then turn to the phrase in
Aristotle. “Art imitates nature” appears three times in Aristotle’s extant treatises: once
in Meteorology, and twice in the Physics. 15 I will apply the results of the study of the
Hippocratics and Plato to these three uses. But, before I begin, I want to give a general
characterization of art as it was understood in the fifth and fourth centuries, and show
what aspect of art was adopted by Aristotle as a model for a theoretical science of nature.

4.1

Art as Inquiry

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle says that “every science seeks [ζητεῖ] certain principles and
causes concerning each of the things known by it, e.g. medicine and gymnastics and the
rest of the sciences, productive [τῶν ποιητικῶν] and mathematical [μαθηματικῶν]”
(Metaphysics K7, 1063b35-1064b3). 16 Similarly at the beginning of the Physics, he says
“in all disciplines [τὰς μεθόδους] which have 17 principles, causes and elements,
knowledge, especially scientific knowledge [τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι], follows from an

15

It is found at Physics II 2, 194a21; Physics II 8, 199a17; Meteorology IV 3, 381b6. It is also found twice in
Iamblichus, Protrepticus (identified by as Aristotle) IX 49.3-51.6 (= During B13-14 = Rose 51R3); and once in
ps-Aristotle, De Mundo 5, 396b12.
16

Πᾶσα δ’ ἐπιστήμη ζητεῖ τινὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑφ’ αὑτὴν ἐπιστητῶν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ καὶ
γυμναστικὴ 1064a.1 καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἑκάστη τῶν ποιητικῶν καὶ μαθηματικῶν.

17

Ross (1953), Aristotle. Metaphysics, ad loc suggests, following Simplicius, that the antecedent of ὧν is an
implied but missing ταῦτα: τὰ ἔχοντα ἀρχάς, the things having principles, i.e., the objects of τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ
ἐπίστασθαι. It is not clear to me why the antecedent should not be τὰς μεθόδους, since there are some
disciplines that do not have principles, namely, the science of first principles. For more on Aristotle’s use of
the term μεθόδος, see Lennox (2011), “Aristotle on the Norms of Inquiry”, HOPOS: The Journal of the
International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1(1).
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acquaintance with them” (184a10-12). 18 The start of the Physics is Aristotle’s attempt to
motivate an inquiry “to determine things concerning these principles [διορίσασθαι τὰ
περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς]” (184a14-16), and one thing he is particularly interested in motivating is
the very possibility of natural science (ἡ περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμη), since this possibility was
sometimes doubted in the Old Academy. 19 However, he is more specifically trying to
motivate an inquiry into the principles of natural science, since, as he will go on to show
in the rest of Physics I, he does not think anyone has quite succeeded in finding them. 20
In the passage from the Metaphysics, he uses the examples of medicine and gymnastics as
obvious cases of sciences (ἐπιστῆμαι) which seek the principles and causes of what they
know, and it is worth asking why he thinks both the theoretical study of physics and the
art of gymnastics are both engaged in the same kind of kind of inquiry.
The development of the productive arts and theoretical sciences is useful here. Already
by the fifth century, τέχναι were understood to be highly specialized, though productive,

18

Ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει περὶ πάσας τὰς μεθόδους, ὧν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἴτια ἢ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ
τοῦ ταῦτα γνωρίζειν. Compare to the more “productive” sounding introduction to NE I 1, Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ
πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν,
οὗ πάντ’ ἐφίεται (1094a1-3).

19

Cf. Menn (1995), Plato on God as Nous, 60-62. The status of the Timaeus is a tricky issue. On the one hand,
it is clear Plato describes his account as an εἰκός μῦθος or “likely story”, and that Plato does not think of it
strictly as science (ἐπιστήμη). Then again, Plato does not think anything is strictly a science except dialectic
and perhaps mathematics. Aristotle, at any rate, does not suggest that what Plato was after in Timaeus is
different from what he is after in the Physics, and usually treats Plato’s views in Timaeus on par with the
Ionians and Democritus. When he attacks Plato in the Metaphysics I do not remember there being any sense
in which Aristotle is attacking the views Plato puts forward in Timaeus, which also suggests Aristotle agrees
that whatever physics studies, whether Aristotle’s or Plato’s, is importantly different from whatever is
studied by first philosophy, what Aristotle calls σοφία.

20

The relation between Physics I and the theory of demonstration in the Analytics is discussed in Bolton
(1991), “Aristotle’s Method in Natural Science: Physics I” in Judson, Ed., Aristotle’s Physics, a Collection of
Essays, 1-29.
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forms of knowledge. In his study of the historiography of τέχνη, Leonid Zhmud notes
four common characteristics of τέχνη:
1) τέχνη is meant to be useful; 2) each τέχνη serves a definite purpose:
medicine keeps one healthy, agriculture provides one with food, etc.; 3)
τέχνη is based on the knowledge of specialists who are in command of all
means necessary to their ends; and 4) each τέχνη can be transferred by
teaching; only that which can be transferred by teaching is entitled to be
called a τέχνη. 21
Zhmud, following earlier studies, believes that these characteristics describe a genuine
theory of science whose aim is productive, rather than theoretical, knowledge.” 22
However, the boundaries between theoretical and practical knowledge at this time are
fuzzy, and, in general, the newly-developing “theoretical” sciences of the classical Greece
arose from reflection on τέχνη and used it as a model for their own research. This has
recently been argued by Zhmud, who shows that by the fifth and fourth centuries, the
theoretical aspect of τέχνη began to emerge and come apart from the utilitarian or
productive one. It might be better to call it the methodological aspect, since it was the
τέχνη conceived of as systematic research that was adopted as a model by the new
sciences. In the fifth century, to the old Ionian sciences of astronomy (ἀστρονομία, from
νόμος) and geometry (γεωμετρία, from μέτριος), 23 the sciences of arithmetic (ἀριθμητική),
logistics (λογιστική), harmonics (ἁρμονική) were added, and in the fourth century,

21

Zhmud (2006), The Origin of the History of Science in Classical Antiquity, 46.

22

Zhmud (2006), The Origin of the History of Science in Classical Antiquity, 47, 48n14, who notes that the
τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη are, generally, not distinguished in Plato’s dialogues.

23

Aristophanes (Nubes ll. 201-3) explicitly mentions these as disciplines taught in the “Thinkery.”

122

mechanics (μηχανική) and optics (ὀπτική) follow. 24 These sciences are conceived of as
τέχνη (e.g. ἡ ὀπτική τέχνη), not as productive, but theoretical.
When, at the beginning of his theoretical investigation into the causes, principles and
elements of natural science Aristotle calls the discipline ἡ περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμη (Physics I
1, 184a15), he refers to it as ἐπιστήμη explicitly to indicate he has more in mind than
simple ἱστορία (or research), which Aristotle thinks only states the facts that need to be
investigated, and which is the kind of investigation he thinks many of the Presocratic
physicists undertook. Elsewhere, however, especially in the Metaphysics, he explicitly
refers to physics as ἡ φυσική or ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιστήμη. I have found no sources before
Aristotle where the term “φυσική” means a body of knowledge or a discipline. 25 Clearly,
he does not mean that physics is a productive science; but, it is also clear that he is
thinking of science in terms of τέχνη, and that he is either appropriating or extending
the theoretical aspect of τέχνη as he understands it to the study of the natural world.

24
25

Zhmud (2006), The Origin of the History of Science in Classical Antiquity, 47.

The term φυσική in this sense is entirely absent before Aristotle, and I am almost sure it is either his
invention or others around the Old Academy. Variants of φυσικός,ή,όν are almost completely absent as well.
The earliest reference I have found is the first cited by LSJ: Xenophon Memorabilia 3.9.1, where Socrates
asks if courage is διδακτὸν ἢ φυσικόν. A TLG search agrees with LSJ that the term is not in Plato. There is
nothing of it in Diels-Kranz fragments of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, or Democritus, although it occurs
regularly in testimonia. The only other authors who make use of it, very infrequently, are the Hippocratic
writers. It is found once in De mulierum affectibus, 230.68: Πειρῶ δὲ φυσικὸς εἶναι (“try to be natural”). In Peri
hemdomandōn, 50.18, we find αὐτὴ ἡ ὥρη ξυμμαχῇ τῇ νούσῳ, οἷον καύσῳ θέρος, ὑδρωπικῷ χειμών· ὑπερνικᾷ γὰρ
τὸ φυσικόν (“[the situation is dangerous] when the season itself fights along with the disease, like summer
with fever or winter with dropsy: for τὸ φυσικόν completely prevails”). And in Epistulae, 2.3 Τὰ φυσικὰ
βοηθήματα οὐ λύει τὴν ἐπιδημίην λοιμικοῦ πάθους (“Natural cures will not free a place from a pestilent
disease”). The author goes on to say that nature heals natural illness, while epidemics require art.) Mansfeld,
based on Hellenistic and Theophrastean terminology, dates Peri hemdomandōn to 400 BCE at the absolute
earliest, and almost certainly not written before 350 BCE. See Mansfeld (1970), The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract
Περι Ἡβδομαδων Ch. 1-11 and Greek Philosophy, 52.

123

That he calls this science φυσική suggests he is continuing a tradition that conceived of
theoretical knowledge along the lines of the theoretical reflection on τέχνη. 26
Of course, Aristotle adopts or coins names for many sciences that are not obviously
productive using this technical convention, notably practical science (πρακτική knowledge of how to act) and first philosophy (knowledge of separate, immaterial
objects, what he sometimes calls θεολογική or the highest form of θεωρητική, although he
does refer to all forms of reflective knowledge as θεωρητική, cf. Metaphysics E 1,
1025b19). It would, of course, be a gross oversimplification to say that Aristotle is
conceiving of all sciences as simply instances of τέχνη. 27 My point, however, is not that
Aristotle is conceiving of these disciplines as τέχνη in the productive sense, but that what
he thinks an ἐπιστήμη or science is, is something that developed from the kind of
reflection on the world that was done by those who developed the arts. Aristotle
explicitly acknowledges this. In his cultural history at the beginning of Metaphysics A, he
sees science as progressing through stages, where the necessary τέχνη which produced
means for survival developed first, followed by the arts for producing pleasure, and
finally the theoretical disciplines, which were concerned with knowledge itself (980b26981b24). And while theoretical knowledge is not itself productive, he nevertheless
identifies what aspect of τέχνη he thinks is common to all sciences: “every science seeks
[ζητεῖ] certain principles and causes concerning each of the things known by it.”
Aristotle sees the general characterization of τέχνη as an inquiry (ζητήσις) into the causes

26

Metaphysics 1005b2, 1025b19, 1026a36, 1026a12, 1026a19, 1064a31; On the Parts of Animals 641b1; he
will also use φυσική to describe processes that are natural, as opposed to artificial [τεχνική], again on the
model of the arts.
27

Similarly in English: biology and eulogy are not both sciences; pathology, technology, methodology—these
sometimes refer to the study of a particular subject (of disease, of tools, or of methods), and sometimes to the
subject itself (diseases, tools, and methods).
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and principles of a specialized subject matter (πραγματεία) as something common
between art and science.

4.2

Hippocratic Theories of Art

The notion of art as a method of inquiry developed in the course of fifth century, in part
among the Sophists, but also among the Hippocratic authors who were attempting to
clarify the method that medical inquiry should follow. 28 The discussion arose in the
context of debates about the role of luck and art in medicine. Many of the doctors were
engaged in a kind of public relations programme to demonstrate that medicine was, in
fact, a τέχνη and that their results, when they had any, were not the result of luck (τύχη)
but of the art. The author of On the Places in Man argues that “the man who has this
understanding of medicine [ἰητρικὴν ἐπίσταται] least depends on luck [τύχη]” and “all
medicine has advanced, and its finest established techniques seem to have very little need
of luck”(On the Places in Man, 46.2-4, tr. Schiefsky). Luck is self-ruled (αὐτοκρατὴς) but
“ungovernable, and it is not its way to come in response to one’s wish, but knowledge
[ἐπιστήμη] is governable and brings success [εὐτυχής] when the one with knowledge
wishes to use it” (On the Places in Man, 46.6-7, tr. Schiefsky). Art and knowledge differ
from luck insofar as what results from knowledge exhibits a regular connection between
cause and effect, while none of the results of luck do. 29 The author of On Ancient
Medicine continues this kind of argument claiming, if medicine were not an art, all
doctors would be equally bad and “all the affairs of the sick would be governed by chance

28

I will not speak directly about the development of τέχνη among the Sophists. See, Zhmud (2006), The
Origin of the History of Science in Classical Antiquity, Chapter 2; Schiefsky (2005), Hippocrates, on Ancient
Medicine, 36-37.
29

Schiefsky (2005), Hippocrates, on Ancient Medicine, 7.
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[τύχῃ] (On Ancient Medicine, 1.2, tr. Schiefsky); as it is, “[s]ome practitioners are bad,
while others are much better” which we would not expect to find “if medicine did not
exist at all and if nothing had been examined or discovered in it” (ibid). The author’s
point is not merely that some doctors are good and some doctors are bad, but that the
doctors who are good are able to produce regular results in virtue of their art or
knowledge.
In the context of asserting that the doctor’s art and knowledge differentiated the results
of medicine from those of luck, some Hippocratics began to ask what this art was. One
of the clearest examples of this kind of discussion appears in On Ancient Medicine. The
author is trying to prove that medicine has discovered [εὑρημένη] a principle and a
method [καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὁδὸς εὑρημένη] (On Ancient Medicine, 2.1, tr. Schiefsky), not only
for applying medical treatment, but for discovering new treatments. He claims the
method of medicine is ancient, and was discovered in the course of learning which foods
were conducive to health and which were harmful. 30 He opposes this to the method
proposed by new doctors who, assuming “newfangled hypotheses [κενῆς αὐτέην
ὑποθέσιος]” like the principles of Empedocles’ system, try to ground medicine in
principles that are ultimately unverifiable [τὰ ἀφανέα τε καὶ ἀπορεόμενα] (On Ancient
Medicine, 1.3, tr. Schiefsky). 31 The author and his opponents differ in what they take the

30
31

On Ancient Medicine 3.1-6.

He seems to have in mind the kind of explanation we see in On Fleshes. “About what is in the heavens, I
have no need to speak, except insofar as is necessary in order to explain how man and the other animals are
formed and come into being, what the soul is, what health and sickness are, what in man is evil and what
good, and where his death comes from” (On Fleshes I, tr. Potter). The author continues by asserting three
basic “stuffs” – heat, which is immortal, all-perceiving and intelligent; earth, which is cold and dry; and air,
which is in between. He asserts that the cosmos began when a great cosmic vortex arose and began
separating out these elements. From this turbulence, most of the heat was separated and became the heavens,
while some remained below. In time, the earth began to dry out by the heat, and “the material left behind
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starting point of medicine to be, but the existence of a debate suggests they agreed an
appropriate starting point for medicine exists, and determining what this is, and what
the appropriate method is that proceeds from it, is subject to rational scrutiny.
Whatever method the art of medicine ends up following, it will be the kind of method
that allows the doctor to demonstrate that his results originate in art and not in chance.
To prove this, the doctor will need to show the method can establish a causal
connection between the practice of medicine and successful outcomes. 32 As Schiefsky
points out in his study of On Ancient Medicine:
To confront the claim that the successes of medicine were due to τέχνη,
not τύχη, it was necessary to do more than just point to successful results;
the doctor also had to be able to show that those results were actually due
to medical treatment. Hence he needed knowledge of causes, knowledge
which would enable him to explain and justify his practice and so
establish a direct connection between that practice and a successful
outcome—or explain why he was not at fault in cases of failure. The
importance of the concept of φύσις in this context results from the close
association between the notions of φύσις and cause. With φύσις was
associated the notion of the regularity of nature, the idea that phenomena
had natural causes that could at least in principle be discovered by human
beings and that were not due to arbitrary divine intervention. ...
Knowledge of φύσις brought with it the knowledge of causes, and hence
the ability to explain and justify medical practice. (Schiefsky, 10)

engendered putrefactions about themselves, which had the forms of tunics. Now what was heated for a great
time and happened to arise from the putrefaction of the earth as fat, and containing the least moisture,
quickly burnt up and became bones. That, on the other hand, which happened to be more gluey and to
contain cold could not be burnt up on being heated or become dry, […] took a form rather different […] and
became cords and vessels.” Potter (1995), Hippocrates: Volume Viii, Places in Man. Glands. Fleshes. Prorrhetic
1-2. Physician. Use of Liquids. Ulcers. Haemorrhoids and Fistulas. Schiefsky (2005), Hippocrates, on Ancient
Medicine, 19-21 gives other examples of this kind of theorizing.
32

Schiefsky (2005), Hippocrates, on Ancient Medicine, 10.
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According to Schiefsky, the starting point of medicine for the Hippocratics was nature
itself. Some doctors will look to a more general conception of nature, like those who
take on the hypotheses of Presocratics, others, like the author of On Ancient Medicine
and On the Places in Man will start from human nature. Either way, starting with a
general grasp of the way nature operates, the doctor can justify his practice (why it was
successful in one case, unsuccessful in another) and also, since the principle is
sufficiently general, apply that knowledge in unfamiliar situations. Furthermore, since
this knowledge rests on general theories of human nature, as opposed to individual cases,
the method of reasoning from human nature to treatment is something that can be
taught. 33
One question faced by the author is trying to prove that medicine has discovered
(εὑρημένη) a principle and a method (καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὁδὸς εὑρημένη), not only for applying
medical treatment, but for discovering new treatments (On Ancient Medicine, 2.1). As a
method of inquiry (ζήτησις), τέχνη is a kind of systematic research, whose aim is the
discovery (εὕρησις) of new knowledge, skills or products. 34 The notions of inquiry and
discovery as sources of knowledge were also associated with two related pedagogical
instruments: learning and imitation (μάθησις and μίμησις).35 Earlier discoveries became
the objects of learning and imitation; and these concepts formed the basis of pedagogy.
Among the Sophists, especially, pedagogy was imitation, as they presented their students
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Schiefsky (2005), Hippocrates, on Ancient Medicine, 10-11

34

Zhmud (2006), The Origin of the History of Science in Classical Antiquity, 47.

35

The development of Greek education and culture (παιδεία) is complex. I am following closely two studies
on this subject: Jaeger (1957), Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture documents the history of culture in
Greece and, more recently, Zhmud (2006), The Origin of the History of Science in Classical Antiquity looks at
the historiographical tradition in antiquity, particularly the development of writing about the history of
τέχνη and science.
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with models (παραδεῖγμα) of speeches, and their students learned by literally copying
(μιμεῖται) these models with modifications to suit different situations. 36 Education as
imitation, however, has earlier roots than the Sophistical method of education. It also
served as a model for explaining the origin of arts and acquisition of new techniques. If
the only way to learn something new is through discovery or imitation, there must have
been someone who first discovered the art, who was then imitated by everyone else.
Before the fifth century, it was often claimed that humans learned the arts from gods,
different gods being assigned to different arts. But in the fifth and fourth centuries, this
mythological view came to be replaced by “rationalist” (but in many ways equally
mythical) accounts of the prōtoi heuretai—the first discoverers of some craft or
technique. 37 The first discoverer is a necessary condition for any account that assumes
knowledge is passed on by imitation. Both Plato and Aristotle, in trying to trace back a
specific discipline to its founder, are following a characteristically Greek tradition of
accounting for the origins of knowledge and culture on the model of imitation.
Many of the Hippocratics, however, explained the discovery of crafts not only through
imitation of a first discoverer or divine figure like Asclepius, but through the imitation
of nature itself. The author of On Diet almost makes a parody of the idea when he claims
that all the human arts arose from imitating human nature: “they use arts that are like
human nature, but they do not know, for the mind of the gods taught [them] to imitate
what is their own, knowing what they are doing but without knowing what they are

36

Jaeger (1957), Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, 286-331.

37

Zhmud (2006), The Origin of the History of Science in Classical Antiquity, 34-44.
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imitating” (On Diet, 11.2-3). 38 The author gives example after example of instances of
the bodily processes the arts imitate: forging iron tools is like physical training (11.13);
carpenters, by pushing and pulling saws, imitate the pushing and pulling of air in
breathing (11.16); everything from cooking (11.18) and building (11.17) to basketweaving (11.19). All are equally imitations of human nature. The connections the
author finds between the arts and nature seem incredible, but what does it mean to
describe the arts as imitations of natural processes? One thing it suggests is that the
author believes nature is intelligible: we have in some sense learned reliable methods of
production from nature, since we “know what we are doing” even if we do not attend to
the fact that these methods are reliable precisely because they are instances of things that
already happen in nature. It also suggests the author believes the reliability of technical
methods must be explained in terms of the regularity already present in natural processes
(11.10-12). 39 The author thinks, however, that the reliability of nature is not in need of
further explanation, because nature does not, like an artist, learn its techniques by
imitating anything else. Instead, “nature from herself knows these things” (15.7). 40
The hypothesis that nature is self-taught allows the author of On Diet to explain the
reliability of τέχνη on the grounds that nature is cause of regular effects. It might also be

38

τέχνῃσι γὰρ χρεόμενοι ὁμοίῃσιν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει οὐ γινώσκουσιν· θεῶν γὰρ νόος ἐδίδαξε μιμέεσθαι τὰ ἑωυτῶν,
γινώσκοντας ἃ ποιέουσι, καὶ οὐ γινώσκοντας ἃ μιμέονται.
39

The author grounds the regularity of nature itself in divine providence, claiming “the gods arranged the
nature of all things” φύσιν δὲ πάντων θεοὶ διεκόσμησαν· ἃ μὲν οὖν ἄνθρωποι ἔθεσαν, οὐδέκοτε κατὰ τωὐτὸ ἔχει
οὔτε ὀρθῶς οὔτε μὴ ὀρθῶς· ὁκόσα δὲ θεοὶ ἔθεσαν, αἰεὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχει (On Diet, 11.9-10). But he is primarily
interested in showing that it is because nature is regular that our arts exhibit the degree of reliability and
regularity that they do.

40

Ἡ φύσις αὐτομάτη ταῦτα ἐπίσταται. Thus, the author of Visits can claim that “[the patients’] nature is the
doctor that cures illness (νούσων φύσιες ἰητροί) (Visits, 6.5.1), and (ps?)-Epicharmus, when describing how a
hen knows to sit on her eggs, claims “nature alone knows how it is with this wisdom, for she has learned from
herself” (Fr.4).
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seen as an extension of the idea of τέχνη onto nature itself, as though nature were a kind
of artist, or the art itself. 41 Yet, more importantly it implies a commitment to the
intelligibility of nature, something the early Greek doctors could appeal to in order to
defend their craft against those who claim their results are no more than luck. If the
causes operative in cases of health or disease could be shown to be intelligible, then it
made little difference whether or not they might ultimately be caused by the gods. So
long as they could be reliably discerned and understood, they could provide an adequate
foundation for medical techniques. The commitment to the intelligibility of nature is
what allows the author of On the Sacred Disease to claim the “sacred” disease is no more
or less sacred than any other. The author zealously attacks the “quacks” (ἀλαζόνες) who
he claims, because of their failure to discern true treatments, called the disease “sacred”
(ἱερῆς) in order to mask their ignorance (οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενοι) (On the Sacred Disease 1-2).
The author asserts that the disease has a nature (φύσις) and a cause (προφάσις), but one
people have failed to grasp because of their inexperience (ἀπειρίης) (On the Sacred
Disease 1.1-5). With experience, however, he thinks the doctor can find reliable
treatments, because the doctor will be able to discover its cause (αἴτιος). But this only
serves to emphasize the fact that the medical art, as an inquiry, relied on the assumption
that nature itself was a cause whose regularities were intelligible, and open to rational
inquiry. And the claim that “art imitates nature” is just the claim that the reliability of
productive methods in art presuppose that nature, as a cause, is a cause of intelligible
effects.

41

Jaeger (1957), Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, Volume 3, 27.
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4.3

Plato on Inquiry in Medicine and Rhetoric

Plato picks up these themes in a discussion in the Phaedrus. There, Socrates discusses
what method the art of rhetoric should follow, and one method he proposes is the
method of “Hippocrates.” Plato is using the discussion about method in medicine to
suggest that a similar method could be used to develop a scientific rhetoric. In the
dialogue, Socrates says that “the greatest of the arts [μεγάλαι τῶν τεχνῶν] (269e4)
requires speculation about nature [πέρι φύσεως] (270a1). 42 The method of
“Hippocrates” starts with an inquiry into human nature to discern what human nature
is, and how this nature regularly interacts with other things. Once these general causes
are uncovered, the method becomes something that can be taught.
Socrates wonders whether “the method [τρόπος] of medicine [is] in a way the same as
the method of rhetoric” (270a1, tr. Nehamas and Woodruff, modified). They are in a
way the same since in both cases “we need to determine the nature of something [δεῖ
διελέσθαι φύσιν]—of the body in medicine, of the soul in rhetoric. Otherwise, all we will
have will be an empirical and artless practice [μὴ τριβῇ μόνον καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ]” (270b4-6, tr.
Nehamas and Woodruff, modified). As we will see, Plato uses these terms in the Gorgias
to discredit rhetoric as an art, claiming instead that it is only a “knack” and the image of
justice. Justice is a true art which serves a corrective function for the soul analogous to

42

This might be taken to suggest the “Hippocrates” Plato has in mind is closer to the doctors the author of
On Ancient Medicine is arguing against. Jaeger suggests that Plato’s characterization of “Hippocrates’
method” is too general to determine direct antecedents in the extant Hippocratic corpus, but that the
method seems similar to the one presented by the author of On Ancient Medicine. See Jaeger (1957), Paideia:
The Ideals of Greek Culture, Volume 3, 22-23. I tend to agree with Jaeger, but I think we can also see that the
method in any case begins from the nature of the body, and both groups take it for granted that the nature of
the body is (in some sense) “reducible” to or explained in terms of what it is made from. Plato is also willing
to group Anaxagoras in with “Hippocrates”, since he thinks Pericles was the greatest orator because he
learned this kind of knowledge about nature from him.
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medicine for the body. Rhetoric, on the other hand, is something more like a kind of
pastry-making: it has the appearance of being good for the body without actually being
so. Plato’s concern in the Phaedrus, however is not to discredit rhetoric, but to motivate
the possibility of a “scientific” art of rhetoric. Thus, he applies to rhetoric the method of
inquiry he attributes to “Asclepius’ descendent”—a method of “thinking systematically
about the nature of anything [διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ὁτουοῦν φύσεως]” (270d1) to show, on the
model of the medical art, what rhetoric would be like if it were truly an art. The method
he has in mind, however, is not a method of productive rules, but a second order
investigation into the principles of medicine itself, which must be carried out if “we
intend to become experts [τεχνικοί] and capable of transmitting our expertise” (270d2).
Socrates says:
Isn’t this the way to think systematically [διανοεῖσθαι] about the nature of
anything? First, we must consider whether the object regarding which we
intend to become experts and capable of transmitting our expertise [αὐτοὶ
τεχνικοὶ καὶ ἄλλον δυνατοὶ ποιεῖν] is simple or complex. Then, if it is
simple, we must investigate its power: What things does it have what
natural power of acting upon [τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκεν εἰς τὸ δρᾶν ἔχον]? By
what things does it have what natural disposition to be acted upon [τίνα
εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ]? If, on the other hand, it takes many forms, we must
enumerate them all and, as we did in the simple case, investigate how each
is naturally able to act upon what and how it has a natural disposition to
be acted upon by what [τί ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἢ τῷ τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ].
(270c10-d7 tr. Nehamas and Woodruff, modified)
It is clear from other dialogues that Plato is critical of the kinds of objects the
Presocratics (or some of the doctors) decided to become experts in, since the kinds of
things they bother about cannot be sources of order in things. In the Phaedo most
notably, Plato raises problems for Presocratic claims that the order of generation and
perishing, and of natural things in general, can be attributed to material causes alone,
since these causes cannot account for the order of the things they compose (Pheado 98d99d). Instead, he posits Forms and souls which participate in forms as sources of order
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(Phaedo 100b-106b). 43 Plato’s intention in the Phaedrus, however, is not to say that
Anaxagoras or “Hippocrates” were correct in the choice of their principles; rather, they
were correct in assuming that any art needed to determine what those principles were if
it was to be successful. This kind of inquiry, which an art must engage in to justify its
practical methods, is one that describes the causal relations among those principles. In
the case of medicine, it may be how the body reacts to different treatments, or even how
the hot acts on the moist (On Fleshes 1-3). Similarly, in rhetoric, the causal relations may
be among different kinds of souls and different kinds of speeches (Phaedrus 271d-e).
Whatever the subject of the art ends up being, those who want to be experts (τεχνικοί) in
their art, who want to produce regular results and teach the art to others, must be able to
discern the regular (here, efficient) causal connections and ground these connections in
the natures of those objects.
Plato also thinks there is a normative aspect to art, since the aim of an art is to produce
something and production requires an objective standard, a model, to serve as the goal of
the art. This is expressed more clearly in the Gorgias, where Plato’s aim is to show why
what the sophists call rhetoric is not an art at all. To show this, he distinguishes between
τέχνη itself and what seems to be one, but is more appropriately called a “knack
[ἐμπειρία] or “routine [τριβή]” (463b3-4). Like the discussion in the Phaedrus, Plato uses
medicine as his model for what an art should be like, and why, compared to this model,
the Sophists’ rhetoric is no art. He instead likens rhetoric to pastry-baking since, unlike
medicine, pastry-baking “has no account of the nature (τὴν φύσιν) of whatever things it
applies by which it applies them, so that it’s unable to state the cause of each thing. And
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See, e.g. Sedley (2007), Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity, Chapter 4, , Menn (2010), “On Socrates’
First Objections to the Physicists - Phaedo 95e8-97b7”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
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I refuse to call anything that lacks such an account a craft” (465a3-6, tr. Zeyl). 44 Plato is
trying to argue that a pastry-baker’s apparent skill at discerning which foods are pleasant
and which are not is a result of his experience of what foods in the past produced
pleasure and what foods did not. He may have learned recipes for some sweet foods from
a previous cook, or he may have reproduced models of pleasant pastries. However, the
pastry-baker does not know why one food is pleasant and another is not, nor could he
explain why to anyone. The doctor, on the other hand, could explain why something is
healthy: he knows why certain foods cause different reactions in the body, and he can
teach this. The condition something must meet to be considered an art is that it
possesses the kind of knowledge the doctor has about the nature of human beings. A
craft is whatever can state the causes for which it does what it does, where those causes
are grounded in an account of their nature and the nature they act on. A knack does not
meet this condition, because the success or failure of a knack does not rely on anything
objective to begin with.
Plato’s point, however, in making the distinction between pastry-baking and medicine is
not only to show that medicine has knowledge of the causes of health and disease. He
also wants to suggest there is a difference in kind among their respective ends. The aim
of the art of medicine is not just to know about the body, but also about health.
Medicine assumes the body has a best state [εὐεξίαν] (464a3), and its goal is to either
bring this about or maintain it. 45 Pastry-baking, too, has a goal, but it is not a goal based
in the nature of the body itself; rather, it is based on people’s perceptions of what tastes
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τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὔ φημι εἶναι ἀλλ’ ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ᾧ προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει ὁποῖ’ ἄττα
τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα.

45

464c4: ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν.
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good and what does not. Thus, it “pretends to know the foods that are best for the
body” but in fact, it only guesses, and “takes no thought at all of whatever is best”
(464c5-e2, tr. Zeyl). Of course, we could imagine a scientific pastry-maker who knows
about molecular cooking and why different esters cause different reactions on the
tongue. Plato might even allow that this kind of pastry production is truly an art, since it
knows the nature of the body and how certain foods cause changes in the body. This is, I
think, precisely Plato’s point. If the pastry-maker had such knowledge, he would no
longer be exercising a ‘knack’, but would be a doctor—although a perverted or vicious
one if he knew his products did not produce health and continued to produce them
anyway. Thus, in the Gorgias, Plato is making the normative aspect of productive
knowledge explicit, something that was not stated among the Hippocratics, and he is
grounding it in the nature of the things it produces or maintains. An art is a body of
knowledge that discerns regular causal connections, and it grounds these in the nature of
its objects of study; but it is also a normative kind of knowledge, which aims always to
provide care for the best state of its objects [ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν] (464c4).
But, more importantly for my purposes here, it is a method of inquiry that aims at
making new discoveries, and it is systematic insofar as it begins from certain general first
principles that guide inquiry in discovering causal connections among phenomena.

4.4

Aristotle: the Technical Model Applied to Physics

The theoretical aspect of τέχνη continued to influence Aristotle’s thinking about science
as a search for causes. By the time of the Metaphysics, Aristotle has already started to
distinguish productive sciences (ποιητικαί) from theoretical ones (θεωρητικαί). Yet he
still finds it important to remind his audience that they are distinct, and for this reason,
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he and refers to his Ethics for a more precise account of their differences. 46 Aristotle also
continues to follow Plato, and distinguishes τέχνη from experience or a knack
(Metaphysics A 1, 980b26-981a12), although the distinction is not as sharp in Aristotle
as it is in Plato. Aristotle thinks that with enough experience in something, a person is
likely to become technically proficient at it, perhaps even more proficient than someone
with only theoretical knowledge (Metaphysics A 1, 981a13 ff.). What Aristotle
maintains, however, is the belief that the person of experience can neither teach nor
make systematic progress, since any discoveries she makes will be accidental (981b14 ff.).
And in describing the project of the Metaphysics as an inquiry into the kinds of causes
and principles that wisdom itself will study 47, Aristotle is still thinking about ἐπιστήμη
on the model of τέχνη, and continuing in the tradition of seeking the appropriate causes,
but also, like Plato did for rhetoric in the Phaedrus, refining the method of inquiry so
that it is appropriate for each discipline. 48 What is appropriate for each discipline will
vary. Unlike some Academics, who tried to apply mathematical precision and methods
to many disciplines, Aristotle thinks “it is the mark of an educated man to look for
precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits”
(Nicomachean Ethics I 2, 1094b24 f.). And so, part of Aristotle’s project, whether in

46

Metaphysics A 1, 981b25-17: εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς τίς διαφορὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
τῶν ὁμογενῶν.

47

Metaphysics A 1, 982a4-6: ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ζητοῦμεν, τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον, ἡ περὶ ποίας αἰτίας καὶ περὶ
ποίας ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήμη σοφία ἐστίν.

48

On the departments of physics as kinds of inquiry, cf. On the Parts of Animals I 1, 645a21-3: οὕτω καὶ πρὸς
τὴν ζήτησιν περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ζῴων προσιέναι δεῖ μὴ δυσωπούμενον ὡς ἐν ἅπασιν ὄντος τινὸς φυσικοῦ καὶ καλοῦ.
“In this way as well we must approach inquiry into each of the animals without disgust, since in all of them
exists something natural and worthwhile.” On celestial physics as inquiry, see De Caelo II 1, 286a5. On the
study of the soul as inquiry, see De Anima I 2, 403b24. On physics in general as inquiry into sensible things,
see Physics III 5, 204a 35.
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physics or in ethics, is to show how his own method is a development and refinement of
the methods of his predecessors. and then to isolate the appropriate first principles of
these sciences at a general level, so that others can continue the work of seeking the facts
and working out the causal relations that account for them. Once the appropriate first
principles have been found, and the method refined, “it would seem that any one is
capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been well outlined, and that time
is a good discoverer or partner in such a work; to which facts the advances of the arts are
due; for any one can add what is lacking” (1098a22-26). 49 Rarely, however, does
Aristotle claim to be starting a new discipline; instead, he sees his own work as
perfecting or completing the advances made by others. 50
This leads to the other characteristic of τέχνη that continued to be associated with
ἐπιστήμη once the two notions began to come apart: ἐπιστήμη, like τέχνη, is teachable.
Unlike people who have experience, “in general it is a sign of the man who knows, that
he can teach, and therefore we think art more truly knowledge than experience is; for
artists can teach, and men of mere experience cannot” (Metaphysics Α 1, 981b8).
Sometimes teaching took the form of imitating the products of an expert. Notably the
method of education used by the Sophists and teachers of Eristic consisted in just this:

49
50

The same point is made at Sophistical Refutations 34, Metaphysics Α and α. See note below.

In Sophistical Refutations 34 he suggests that he thinks the whole development of syllogistic is, in fact, an
entirely new discipline, and this obviously has extensive implications for how he conceives of both acquiring
facts, giving definitions, and presenting demonstrations. However, logic seems to be the only discipline
which he claims to have invented. Even in Metaphysics, he prefers to think of himself as one of a line of
thinkers investigating σοφία and first principles. The doxography of Metaphysics A and the description of
progress in attaining truth in α1 might serve rhetorical purposes, but it is clear that Aristotle is one, if not the
first, philosopher to see his place in the history of thought. This view is developed in Jaeger (1957), Paideia:
The Ideals of Greek Culture, 3-7, and seems to influence the work of Zhmud (2006), The Origin of the History
of Science in Classical Antiquity, Chapter 4.

